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A MODEL FOR INITIATING CHANGE
IN LARGE SOCIAL SYSTEMS
Richard E. Ault, Ed.D.
Western Michigan University, 1977
The purpose of this study was to develop a model for
introducing change in large social systems.

The model was

based on (1) a review of existing models, and (2) the analysis of a participant-observer study of an attempt at intraducing large system change.

Organization Development was

the focal change modality examined.

It was intended that

the model thus developed would be of utility to the practic-

ing change agent in whatever field--education, social work,
community development, government, unions, business, or
industry.
From the review of existing models and related literature, it was concluded that a useful model for practitioners
would include consideration of the change agent, the client
system, the nature of the change, the process, and time.
Six months of a detailed case history of an attempt at
launching organization change was then presented, followed
by summary shapshots of the state of this organization change
process at two later time periods--the case thus encompassing
a total of 2-1/2 years.

The launch strategy used in the
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first 6 months was then assessed for its relative success,
and existing models reexamined to determine the extent to
which they helped explain or predict the level of success
of the launch strategy employed.
Based on this review and analysis, an integrative model
was developed which was characterized as two-dimensional,
nonrnathematical, dynamic, and analytic, and meeting the two
main criteria of utility and relative simplicity.

The model

integrated the concept of an s-curve rate of change with
Lewin's phases of change--unfreezing, change, refreezing-and five stages of change agent activity:

Scouting, Entry,

Conducting Trials, Managing Diffusion, and Fostering Institutionalization.

The first three of these stages--Scouting,

Entry, and Conducting Trials--were identified as the "launch
period," the focal point of this study, and guidelines for
change agent behavior were developed for each of these three
stages.

Finally, the model incorporated the concept of the

system, moving first to a state wherein it is increasingly
ready to adopt innovation and then on to a state wherein it
is increasingly adaptive with optimum boundary permeability
and mutuality of relationships.

Implications of the model

were discussed in relation to practice and research in the
field of educational leadership and other fields.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
This study represents an experiential attempt to under-

stand the process of change.

The author/investigator is a

professional "change agent," one who's job it is, as an
Organization Development consultant, to bring about deliberate and intended change in organizations.

What follows is

the documentation of the first stages of one major change
attempt in which he acted as the primary change agent, as
well as an attempt to reflect systematically on that change
effort to see what he learned.

This learning is posited as

a model for initiating change in large social systems.
As the above would indicate, both the learnings--the
model--and the experiences on which they are based are very
important to the author on both a personal and professional
level.

However, it is also hoped that the study will be of

some importance to the fields of behavioral science and educational leadership, especially to those on either the giving
or the receiving end of the change process.

Perhaps the

author's personal feelings for the project will serve to
enrich the data available for future researchers more dispassionately interested.
In this chapter are given reasons why the study is
thought to be important to the field (Background and
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Rationale), what was intended (Purpose and Objectives), how
the study was done and why it was done that way (Methodology,
Scope, and Limitations), and some overview of what is to
come (Organization of the Dissertation) .
Background and Rationale
The following quote from Trist (1971) is the essence
of the rationale for this study:
Very little is known in social science about how
to bring about relatively rapid value change in
areas of central concern in large organizational
populations. Usually such value changes come
about very slowly--over a period of several years.
Unless we learn how to bring them about much more
rapidly, adaption to a faster change rate will
not be possible.
(p. 199)
It is the intent of this study to contribute to such learning.
Change is now a way of life.

To state that we are in

an era of rapid change is to state the obvious--a truism on
its way to becoming a cliche.
truth is to be redundant.

To detail evidence of this

To say that learning to cope with

change is a critical set of skills is to be trite.
"Change is the biggest story in the world today"

(Ben-

nis, 1969, p. 1), and it is affecting all institutions-corporations, unions, communities, governments, schools and
universities, societies, and even the international order.
And, added Bennis, "We are not coping with it adequately"
(p. 1).

Gardner added:

What may be most in need of innovation is the
corporation itself. Perhaps what every
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corporation (and every other organization) needs
is a department of continuous renewal that could
view the whole organization as a system in need
of continuing innovation.
(Bennis, 1969, p. 2)
"Every other organization
tutions.

11

includes educational insti-

Educational systems need change just to keep up

and educational leaders find themselves in an "innovation
predicament" faced with the pressure to innovate on the one
hand and, on the other, with resistance to the introduction
and implementation of innovation while armed with only
inadequate empirical knowledge of the process of change and
innovation (Peets, 1970, pp. 1-2).

The very use of the term

"educational leadership," as opposed to

11

school administra-

tion," suggests bringing about changra in education rather
than maintaining the

11

status quo."

Yet, while change is occurring in or to all of our
social systems, much of it is neither deliberate nor planned.
Much organizational change--whether, for example, in schools,
communities, or corporations--is reactive in nature.

That

is, the organization changes solely as a reaction to outside
pressure--from such forces as legislation, economic conditiona, consumer groups, changing cities, and changing work
or student populations.

This reactive approach to change is

not the sort of internal, proactive approach suggested by
Gardner in his call for a

11

department of continuous renewal. 11

Such a function is attempted, however, by departments
of Organization Development (OD) now established within many
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organizations.

Organization Development as a function is,

in a way, both a response (or reaction) to the increasingly
rapid rate of change as well as a vehicle for proactively
and deliberately causing change to occur.
used as a modality for producing change
while at the same time

11

11

It is

11

Widely

(Nielson, 1977),

is a response to change, a complex

educational strategy intended to change the beliefs, attitudes, values, and structures of organizations so that they
can better adapt to new technologies, markets, and challenges,
and the dizzying rate of change itself 11

(Bennis, 1969, p. 2).

It is a planned process for increasing organization effectiveness and health through interventions based on behavioral
science knowledge (Beckhard, 1969) .
As a specific approach to organizational change, Organization Development is a subject of analysis of this study.
Brimm (1975) distinguished between studies of organization
change in general and Organization Development in particular
as follows:

11

While numerous studies and analyses have sought

an understanding and conceptualization of organization
change, OD is concerned with the active task of changing
organizations .. (p. I-1).

He further suggested that this

"nuance of language 11 causes OD to be a desirable focus of
study because,
• • . first, there is a currency to the theory and
practice of OD. While people have designed and
altered organizations throughout the social history
of man, current efforts are generally subsumed under
the label of organizational developrr.ent . . . •
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Secondly, interest in the active task of changing organizations provides a basis for bridging a
theoretical analysis to its practical implications.
(pp. I-1-2)
In this latter case, the author shares with Brimm his
preference for "conceptual analyses which have direct implications for understanding and acting upon events of the
immediate world"

(p. I-2).

Moreover, while very much in currency, the enthusiasm
for this "nouvelle vague"

(Kimberly, 1977) is matched by

"relatively few examples which systematically assess the
impact or effectiveness of OD in producing change"
1977).

(Nielson,

Some few models for social system change exist based

on the more general research into the change process (Beckhard, 1969; Dalton & Lawrence, 1970; Greiner, 1967; Havelock,
1970,1971; Rogers, 1962; Rothman, 1974; Watson, 1969), but
even fewer represent research on OD as the approach to change.
More scarce yet are studies, or models based on empirical studies, of change agent behavior in the change process,
especially when the change agent is an OD consultant.

Man-

agers who function as change agents are included in some
models (Dalton, 1970; Greiner, 1967) as are agricultural
extension agents, Peace Corps workers, and medical workers
(Rogers, 1962) or teachers and school administrators (Havelock, 1970, 1971) but not, for the most part, OD consultants,
and especially not those located internal to the organization.
This, despite the fact that "since 1965 we have seen a rapid
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increase in the development and use of internal consultants.
• • • Organization development consultants and others have
become an internal source of help to organization problem
solvers.

• . . But effective consultation is not a simple

process.

Organization managers, as well as consultants,

find it difficult to know why so many consulting situations
seem ineffective''

(Lippitt & Lippitt, 1977, pp. 129-130).

Perhaps O'Connell (1968) summed up best:
Obviously it is too early for a general theory
of organizational change. The social scientists
involved can have faced only a narrow range of
situations in application of their somewhat
restricted techniques. Only very recently have
participant-observer and nonparticipant-observer
studies of such projects appeared in the literature.
It will be some time yet before social
scientists not directly involved will have data
rich and complete enough on which to base a general theory. While social-science practitioner
and management-consultant practitioner have just
recently begun some formal dialogue in search of
mutual enlightenment, to the researcher's knowledge,
no careful study exists in the literature of the
professional management consultant at work assisting a client in organizational change. This gap
in the literature--in large measure explained by
the consultant's professional and commercial
responsibility to his clients--stands in the way
of theoretical development of the field of organizational change. The persons having the most
experience with organizational change have not
enriched the literature with their experiences
nor have direct observers been present to record
such data. Only when the empirical record shows
a range of studies of many kinds of change agents
at work in many different situations will theoriz-

ing be well founded.

(p. 2)

This study is intended to fit into the literature gap
described and to add

t~

the richness of that empirical

record.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Purpose and Objectives
The purpose of this study will be to document an attempt
at introducing social system change and to develop a model
for OD consultant behavior in initiating change in large
social systems.

The model will be based on a review of

.existing models and on the documentation referred to above
in the form of a participant-observer study of one attempt
to initiate change in one such system.
There are three specific objectives in this study.
First, the desire to add to the empirical base in the field
of organization change and more specifically Organization
Development.

As O'Connell (1968) suggested,

11

Clinical case

studies are a necessary preliminary step in scientific
progress in this area"

(p. 14) .

The second and third objectives are intended to further
underst:mding of change based on this empirical knowledge.
The second objective is to analyze the relative success or
lack of success of the change effort described (especially
the critical initial or launch phase to be defined in the
section on methodology) in light of existing models.

Finally,

to meet a third objective, general conclusions about the
initiatory stages of the change process are conceptualized
in the form of a model.
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Scope and Limitations
The study consists of a participant-observer case
description, an analysis of that description, and a model
for initiating change.

Chapter III will discuss the methodol-

ogy in detail, but because of the nature of participantobserver studies in general and, in particular, one in which
the observer is a very active participant--in fact, one of
the key subjects of the observation--probably more than a
cursory note on scope and limitations is necessary.
The author was the key change agent, the primary OD
consultant, involved in this case.

His activities are

described for a 6-month period in attempting to initiate an
OD change process in General Motors-Holden's Pty. Limited,
the wholly owned Australian subsidiary of the General Motors
Corporation.

A further summary of the state of the change

process 6 months later and 2 years later is provided.

These

latter data will come from the author's records, company
records and documents, and from reports of an OD consultant
who succeeded the author on the project.

The analysis will

be based on, and the model inferred from, the author's experiences in interaction with others from this organization as
well as on a review of existing literature and models.
The limitations on a study of this nature are many, but
many advantages exist which are often overlooked.

After

making a strong case for field research in general, Bouchard
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(1976) said:
In spite of the law esteem in which participant
observation is held by the scientific community,u
it is worth noting that a number of the classic
studies in industrial and organizational psychology are based on this methodology (Blau, 1963;
Dalton, 1959; Gouldner, 1954; Selznick, 1949).
This much maligned method • • • has strengths
which compensate for the weaknesses of other
methods.
(p. 385)
11

Three advantages he cited are focusing the research on actual
behavior rather than on interview or test-taking behavior;
forcing the researcher to look at the integrated wholeness
of the system; and putting the investigator in the "context
of discovery" (p. 385), or what Merton called

11

the seren-

dipity pattern of social research," referring to "the fairly
common experience of observing an unanticipated, anomalous
strategic datum which becomes the occasion for developing a
new theory or extending an existing theory'' (Bouchard, 1976,
p. 385).
O'Connell (1968), as cited earlier, referred to the
need for clinical research in advancing science in this area,
and this study is certainly, at least in part, a case of
that--far removed on a continuum from laboratory-controlled
quantitative methodologies.
Ideals of researcher objectivity, neutrality or
independence are effectively precluded by organizational membership. Standards of replicability
and experimental control are foregone as the
researcher becomes part of the studied system's
evolving history. However, the sacrifice of these
attributes • • . appfars to bene greater than in
other methodologies ~ social' science research[emphasis mine].
[In regard to replicability]
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studies of on-going social systems preclude traditional scientific rigor in an inability to control
sufficient variables and researcher contamination.
The researcher cannot return in time to readminister his survey questionnaire to the same sample!
The very fact of his previous administration of
the instrument and the passage of time creates an
alteration of conditions which may significantly
impact on findings.
(Brimm, 1975, pp. II-2)

Brimm made similar arguments regarding the criticisms
having to do with researcher bias, pointing to other studies
that either (1) cite bias factors in other types of "more
respectable" methodologies, or (2) argue for the advantages

of participant-observer studies.
This study, like many .others of its genre is based on
an N of 1, a single-case study, the underlying assumption for
which is that from the understanding of this one system's
experience valid inferences may be made to other systems.
Indeed, some classic studies already alluded have done just
that!

But this study has the added ingredient that it was

done in Australia, which, of course, in strictest terms may
limit it further.

However, it was the author's experience

that the issues found in the company in Australia were largely
the same as those he found in his consulting experience
before and since in hundreds of organizational units in North
America as well as in a broad examination of the literature
attesting to the experience of others in organizational
development.

What's more, Australian enterprise operates in

a Western, industrialized democracy similar to most cultures
in which research of that kind has been done.

Certainly

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

11

there were unique elements to this case as there are to any.
These will be pointed out in the case description and to
that extent the metaphoric nature of the case is limited.
However, these turn out to be relatively minor in the context of the overall study.
Finally, in addition to the limitations in all
participant-observer studies, this one has a very active
participant--a key actor in the drama--as the observer.
Despite the obvious exaggeration to the usual limitations,

exaggerated advantages can also be cited.

Johoda, Deutsch,

and Cook (1951) pointed out:
The importance of active participation for

research is not limited to assuaging suspicions,
establishing rapport, or enhancing the "naturalness" of the observer's position in the [system].
Its main function for research consists in opening
new avenues of understanding the [system]. Through
intensive participation in [the life of the system],
the observer exposes himself to experiences which
give him a firsthand knowledge of the more subtle
pressures and counterpressures to which members of
the [system] are exposed. His introspection about
his own experiences as ~ participant represen~
one of the most fruitful means ~ understanding
the [system's] characteristics [emphasis mine].
Moreover, active part1c1pat1on opens the door to
sources of information which would otherwise
remain closed to him.
A personal and introspective account is intended.

It

is hoped the limitations will be balanced by the richness
of clinical detail this might offer future researchers who
may have an interest in examining this case.
Two final quotes sum up the essence of the argument,
the first from Gouldner, the second by Darwin:
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Whether or not it should be, social theory is always
rooted in the theorist's experiences. Whether or
not it should be, the sensed validity of a theory
depends therefore upon the sharing of experience
and of the sentiments to which such experience
gives rise, among those who offer and those who
listen to the theory.
(Brimm, 1975, p. II-5)
How odd it is that anyone should not see that all

observation must be for or against some view, if
it is to be of any service.
p. 130)

{Johoda et al., 1951,

Organization of the Dissertation

There are nine additional chapters in this study.
Chapter II will review literature in the areas of the change

process, change models, "change agentry," and OD consulting
and adoption and diffusion of innovation as it applies to
this case.

While some historical perspective is provided,

emphasis is on recent literature.

Chapter III gives a

detailed description of the methodology, especially focusing
on participant-observer methods and

~odel-building.

The case

data for the initial 6-month launch period are presented in
Chapters IV through VII.

Chapter VIII provides the perspec-

tive of two later time periods, 6 months and 2 years after
launch.

An analysis of the case in light of existing models

makes up Chapter IX.

In Chapter X, a model for initiating

change in social systems is presented based on (1) a review
of existing models and (2) conclusions reached from the analysis of the clinical case data.

Chapter X suggests practical

implications for organization change and development in
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general and for educational leadership in particular, as
well as recommendations for further research.
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CHAPTER II
MODELS OF CHANGE:

AN OVERVIEW

The truth seems to be that we still know too

little about the way in which organizations
[are] modified. The simple question has not
been asked enough:

"Who does what, when,

where, how, with whom, and how often?"
(Guest, 1962, p. 153)

Introduction
The literature abounds with statements to the effect
that we need to understand better the process of change,
particularly how to cause planned change rather than react-

ing and, in Pelligrin's phrase, being
the pressures and demands of society"

11

buffeted about by

(Peets, 1970, p. 18).

Peets (1970) summarized much of the literature on change and
innovation as it applies to education and summed up with:
11

There seems little question that there exists great interest

in educational change .

.

• yet

change fails to take place 11

problems persist and

(p. 19).

There is a similar plethora of print decrying lack of
both sufficient knowledge (e.g., Guest, 1962: O'Connell,
1968: Rothman, 1974) and theory (e.g., Alderfer, 1976; Bennis, Benne, & Chin, 1969) of the change process in social
systems more broadly, including social welfare, communities,
and much in business and industrial organizations.

Bennis

14
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et al. (1969) stated flatly:
Unfortunately, no viable theory of social
change has been established. Indeed it is a
curious fact about present theories that they
are strangely silent on matters of directinf
and implementing change. What I part1cular y
object to • . • is that they tend to explain

the dynamic interactions of a system without
providing one clue to the identification of
strategic leverages for alteration. They are
suitable for observers of social change, not
practitioners. They are theories of change,
and not of changing.
(p. 64)
------

This study is meant to be of help to practitioners and
to contribute to, in Bennis' terms, a theory of "changing."
The outcome of this study is a model for initiating change
consistent with an Organization Development approach.

The

first step in building this model is the following review of
existing models and related literature.

First, very general

models of change are reviewed followed by models of adoption
and diffusion of innovation, organization change, and "change
agentry

11

or consulting for change, and overcoming resistance

to change.

Finally, there is a summary discussion of the

"state of the art" relative to change models.
General Models of Change
In a paper that focuses on changing in education, Chin
and Benne {1969) traced historically and attempted to classify conceptually "general strategies and procedures for
effecting change" {p. 32), even then, however, conceding that
they must limit their discussion to planned changes lest they

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

16

face the need to encompass vast quantities of the literature
of modern behavioral science.

They developed a typology of

strategies including (A) empirical/rational, (B) normative/
reeducative, and (C) power/coercive, and delved into the main
roots of each.

These are shown in some historical perspec-

tive in the model in Figure 1.

The authors did not suggest

that they are mutually exclusive strategies, although certainly some conflicting assumptions are at the base of each.
In common, however, they found "in all approaches to planned

change is the conscious utilization and application of knowledge as an instrument or tool for modifying patterns and
institutions or practice 11 (p. 33).
By their own admission, these authors made no attempt
to differentiate strategies by size or level of analysis
(individual, small group, organization, community, culture);
rather, they assumed that the process of change is the same
at any level or size and put their general focus on strategies
for individual change.

This would seem to ignore some of the

work of systems-oriented practitioners and researchers (e.g.,
Alderfer, 1976; Emery & Trist, 1965; Katz & Kahn, 1966).
Katz and Kahn (1966), for example, conclude that "systemic
change . . . is the most powerful approach to changing human
organizations" (p. 451).

There was, in the body of the Chin

and Benne paper, only the slightest recognition of the important stream of work and thought that has grown out of the
sociotechnical tradition--and no mention at all in the model
shown in Figure 1.
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Bennis (Barnes, 1969) listed seven change approaches
other than planned change (Indoctrination, Coercive, Technocratic, Interactional, Socialization, Emulative, and Natural)
and added his own typology in the planned change area:

expo-

sition and propagation, elite corps, human relations training,

staff, scholarly consultations, circulation of ideas to the
elite, developmental research, and action research (Bennis
et al., 1969).

Pointing out weaknesses of bias in each of

these approaches to change, they too concluded with a critique
of the lack of a systems approach.

In this same vein, Greiner

(1967) identified, from his review of the literature, seven
11

most commonly used approaches":

Decree, Replacement, StrU;c-

tural, Group Decision, Data Discussion, Group Problem Solving,
T-Group.

Both the Bennis and Greiner typologies emphasized

power distribution, as Barnes (1969) observed, and power
redistribution in the direction of broadly distributed and
mutually shared power mark much of the work in the field of
Organization Development.

A final typology offered here is

taken from Olmosk (1972), who described the seven approaches
he saw being used most often as "Seven Pure Strategies of
Change":

Fellowship Strategy, Political Strategy, Economic

Strategy, Academic Strategy, Engineering Strategy, Military
Strategy, Confrontation Strategy, and what Olmosk called the
Applied Behavioral Science Model.

He cautioned that they

seldom appear in their pure form, but did suggest that there
is typically a dominant strategy modified by one or two of
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the other approaches.

Olmosk 1 s descriptions are summarized

below:
l.

Fellowship

a.

Basic assumption.--If we have good warm interpersonal relat~ons, all other problems will be
minor.

b.

Inclusion.--Get everybody in.

c.

Influence.--Everybody equal.

d.

Perceptual approach.--Accepts all.

Shuts out

none.
e.

Emotional needs.--Warrnth, love and trust.

f.

Good

g.

Chronic problems.--Financial support. Actual
implementation of decisions. Matinaining long
run commitment.

h.

Questions suppressed.--What•s in it for me?

i.

Most often used by.--Churches. Volunteer organIZations:- GroupSwith limited power.

~---Mobilizing

Competence.

2.

initial energy.

Individual difference.

Political
a.

Basic assumption.--If all the really influential
people agree to do something, it will be done.

b.

Inclusion.--Get everyone in who possesses power.

c.

Influence.--Based on level and breadth of perce1ved power.

d.

Perceptual approach.--Stereotype. Ignore individual differences unless they relate to power.

e.

Emotional needs.--Control and attention.

f.

Good at.--Mobilizing power.
dec1siOns once made.

g.

Chronic problems.--Maintaining credibility.

Implementing

Fighting backlash.
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3.

h.

Questions suppressed.--Is my action consistent
Wlth my value system?

i.

Most often used eY---Those already in power.

Economic
a.

Basic assumption.--!£ we have enough money or
material wealth, we can buy anything or any
change we want.

b.

Inclusion.--Based on possession of marketable
resources.

c.

Influence.--Based on perceived wealth.

d.

Perceptual approach.--Materialistic.

e.

Emotional needs.--Control and rationality.
Good

g.

Chronic problems.--Maintaining change and/or
sat1sfact1on. Few people or groups have
unlimited resources.

h.

Questions suppressed.--Is it ethical?
feelings.

i.

4.

~---Implementing

f.

decisions once made.

Most often used by.--Corporations.

wealt~---

Most

The very

Academic
a.

Basic assumption.--People are rational. If you
present enough facts to people, they will change.

b.

Inclusion.--Based on possession of knowledge
and facts.

c.

Influence.--Based on specialized knowledge and
expert~se.

d.

Perceptual approach.--Analytical and detached.

e.

Emotional needs.--Autonomy and rationality.

f.

Good at.--Finding causes.
information.

Presenting relevant

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

22
g.

Chronic problems.--Implementing findings.
Mob~l2zing energy.
Getting people to pay
attention or read reports.

Time consuming.

h.

Questions suppressed.--How do I feel about

i.

Most often used EY,. --Outsiders.

results?

How should results be used?
People in

staff positions.
5.

Engineering

a.
b.

Basic assumption.--!£ the environment or surroundings change, people have to change.
Inclusion.--Based on possession of technical
skills.

c.

Influence.--By changing structure or task

env2ronrnent.

d.

Perceptual approach.--Task relevance and
rationality-.---

e.

Emotional needs.--Rationality, clarity and
structure.---

f.

Good at.--Being aware of surroundings and/or
envirMment.

g.

Chronic problerns.--Gaining acceptance for change.
Deal~ng w~th unexpected consequences.
Time conFew people can control structure.

suming.

6.

h.

Questions suppressed.--How will people feel
about ~t?

i.

~often

used by.--Top management.

Confrontation
a.

Basic assumption.--If we can mobilize enough
anger and force people to look at problems
around us, the required changes will be made.

b.

Inclusion.--Based on ability to deal with and
use conflict.

c.

Influence.--By non-violent argument.

d.

Perceptual approach.--Narrow belief in

11

Truth."
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7.

8.

e.

Expres-

f.

Good at.--Forcing people to look at issues they
may not want to acknowledge. Gaining attention
and publicity.

g.

Chronic problems.--Finding alternatives.
Deal1ng w1th backlash.

h.

Questions suppressed.--Is anything in opponent's
argument worthwhile?

i.

Most often used by.--Revolutionary students.
Thep~ Un~on5:""

Military
a.

Basic assumption.--!£ we possess enough physical
force, we can make people do anything.

b.

Inclusion.--Based on possession of physical
power.

c.

Influence.--By fear of authority and threat of
punishment.

d.

Perceptual approach.--Exploit for use of power
structure.

e.

Emotional needs.--Control, status and security.

f.

Good

g.

Chronic problems.--Rebellion.

h.

Questions suppressed.--Who should
decisions? Is it 11 right 11 ?

i.

Most often used
vweithermen:n--

~---Keeping

order.

~.--Military.

can never relax.
11

really" make

Police.

Applied Behavioral Science
a.

Basic assumption.--Most problems are complex
and overdetermined. A combination of approaches
is usually required.

b.

Inclusion.--Based on including as many of those
effected as possible.
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c.
d.
e.

Influence.--Based on knowledge and the degree
to which the decisions will effect them.
Perceptual approach.--Eclectic but situation

centered.

----

Emotional needs.--Emotional and intellectual

integra tic~
~---Using

f.

Good

g.

Chronic problems.--Making itself understood.
Not appear1ng "wishy-washy ...

as much information as possible.

h.

Questions suppressed.--How should I 11 really 11
do it? Do you really know what you are doing?

i.

Most often used by.--Human relations consultants, organizatiOn development consultants.

All of the above typologies, as models, are interesting
and helpful at a descriptive level.

That is, they do provide

the student and the practitioner of change some understanding
of the range of options available in the strategic repertoire
and, in the discussion of the types, some understanding of
advantages and disadvantages, strengths and pitfalls.

How-

ever, they fall far short in providing useful action guidelines for either change agents or client systems.

Further,

as is in the nature of typologies, they lack synthesis or
even integration and the lack of a
already been pointed out.

11

systems approach 11 has

Most of all, however, the missing

element is the lack of any feel for process.
In the next two sections of this chapter, models will
be examined that focus on the process of change.
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Adoption and Diffusion of Innovation
A fairly rich vein of research is found in reviewing

studies of adoption and subsequent diffusion of innovations
by social systems.

"Adaptability" as a measure of school

system openness to change is part of a long tradition starting with Mort (e.g., Mort & Cornell, 1938) and continuing
with D. H. Ross (1958), Miles (1964), Carlson (1965), and
P. F. Ross

(1974).

Moreover, Rogers (1962) and his col-

leagues have done seminal work in this field in a broad
range of social systems covering a broad range of types
of innovations.
This field of study concerns itself with the communica-

tion and adoption of new ideas.
11

(1) the innovation,

nels,

( 3) over time,

Rogers 1 model included:

(2) which is communicated through chan( 4) among members of a social system"

(Rogers & Shoemaker, 1971, p. 18).
Like others in this general field, Rogers made no distinction as to the kinds of innovation being adopted or diffused.

The innovations studied included new consumer prod-

ucts, new medical practice, and the use by farmers of hybrid
corn, for example.

However, he did make some useful observa-

tions regarding the attributes of innovations as they are
related to adoption and diffusion.

He concluded, first,

that faster adoption will occur the greater the relative
advantage of the innovation.

In other words, how much better
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than present practice is the new practice?

Second, com-

patibility of the innovation with past experiences of potential adopters will affect the rate of spread.

The greater

the degree of compatibility, as contrasted with innovations
requiring major formation of new habits, the more rapidly
the innovation will spread.

Third, Rogers found an inverse

relationship between the adoption rate and the level of complexity of the innovation, that is, the easier the innovation
is to understand the more quickly it is adopted.

Fourth,

the divisibility of the innovation correlates directly with
the rate of diffusion, innovations that can be tried in part
or by part of the target population diffusing more rapidly
than those that must be accepted as a total package.

The

fifth and final attribute is how easily the innovation can
be explained or communicated.

The easier it is to show or

tell about, the more rapid the adoption.

Many of the above

generalizations, based on Rogers' extensive review of
research, support principles for overcoming resistance to
change by Watson (1969), which will be discussed later in
this chapter.
Organization Development, when considered as the innovation to be adopted and diffused, does not stand up well
with the above criteria.

Its relative advantage has some-

times been demonstrated, but sufficient numbers of "failure"
or

11

one.

no affect" have occurred that the picture is not a clear
For that matter, most

11

SUccesses" are ambiguous enough
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or the causal factors unclear enough to make even the relative advantage of the winners difficult to demonstrate convincingly.

The innovation can be made to be perceived as

compatible with t"lestern cultural values of fairness, egali-

tarianism, the "Golden Rule 11 (the general Judea-Christian
ethic); however, in many industrial organizations these
espoused values are not always the ones acted upon.

Implicit

values, such as production at any cost (especially human
cost), have been known to shape behavior in some organizations and, while OD can be seen as valuing increased productivity, it runs into conflict with

11

at any cost ...

Further,

OD as a "subset of knowledge and practice represents a distillation of theory and research 11 (Brimm, 1975, p. I-2) in
the field of applied organization behavior.

As such, it is

of sufficient complexity as to render it difficult to communicate easily--both attributes slowing the adoption/diffusion
rate.

It can be made somewhat divisible and therefore has

one out of the five in its favor.
Compounding the confusion somewhat is the fact that OD
is, in a sense, both the innovation to be adopted and the
process for adoption and diffusion.
In regard to the process, Rogers referred to communication through channels, over time, in a social system.

The

communication takes place between a source (e.g., an inventor,
a change agent, or an opinion leader) and a receiver (member
of a social system).

Channels include mass media and/or

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

28

interpersonal.

Effects of this communication include more

receiver knowledge regarding the innovation, a change in
his attitudes toward it, and eventual adoption or rejection.
The adoption process as outlined by Rogers included stages
of (1) awareness,

and (5) adoption.

(2)

interest,

evaluation,

(3)

(4) trial,

In a slightly different formulation, Have-

lock included four stages:
(3) trial, and (4) adoption.

(1) awareness,

(2) knowledge,

In regard to communication,

then, Havelock {1971)--largely backed up by Rogers--suggested

that stages 1 and 2 (awareness and knowledge) are most efficiently and effectively brought about through mass media
approaches, while the trial and adoption stages require personal contact with opinion leaders.
The stages occur over time, according to Rogers, at
differential rates for different members of the social system.

Figure 2 shows his classification system of adopters

based on how early or late they are likely to adopt the
innovation.

Table 1 shows characteristics of these cate-

gories based on Rogers 1 findings.

A second important aspect

of the time dimension is the shape of the diffusion curve,
indicative of the rate of diffusion.

Rogers, in investigat-

ing the cumulative diffusion level, found an s-shaped curve
to be the norm.

This is shown in Figure 3.

This represents

a prolonged introduction period, followed by a steeply rising
period of diffusion, followed by a leveling-off.
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Table 1
Summary of Characteristics of Adopter Categories (Rogers, 1962)
Salient
Values

Adopter
Category
Innovator

Early
adopter

Personal
Characteristics
Highest status;

Communication
Behavior

Social
Relationships

Contact with scien- Some opinion lead-

"Venturesome";
accepts risks;
scientific

wealthier; high

tific sources and

ership; very cos-

education

other innovations;
more impersonal
contacts

mopolitan

"Respect 11 ;
regarded by

High status;
above-average

Contact with local

Greatest opinion

local leaders

change agents;

leadership; localite; social parti-

others as role

education;

model

empathetic

Early
majority

11 Deliberate";
adopt only after
peers have
adopted

Above-average
status; aboveaverage education;
empathetic

Contact with local Some opinion leadadopters & change
ership; social
agents; many infor- participation
mal contacts

Late
majority

"Skeptical";
pressure needed
before adoption

Below-average
status & education; small
income; dogmatic

Secure ideas from
peers--less use of
media; little
activity in organizations

Little opinion
leadership or
social participation

Laggard

"Tradition"
oriented; fear
of debt

Lowest status;
lowest income;
oldest; dogmatic

Secure ideas from
neighbors, friends
& relatives; semiisolates

Very little opinion leadership or
social participation

cipation

w
0
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Figure 3.

Generalized Cumulative Diffusion Pattern
(Rogers, 1962).
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Rogers also found differing characteristics of the
social system itself to have differing affects on adoption.
Rothman (1974) summarized these well and added supportive
data from his exhaustive review of recent research in social
change.

He wrapped the findings into important generaliza-

tions and corollary action guidelines for practitioners.
These generalizations included finding high innovativeness
positively related to such target system characteristics as
.,a modern orientation 11 {p. 424), high socioeconomic status,

previous positive experience (and absence of previous negative experience) with innovations, felt need or discontentment, and supportive value orientations including "liberalism, scientism and non-authoritarianism" (p. 435).

Rothman

found size in and of itself not a determining variable, but
when large size is accompanied by greater organizational
slack (available resources) and the employment of more and
higher level professionals than small organizations, they
are more likely to adopt a larger number of innovations.
This is even more true of decentralized organizations.
Smaller organizations tend to adopt fewer innovations but
do so to a more intensive degree.

Rogers' general model as

presented by Rothman is shown in Figure 4.
In a similar vein, Peets (1970), in studying innovativeness in Michigan school districts, found positive relationships with system characteristics such as willingness to
expend a high level of money, high superintendent status,
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more open-minded administrators, younger and better
prepared teachers, and a high level of goal congruence
among different levels of the system.
In summary, the findings of this school of research can
be of immense help to a practicing change agent.

Neverthe-

less, they do not encompass the complete story.

Despite the

wide variety of researches from a fairly long tradition,
Ross (1974), himself a student in this mainstream with a
major interest in school district innovation, concluded:
It seems fair to say that the literature on organizational behavior in innovation adoption as compared with the work on behavior of individual
adopters, lacks consensus on even a few major conditions affecting innovation adoption, has not
worked with care on the indicators of adaptability,
and generally fails to test its observations using
models • • • relating environmental and internal
conditions to organizational behavior in adoption
performance.

(pp. 25-26)

Moreover, according to Chin and Benne (1969), this
tradition assumes "a relatively passive recipient of input
in diffusion situations 11 (p. 41).

They added:

A clearer view of processes of diffusion must
include the actions of the receiver as well as
those of the transmitter in the transactional
events which are the units of diffusion process.
And strategies for making diffusion processes
more effective must be transactional and collaborative by design.

(pp. 41-42)

In this regard, Sashkin (1974) described six approaches
to change, three of which he called "adoptive," and three of
which he called "adaptive."

The first category is in the

adoption/diffusion of innovation tradition, while the second
is aimed at helping

11

the client become more adaptable, more
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open to change, and able to change in needed ways

11

(p. 209}.

In the latter instance, the goal is to cause the target
social system to approximate more closely the characteristics
Rogers, in Rothman 1 s summary above, would use to classify it
as an innovative system.

This confounds further the dilemma

referred to earlier when OD is the innovation to be adopted
and the process for adoption.

We now add that a major goal

is to increase the adaptive capacity of the target system.
Finally, Bennis et al.

(1969) suggested, "As far as adopting

and acceptance, we already know a good deal.
know least about is implementing"

. What we

(p. 77).

The next section, an overview of organization change
models, puts the

11

receiver

11

in a more active mode and begins

to suggest implementation processes.
Organization Change
Perhaps the beginning of models of organization change
in contemporary social science is the now famous one by Lewin
(1958).

He identified three phases in the change process:

unfreezing, changing, and refreezing.

Lewin said the system

(or key members of the system) must first feel some pain, or
at least recognize the need to find a better way.
usually requires an unfreezing event or events.

This
The initia-

tion of a new idea, process, structure, technology, or fundamental new approach or approaches occurs in the change stage.
The refreezing stage is a period of consolidating new
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approaches and restabilizing.

This model has continued to

be useful for both students and practitioners and as a
general model has stood the test of time, research, and
experience.
Other early models focused on the what question:
is to be changed?
approaches:

What

Leavitt's formulation included three

structure, technology, and people; changes in

one or more of which, he said, would lead to changes in the
ultimate what, the task (Greiner, 1970).

After acknowledging

the existence of change goals such as better performance,
increased adaptibility, greater motivation, and the like,
Greiner and Barnes (1970) suggested two objectives underlying
all attempts at organization change:

"Changes in an organ-

ization•s level of adaption to its environment, and changes
in internal behavioral patterns of employees 11 (p. 2).

Alder-

fer (1976) came to much the same conclusion out of open systems theory, referring to boundary permeability and relationship mutuality as the critical system phenomena to be treated
in the change process, a healthy organization being one
characterized by optimally open boundaries and relatively
high levels of mutuality in internal and external relationships.
Likert (1961) developed a model based on the what question to which he added the important feature of

11

time lag.

11

According to this theory there are three sets of variables:
(1) causal--such as organizational climate and leadership
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behavior;

(2) intervening--such as communications, control,

decision-making, and motivation; and (3) end results--such

By

as productivity, costs, profits, and satisfaction.

making changes in the causal variables, Likert said, changes
will be affected in turn in the intervening and end result
variables.

However, the model holds, these subsequent

changes occur only after a lag in time.

Considerable time

may pass between the time a change is made in the causal
factors and the time that shows up in the end results.

How

much time, Likert says, is a function of the size and complexity of the organization, but his findings indicate a
3- to 5-year time lag in reasonably large, complex systems.
Since the main concern of this study is the process,
however, we return for a starting point to Lewin.

His model

introduced the fundamental concept of understanding change
as taking place in a series of stages.

Subsequent research

has supported this notion and expanded upon it.
Greiner, for example, examined a number of studies of
organization change--both failures and successes--in an
attempt to find common patterns.

In particular, he asked,

is there a common success pattern and a common failure pattern?

He found a common pattern of success, in fact, while

failure did not seem to have any pattern at all.

One might

say that the pattern of failure was that it was without
pattern.

The success pattern is shown in Figure 5.

Greiner

described the series of stages as follows:
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1.

The organization, and especially top management, is under considerable external and
internal pressure for improvement long before
an explicit organization change is contemplated. Performance and/or morale are low.
Top management seems to be groping for a
solution to its problems.

2.

A new man, known for his ability to introduce
improvements, enters the organization, either
as the official head of the organization or
as a consultant who deals directly with the
head of the organization.

3.

An initial act of the new man is to encourage

a reexamination of past practices and current
problems within the organization.
4.

The head of the organization and his immedi-

5.

The new man, with top management support,
engages several levels of the organization
in collaborative, fact-finding, problemsolving discussions to identify and diagnose
current organization problems.

6.

The new man provides others with new ideas
and methods for developing solutions to problems, again at many levels of the organization.

7.

The solutions and decisions are developed,
tested, and found creditable for solving
problems on a small scale before an attempt
is made to widen the scope of change to
larger problems and the entire organization.

8.

The change effort spreads with each success
experience, and as management support grows,
it is gradually absorbed permanently into

ate subordinates assume a direct and highly
involved role in conducting this reexamination.

the organization's way of life.

(pp. 124-125)

The sequence is not unimportant in that all success followed
this sequence while failure was characterized by a variety
of starting points and illogical gaps in sequence.
Clearly, in addition to focusing on sequence, the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

40

Greiner model also put emphasis on the use of power.

Greiner

found all successful change attempts characterized by the
use of shared power--as shown in the eight steps--whereas
failure was characterized by power use at either the unilateral end or completely delegated end of a power continuum.
Beckhard (1969) also examined the issue of success and
failure in organization development efforts and listed the
following conditions as necessary for success:
1.

There is pressure from the environment,

2.

Some strategic person or people are

3.

Some strategic people are willing to do a

4.

There is leadership (consultant, key staff

internal or external, for change.
"hurting."
real diagnosis of the problem.
man, new line executive} .
5.

There is collaborative problem identification between line and staff people.

6.

There is some willingness to take risks in
trying new forms or relationships.

7.

There is a realistic, long-term perspective.

8.

There is a willingness to face the data of
the situation and to work with them on changing the situation.

9.

The system rewards people for the effort of
changing and improvement, in addition to
rewarding them for short-term results.

10.

There are tangible intermediate results.

(p. 97)

Further, Beckhard (1969) listed conditions for failure:
1.

A gap between what top management says and
what it does.
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2.

A flurry of activities without a solid base

of change goals.
3.

Confusion of ends and means.

4.

Short time framework.

5.

No linkage between OD change efforts and
other units of change in the organization,
such as industrial engineering, training,

systems development, etc.
6.

Overdependence on either outside help or

7.

A gap between the effort at the top and
efforts in the middle of the organization.

inside specialists.

8.

11

New wine in old bottles"--i.e., trying to

fit a major change into an old structure.
9.

Confusing

11

good relationships" as an end

with good relationships as a

conditio~

10.

The search for "cookbook" solutions.

11.

Applying an intervention or strategy
inappropriately.
(pp. 93-96)

The conditions referred to by Beckhard are

11

sequence free,"

of course, in the sense that they may occur throughout the
change process.
Dalton's model, however, included again the important
series of stages element.

He began, in an attempt to under-

stand the experience in an organization change effort he had
been tracking as well as other cases reported in research,
with Lewin's familiar three stages, reworded them slightly,
and added a stage between unfreezing and changing.

Thus,

Dalton's (1970) four stages in the change process were:
1.

Tension and the need for change experienced
in the system.
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2.

Intervention of a Prestigious Influence

Agent (taken together, these two stages
constitute unfreezing).
3.

Individuals within the organization tested

out the proposed changes (Lewin S "change"
stage).
1

4.

New behavior and attitudes were either

reinforced and internalized or rejected
and abandoned (refreezing).
(p. 233)
Similarity can thus far be seen with the Greiner model.
However, Dalton (1970) discovered that, while this was the
core process in change, in the successful efforts several

"subprocesses 11 were at work at the same time,
simultaneously" (p. 233).

11

all moving

These four subprocesses all tie

to an overarching "micro" process underlying all the stages,
the micro process of

11

Social and personal lear.ning."

These

learning subprocesses are ''far more complex than merely
acquiring new cognitive or intellectual skills from a classroom lecture.

Rather, in instances where individuals are

successfully influenced to change their behavior, he found
that the self-esteem of those being influenced had often
been threatened, prior social ties were broken, new objectives were set with outside help, experimental solutions
were attempted, and, finally, increased self-confidence
resulted from successful and rewarding applications of new
behavior on the job

11

(Greiner, 1970, p. 7).

The dynamic

character of the four subprocesses is shown in Figure 6.
When these subprocesses are combined with the sequence in
the core process, a matrix model results as shown in Figure 7.
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Dalton's model was basically derived from a review of
five studies of relatively successful organization change
efforts.

However, he tested it further against instances

of individual and group change under such diverse conditions
as brain-washing or "thought-reform" in prisons to religious
conversion to recovery from alcoholism to psychotherapy.
An important contribution of the Dalton model was the

introduction of the concept of "the prestigious influencing
agent" as an essential stage as well as actor in the change
process.

Greiner's model also included

11

a new man, known

for his ability to introduce improvements" (p. 122).

However,

both derive from cases wherein this "influencing agent" may
have been a new top manager, a new staff or department head,
or a consultant dealing directly with the top manager.

(In

all cases, the consultant was external to the organization.)
Neither zeroed in on the unique role of the professional
"change agent, or, even more specifically in the present
study, the internal OD consultant.

The next section of this

chapter focuses on this role in the Organization Development
approach to change.
Organization Development and the Change Agent
During the last few years a new term, "organizational development," has been rapidly finding its
way into the organization charts of American corporations. Because of the recency of this phenomenon it is sometimes difficult to ascertain
the extent to which the activities carried out
under this title are old activities being carried
out under a new name or a new set of activities
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aimed at an old but increasingly urgent problem.
But one fact does emerge: there is an increasing
number of men in these organizations whose primary function is to foster change. This has

always been part of the job of a manager, and
often a significant part; but now there is an
increasing number of men in the organizations who
are essentially specialists in the process of
organizational change.
(Dalton, 1970, p. 230)

Why consider the subject of practitioner-change
agent roles? In a sense practitioner roles,
translated as specific behavioral modes of operation on the part of practitioners, are at the

heart of what may be termed intervention or
change agentry or practice.

An individual who

uses knowledge, technical skills, and sensitivity
in social interaction, with his own person as a
major and direct instrument of impact, often
plays a crucial part in professions and movements
aiming to modify patterns of social arrangements.
This implies that he must have a keen understanding of what roles to assume at what times and how
to execute these roles to achieve maximum effect.
(Rothman, 1974, p. 35)
Despite the above call for understanding, Rothman's
thorough literature search caused him to caution,

11

Practi-

tioner role performance is a fairly amorphous area in which
not many studies were found and in which there is an almost
total absence of conventional theoretical superstructure ..
(p. 31).

Since this is the case, this section relies pri-

marily on expository Inaterial with some reference to the
thin research available.

We will begin with a brief overview

of Organization Development and then focus in on the role of
the change agent or OD consultant in that process.
Organization Development was defined in Chapter

I

as a

planned process for increasing organization effectiveness and
health through interventions based on behavioral science
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knowledge {Beckhard, 1969) .

Typical "families" of interven-

tions include diagnostic techniques, survey-feedback-action
planning, team-building, intergroup techniques (and conflict

management generally}, job design, goal-setting and planning,
education and training, and open sociotechnical systems

approaches.

The behavioral science underpinnings of the OD

approach generally emerge from three mainstreams of social
science research and activity:
movement;

"(1) the laborabory training

(2) survey research and feedback methodology; and,

basic to both of these,

(3) the writings, efforts, energy,

and impetus of the late Kurt Lewin" (French & Bell, 1972,
p. 1).

To this list of three, others would add, as a separate

and important stream, the open systems stream represented by
people such as Katz and Kahn, Emery, Trist, Rice, and others.
These latter can be traced clearly to influences from General
Systems Theorists such as Bertalanffy and J. G. Miller.
Exactly where the term "organization development " carne from
or when it first was used is not clear, but there is fairly
widespread agreement that it was first coined by Blake,
Shepard, and Mouton in their work with a refinery in about
1956 or 1957 (French & Bell, 1972).

The process is various described, though the model by
Frohman and Kolb (Kolb, Rubin, & Mcintyre, 1971) is a fair
representation of a consensus (see Figure 8).

Their descrip-

tion of this model began to suggest the role of the OD consultant or change agent.
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Termination

Figure B.

The Process of Planned Change (Kolb,
Rubin, & Mcintyre, 1971).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

49
Frohman and Ko1b (Ko1b et a1., 1971) suggested that the
consultant's critical task during the scouting phase is to
determine appropriate entry points into the system, focusing
on understanding both the formal and informal power structure.

This notion is supported by the adoption/diffusion

literature regarding the critical role of opinion leaders in
bringing about change.

In addition to power, other writers

emphasize the need in scouting to determine the

11

readiness"

of the system for change (Beckhard, 1969, 1975; Glidewell,
1959).

This sensing includes the search for the "felt needs"

of the system as well as, in Beckhard's terms cited above,
the degree of "pain felt by strategic" members of the
system.
The best opportunities occur when problems exist
for which there is no Standard procedural or
bureaucratic solution, and where the managers
involved are really bothered by their difficulty
in coping. Look for these problems where new
technology is being introduced (e.g., computers);
where a problem requires close collaboration and
coordination across functional lines (e.g., "business areas"); where organizational boundaries are
being changed (e.g., mergers and takeovers); where
organization restructuring of any kind is taking
place; where physical locations are being changed
or new plants and facilities being built and commissioned; or where the organization is expanding
or contracting rapidly (e.g., redundancies).
(Harrison, 197la, p. 1)
11

11

This would seem consistent with the Lewin, Greiner, and
Dalton models asserting pressure as a necessary antecedent
condition for change.
In addition to opinion leaders, other

11

Strategic" system
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members may need to be discovered during this scouting phase.
Rogers (1962) also referred to "gate-keepers" as quite a dif-

ferent species.

Gate-keepers may or may not lead opinion,

but as legitimately constituted authorities within the formal
system, they are in positions to stop the change process or
allow it to occur, to shut or open the gate.

While they may

not need to be involved to the same extent as opinion leaders,
they must be involved to the extent that they are at least
"neutralized" so that they will not stop effort.

Harrison

(197la) further suggested being on the look-out for "the

forces in the organization which are supportive of change
and improvement" (p. 1).

This is supported by some of the

adoption/diffusion principles of Rothman (1974) cited in the
previous section.

Shepard (1975) put it more succinctly when

he suggested finding "a few friends" (p. 3), or "find the
people who are ready and able to work, introduce them to one
another, and work with them" (p. 4).

Harrison (197la) also

suggested looking for multiple entry points:

"a variety of

people, groups, processes and problems with which contact
can be made and to which help may be given" (p. 1).

In

searching for these entry points, the consultant was advised
by both Harrison and Shepard to look for "promising arenas,"
"relatively healthy parts of the system . . . with individuals and groups which have as much freedom and discretion in
managing their own operations as possible" (Harrison, 197la,
p. 2).

Shepard (1975) again made the point strongly:
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The physician-patient relationship is often
regarded as analogous to the consultant-client
relationship. The results for system change
can be unfortunate. For example, the organization development consultant is likely to be
greeted with delight by executives who see in
his specialty the solution to a hopeless situation in an outlying plant.
Some organization
development consultants have disappeared for
years because of the irresistibility of such
challenges. Others have whiled away their
time trying to counteract the Peter principle
by shoring up incompetent managers.

(pp. 2-3)

This too is supported by the Rothman generalizations
reported earlier regarding system innovativeness.

The

general readiness question in scouting was neatly summed up
in a formula by Gleicher:
a

=

"C

=

(abd)

>

x, where C

level of dissatisfaction with the status quo, b

or understood desired state, and x
~eckhard,

1975, p. 45).

=

=

change,

=

clear

'cost' of changing"

In other words, the combination of

felt need, the clarity of a goal or preferred future, and
know-how regarding practical starting points must be greater
than the money, time, and energy required in changing in
order for change to occur.

A consultant must assess all of

this in the scouting period.
Entry points having been chosen, the consultant begins,
in the Frohman-Kolb model, the entry process itself with
building a contract (or series of contracts) with the client
system.

This may or may not be a legal document and often

exists purely as a "psychological contract, 11 but, in any
case, i t defines mutual expectations regarding how future
stages in the change process will be carried out (Kolb et
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al., 1971).

While given here as an early entry issue, the

dynamic nature of change calls for keeping the contract open
for continual renegotiation.
The diagnostic phase of the OD process is of critical
importance.

Dalton described this step as

• . . essentially a job of drawing conclusions
from an intensive diagnosis of the situation.
If an analysis is to be more than an academic
exercise, it must reach decisions about:
(a)
What are the specific problems to be corrected?
(b) What are the determinants of these problems?
and (c) What forces are likely to work for and
against change? Answers to these questions are
difficult to derive because managers are easily
overinvolved or insulated from the sources of
problems in their organizations. A variety of
diagnostic techniques may have to be employed-such as the use of meetings, consultants, conferences, task forces, interviews, questionnaire
surveys, informal conversations, and so forth.
The central concern here is to gather reasonably
valid information that is not skewed to fit only
the biases of a few managers or a newly hired
outside consultant. Because the impact of
organization change can be so significant, we
believe it pays to spend sufficient time in this
stage to gather information from a wide range of
sources and to accomplish this through a variety
of data-gathering techniques.
(Greiner & Barnes,
1970, p. 2)

Planning proceeds from the diagnosis.

This diagnosis

may turn up data that give rise to the need for "a renegotiation of the entry contract" (Kolb et al., 1971, p. 357), thus
the return arrow from planning back to entry in the FrohmanKolb model in Figure 8.

Planning includes objectives to be

achieved (thus working on variable

£

in the Gleicher formula)

and solutions or strategies to be tried (thus working on
variable~).
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Action has already taken place, of course.

One or more

people have already done something to, with, or in the system during scouting, entry, diagnosis, and planning.

However,

the action phase of the model refers more specifically here
to the system's acting to implement those solutions or strat-

egies agreed to in the planning phase.
Some solutions or strategies may work, some may not, but
it is necessary to evaluate to know which is the case.

This

evaluation may involve archival performance data, surveys,
critical incidents, or many other techniques.

It is often a

difficult phase of OD to accomplish, especially the "human
systems" aspect of an OD intervention.
11

As Jones (1975) said,

The things that can be measured precisely are relatively

unimportant in human relations

11

(p. 116).

Nevertheless, it

is an important step, as Greiner (1967) found in his patterns
of success wherein successful change attempts involved measuring the results of small scale trials as reinforcement for
continuing the change effort.

Evaluation is, in a sense, a

re-diagnosis of the system or a diagnosis of the system in
a new state, thus a feedback arrow in the model to planning
(Figure 8).

This looping phenomenon causes the OD approach

to be seen as an ongoing process, rather than a program with
a beginning and an end.
While the process goes on, the consultant or change
agent's work with the system may end, thus the
phase.

11

Termination

11

It has long been stated as a rule of thumb in OD
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that the consultant's goal is to work himself or herself out
of a job.

This requires building internal capacity in the

client system for sustaining the process.

This requirement

leads to the inclusion in some models of a phase called
11

Institutionalization."
A general concept in OD is that it is and should be a

"transactional and collaborative process" (Chin & Benne,
1969, p. 42).

Thus, the consultant and the client system

would engage jointly in all stages shown in the Frohman-Kolb
model.

That leads to a discussion of one point of possible
confusion in this otherwise very helpful model.

Since the

process is joint, it is difficult, when just looking at the
model, to sort out who is doing what, especially when the
11

action 11 phase does not appear until the fifth stage and yet

the

consulta~t

has clearly been very active prior to that.

Lippitt and Lippitt (1977) assisted in this regard with a
model that specifically focused on the phases in consulting:
1.

The phase of contact, entry, and relationship establishment.

2.

The phase of contract formulation and
establishing a work-relationship.

3.

A phase of planning the goals and steps
of problem-solving (change effort).

4.

And a phase of action-taking and continuity of effort.
(p. 131)

These phases were then broken down further into work foci.
The resultant model could then be visualized as in Figure 9.
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Phase I:
Contact
and

{

Work Focus

1:

Work Focus

2:

Work Focus

T<

Phase II:
Contract
Formulation

Phase III:
Planning
for

{

Problem
Solving

t
Figure 9.

4:

Work Focus

5:

Work Focus

6:

Work Focus

7:

Work Focus

8:

Work Focus

9:

Work Focus 10:

1

Phase IV:
Action
Taking
and
Continuity

3:

Work Focus

Work Focus 11:

Work Focus 12:
{

Work Focus 13:
Work Focus 14:

Initiative for making
the first contact.
Helping identify, clarify
the need for change.
Explaining the readiness
for change.
Exploring the potential
for working together.

l l ll

What outcomes are
desired?
Who would need to do
what?
Time perspective and
accountability.

l l ll

Force-field diagnosis and
action goal derivation.
Planning steps, action,
documentation, evaluation.
Planning for involvement
--who and how?

l l ll

Successful action-taking.
Evaluation and guiding
feedback.
Revision action, mobilizing additional resources.
Follow-up support and
termination.

Work Foci in Phases of Consulting (Lippitt &
Lippitt, 1977, pp. 131-135).
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Similarities with the Frohman-Kolb model are obvious.
For example, Lippitt and Lippitt (1977) said, "Processes of
of entry and contract formulation involve preliminary diagnostic activity, readiness for change and the dynamics of a
working relationship 11

(p. 133).

This would be a reasonable

summary of Frohrnan-Kolb's "Scouting" and "Entry" phases.
However, Lippitt and Lippitt did zero in more on specific
consulting steps and the dilemma to be resolved in each.

A

further helpful contribution they made was that in their discussion of these steps they explored the role of both the
external consultant and the internal consultant, a considera-

tion left out of most of the literature which focuses almost
completely on the external consultant role.
In regard to role specifically, they also developed a
model of multiple
Figure 10.

11

Consultant Roles,

11

which is shown in

This was intended to be a descriptive model and

not to indicate any one role or any direction on the
directive-nondirective continuum is better or worse.
are the roles necessarily mutually exclusive.

Nor

Schuttenberg

(1971) developed a similar model (see Figure 11), though it
was somewhat more value-laden in the sense that fostering
client dependency is contrary to norms of OD consulting
generally.
Because of this value orientation, many OD consultants
operate exclusively toward ·the nondirective end of either
the Lippitt or the Schuttenberg model, and shun those roles
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Reflector
Process Specialist
Fact Finder
Alternative Identifier
Collaborator in
Problem-Solving
Trainer/Educator
Technical Specialist
Advocate

Figure 10.

Consultant Roles (Lippitt & Lippitt,
1977' p. 136).
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Advisor
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Leader
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Judge

Schuttenberg's Model of Consultant Roles (Schuttenberg, 1971, p. 9).

"'"'

59

seen as more directive almost on ideological grounds.
Rothman (1974) found considerable research supporting the
notion that the consultant is better off with a rich repertoire of roles combined with sound judgment with respect to

how and when and where to tap in to that repertoire:
Practitioners need to assess whether their
tasks require employment of limited or multiple
role sets. Many • • • are located in situations
calling for an extended role set but define themselves in limited role set terms. In some cases,
practitioners are unaware that they have defined
themselves unidimensionally and consequently perform ineffectively by constricting the boundaries
of their potential role repertoire. Sometimes
such limitations are cognitive in etiology (being
familiar with only certain potential roles); sometimes they are ideological (only certain roles are
considered appropriate from a value standpoint).
Frequently such ideological prescriptions are not
fully thought through and may be dysfunctional in
terms of the objectives the practitioner is seeking. The converse of the problem may also be
true, that is to say, practitioners may be employing too wide a range of roles in terms of the
objectives being addressed.
Diagnosis of one's role set should hypothetically contribute to effectiveness in [client
system] practice. Not only might the practitioner
be better able to determine the particular roles
to employ under given conditions, but this framework might also help him to move from a limited
to an extended role set and back again flexibly
as circumstances require. As a rule of thumb, a
broader role set is suggested when a practitioner
is in a decentralized structure or when he is using
a high-intensity approach with distrustful groups.
Employing this general framework, experienced practitioners can discern many additional criteria for
determining the appropriate scope of role set.
(p. 64)

Further, particularly with respect to the directivenondirective dilemma, Rothman's (1974) research review led
him to conclude:
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For various reasons, practitioners have sometimes
failed to assume appropriate assertive roles in
• • . intervention.

Occasionally, there is an

underestimation of "what the traffic will bear"
with respect to reactions of important • . •
actors and groups. Practitioners should be alert

to this possibilityi perhaps they should develop
better tools for determining attitudes and expec-

tations of others and the nature of boundaries
thereby imposed on role performance.

~

In assess-

the proper extent of directive role-periOrmance,

practiTioners should take into account the situational context, goals being sought, and attitudes

of . . ~cipaiifS [emphasrsmi'ner.- J:'ilSmair
groups or consensual problem solving, there is evidence that the worker should take a more directive,
task-oriented role when the group atmosphere is
informal. One should lean toward more nondirective,
socio-emotional roles when the group atmosphere is
formal. Target groups that are distrustful or that
feel a sense of distance or inferiority with respect
to the practitioner may react negatively to the
exercise of more assertive roles; hence, the practitioner should be cautious in regard to assertiveness with such clients and constituencies until
trust is established, or disparity in knowledge or
skill is reduced.

(p.

75)

In regard to building trust, the concept of homophily
appears to play a critical part (Rogers & Shoemaker, 1971).
"Homophily is the degree to which pairs of individuals who
interact are similar in certain attributes, such as beliefs,
values, education, social status, and the like" (p. 14).
Generally speaking, "change agent success is positively
related to his homophily with his clients" (p. 242).

There

is an almost inherent problem here, however, in that complete
homophily is unlikely to lead to change and "one of the most
distinctive problems in the communication of innovations is
that the source is usually quite heterophilous to the
receiver" (p. 15).

This suggests that the change agent
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attempts to develop optimum heterophily with his clients.
Sashkin (1974), in his exploration of adoptive and

adaptive change approaches discussed in an earlier section
of this chapter, concluded with a model that integrated role
with the approach to change.

This is shown in Figure 12.

His three adoptive approaches derived from the field of
research in the utilization of knowledge and adoption and
diffusion of innovation.

They are most fully reviewed by

Havelock (1971) and include Research, Development, and Diffusion (RDD) ; Social Interaction and Diffusion (SID) ; and
Linkage.

Adaptive approaches include Intervention Theory

and Method {ITM), Planned Change (PC), and Action-Research
(AR).

Three generalized role sets are also posited:

sultant, Trainer, and Research.

Con-

As can be seen in Figure 12,

different of these role sets become ascendant in different
change approaches and emphasize different aspects of a given
role set as well.
Blake and Mouton (1976) went even further in an attempt
at integration with their

11

Consulcube. 11

Consistent with

their penchant for grid-like models, these two very active
practitioners developed a three-dimensional grid intended as
a guide for consulting.
include:

The three dimensions of their grid

(1) Kinds of Intervention (Acceptant, Catalytic,

Confrontation, and Prescription);

(2) Focal Issues for Inter-

vention (Power/Authority, Morale/Cohesion, Standards/Norms,
Goals/Objectives); and (3) Units of Change (Individual,
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ADOPTIVE
CHANGE
MODELS

ROLES
Consultant

Trainer

Researcher

RDD

Primary emphasis; major
function of change agent
is facilitating adoption
of some specific innovation.

Not included; but some
training may occur in
sense that client may be
taught how to obtain similar knowledge in future.

Research may be accomplished but this is
rare and is not a part
of change process or
necessary to it.

SID

Primary emphasis; major
function of change agent
is facilitating adoption
of some specific innovation or practice.

Not included, but certain
members of client system
may be made more aware of
their roles as resources
for new knowledge & other
members may learn to seek
them out & use them more
effectively.

Research is not primary
focus and not part of
change process, although
research done on this
model has been used to
11 refine 11
it.

Primary emphasis; major
function of knowledge
linker--change agent--is
effective diffusion of
specific technical or
social innovation by creating linkages between
knowledge source & user;
such linkages may be made
permanent through roles
carried out by individual
linker or by linking group
or as institutionalized
procedures.

Training may occur in that
client learns more effective methods for getting
information from external
resources; in addition,
client may learn better
internal data-retrieval
procedures.

Research is not a focus,
although considerable
research has been done
on the model and on diffusion and utilization
processes; however, the
model itself does not
contribute to such
research as part of its
normal operation.

Linkage

Figure 12.

Comparison of Six Change Models in Terms of the Roles of the Change Agent
(Sashkin, 1974, pp. 212-213).

"'
"'
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ADAPTIVE

ROLES

CHANGE

MODELS
ITM

Consultant

Trainer

Researcher

Consultation on process Primary emphasis on Emphasized to extent of training
only, not on content
training client in client in research skills needed
problems; but interven- new skills/methods for generation of valid informationist does introduce
(process oriented). tion prior to & during change
client to new methods
process; research for development
of data-gathering,

of new behavioral science know-

analysis, decision-

ledge is emphasized conceptually,
but does not seem an integral
part of the model.

making.
PC

Consultation on process Major emphasis on
primarily, but also on training client in
content; for example,
skills & methods
derivation-utilization for creating adapconference introduces
tive changes.
client to new content
knowledge resources.

Emphasized mostly in evaluation
of effects of specific changes
& client training in certain
research skills needed for data
collection & diagnosis; importance of generation of new behavioral science knowledge is noted,
but it is not operational part
of model.

AR

Consultation on process Major emphasis on
is emphasized, but con- training for dev-

Major emphasis on research as
basis for action, an important
area of client training, & source
of new knowledge about change
which can be used by behavioral
science practitioners & theorists.

~~~~r~~nsultation also~~~~p~:~~u~~e!n~~~change.

Figure 12.

(Continued.)

"'w

64

Group, Intergroup, Organization, Larger Social System).
resultant
cube are

11

11

Consulcube" is shown in Figure 13.

The

Within the

one hundred cells, each of which represents the

characteristics of a particular kind of intervention being
applied to a particular client who is facing a particular
problem of breaking out of an unproductive or self-defeating
cycle" (p. 6).

It seems a fitting conclusion to this section on consulting and change agentry to present a model of such complexity and to add that even that model represents an oversimplification of the reality of the consulting job.

This

complexity, coupled with relatively little empirical
research, leaves change agentry still much more of an art
than a science.
Swnmary
The art (and, to the extent revealed in this review of
the literature, the science) of consulting for change is
indeed a complex one, and models designed either to describe
or prescribe in this field must, of necessity, include consideration of some variables at the expense of others.

"An

analyst almost has to choose a limited number of variables
which are recognized as dynamically independent and then try
to work from there toward a more accurate understanding of
reality" (Barnes, 1969, p. 80).

Moreover, "COnceptual

schemes are never right or wrong; they are only useful or
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not for some specified purpose" (Bennis et al., 1969, p. 61).
What, then, is our purpose?

The purpose of the model

derived in this study is to provide a guide or guides for
action for a practitioner consulting in large social systems.
It may also be of some assistance to client systems who may
use such consulting help.
included?

What variables must then be

At this stage of investigation, having reviewed

many existing models designed to serve their specific purpose,
i t would seem a model ought to combine many of the variables

reviewed without becoming so complex as to lose its practical
value.

Perhaps it should at least start by treating the

variables suggested by Guest (1962), with which this chapter
opened:

"Who does what, when, where, how, with whom, and

how often? (p. 153).

Guest said this was a "simple question,"

but the above literature review strongly indicates that is
not the case.
However, Watson (1969) used some variables very close
to these in his principles for overcoming resistance to
change.

His fundamental framework was to divide his recom-

mendations as answers to three questions:
change?

11

Who brings the

What kind of change succeeds? and How is it best

done--by what procedures and in what climate?" (p. 22) .

The

similarity to Guest's question is apparent, and the Watson
principles given below make it even more so:
A.

Who brings the change?
1.

Resistance will be less if administrators,
teachers, board members, and community
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leaders feel that the project is their
own--not one devised and operated by
outsiders.
2.

Resistance will be less if the project

clearly has wholehearted support from
top officials of the system.
B.

What kind of change?
3.

Resistance will be less if participants

see the change as reducing rather than
increasing their present burdens.
4.

Resistance will be less if the project

accords with values and ideals which have
long been acknowledged by participants.
5.

Resistance will be less if the program
offers the kind of new experience which
interests participants.

6.

C.

Resistance will be less if participants
feel that their autonomy and their security
is not threatened.

Procedures in instituting change.
7.

Resistance will be less if participants
have joined in diagnostic efforts leading
them to agree on the basic problem and to
feel its importance.

8.

Resistance will be less if the project is
adopted by consensual group decision.

9.

Resistance will be reduced if proponents
are able to empathize with opponents, to
recognize valid objections, and to take
steps to relieve unnecessary fears.

10.

Resistance will be reduced if i t is recognized that innovations are likely to be
misunderstood and misinterpreted, and if
provision is made for feedback of perceptions of the project and for further
clarification as needed.

11.

Resistance will be reduced if participants
experience acceptance, support, trust, and
confidence in their relations with one
another.
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12.

D.

Resistance will be reduced if the project
is kept open to revision and reconsideration if experience indicates that changes
would be desirable.

Climate for change

13.

Readiness for change gradually becomes a
characteristic of certain individuals,
groups, organizations, and civilizations.
They no longer look nostalgically at a
Golden Age in the past but anticipate
their Utopia in days to come. The spontaneity of youth is cherished and innovations are protected until they have had a
chance to establish their worth. The
ideal is more and more seen as possible.
(pp. 22-23)

This simple framework does hold some promise, though the
coverage is not comprehensive enough for our purposes.

Wat-

son 1 S focus, of course, was on overcoming resistance, and,
while the principles suggest more than that, it is a focus
more narrow than consulting for change in general.

Nhile a

reader of these principles will see that many of them are
supported by research reported on earlier in this chapter,
there is also much left out.

The category on "Who brings

the change?" could very well include more recommendations
relative to change agents, opinion leaders, and gate-keepers,
for example; and the category of climate for change could
include principles based on findings reported in this chapter
on indicators of system innovativeness.

Moreover, the time

dimension--the stages of the process, etc.--are not represented.

This is not to criticize this most useful set of

recommendations, for it was not Watson's purpose to develop
such an inclusive model.

We are merely suggesting some
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directions that the present study might take in the development of a model.

Certainly, a model resulting from the

present investigation must include some consideration of the
change agent, the client system, the nature of the change,
the process, and time.

The next step in development of this model will be the
analysis (in the context of this literature review) of one
case of consulting for change.

This case and this analysis

will be reported in Chapters IV through IX.

The next chapter,

Chapter III, will describe how the study was designed and

carried out.
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CHAPTER III
RESEARCH PROCEDURES
Introduction

The empirical core of this study is a participant
observer record of the interaction of a consultant (the
author) with a client system (General r.tlotors-Holden' s Pty.
Limited)

in a collaborative effort to bring about change

using a general approach to change known as Organization
Development {OD).

As such, the purpose is to add a clinical

and personal account to the data base in this field.
11

An

apologia" of sorts for this method was made in Chapter I

(see Scope and Limitations section) and no further justification will be attempted here.

In this chapter, the particular

approach used in this study will be described.
In addition to adding to knowledge, i t is the purpose
of this study to add to understanding.

As a consequence, an

analysis of the case is undertaken and a model for initiating
change is proposed.

This chapter will describe the process

used for analysis and model building.
The Research Setting
The clinical research for this study was conducted
beginning officially on February 2, 1975, in Australia in
70
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the wholly owned subsidiary of the General Motors Corporation,
General Motors-Holden•s Proprietary Limited (hereinafter
referred to, as it is in Australia, as GMH or Holden's).

The

author had been assigned on that date to GMH as an OD consultant, at their request, from the General Motors Corporate
Office Department of Organizational Research and Development.
The original assignment was for 6 months.

Near the end of

the original assignment, he was asked to stay for approximately 6 more months and agreed to do so.

In all, then, he

was in Australia on this assignment for all of 1975 except
for January.

While asked to extend the stay 2 further years,

the press to return to the u.s.A., both personal and professional, caused the author and his family to leave Australia
in early January,

1976~

He was replaced as consultant by

another member of the General Motors Organizational Research
and Development Department at that time.
sultant remained at GMH to July,

1977~

This second conThe above time

period--approximately February, 1975, to July, 1977--constitutes the time period encompassed in the

case~

However, the

primary focus will be on the first 6 months of the author's
assignment there, during which time he was trying to get a
change process

launched~

Data from later time periods will

be presented in more summary form than the clinical detail
of the first 6 months.
GMH is a large organization by most standards.
employs approximately 25,000 people.

It

While a subsidiary, it
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is a very complete and integrated
its own right.

11

automobile company .. in

It designs, engineers, manufactures, tests,

and markets its own line of automobiles as well as many parts
and assembles trucks from imported parts.

It is by no means

merely an assembler or distributor for products designed and
manufactured elsewhere.

Further, it competes in Australia

with two other U.S.-based local manufacturers and Japanese
and European imports in the form of both completely built
units and units assembled locally from shipped-in parts.

Its

headquarters and a major part of its operations are located
in Melbourne.

Almost half of the company's facilities are

located in and around Adelaide, while additional assembly
plants exist near Sydney and Brisbane.

The case includes

data from all of these locations, with the emphasis on the
Melbourne and Adelaide areas.

In addition, the company has

an Automotive Proving Ground at Lang Lang (about 50 miles
from Melbourne) and sales offices widely distributed throughout the country.

These were not a part of the case.

A more

complete description of GMH as a client system for change
appears in the body of the case.
In the course of consulting, the author interacted with
system members from all levels of the organization (although
primarily at management and supervisory levels) and all functions.

These interactions make up the core of the case.

He

was introduced and known to people in the organization as a
consultant, not as a researcher.

This was not an attempt at
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covert research; in fact, he had official clearance to do
this research by the Managing Director and the Personnel
Director of GMH and some few others also knew and he never
attempted to keep it a secret.
his primary role

~

It was simply the case that

as a consultant rather than as a

researcher, and that, therefore, was his primary role identification.
Design of the Case
As indicated above, the primary emphasis in the case
study proper is on the first 6 months of the author•s activity as a change agent or consultant.

The intent is to focus

primarily on the initiation or launch phase of the change
process.

Six months is, to some extent, an arbitrary opera-

tional definition of this initiation or launch phase.
some ways, however, it is not.

In

In the first place, the

original assignment was for just 6 months, therefore much
of the consultant's thought, planning, and action at that
time was aimed at accomplishment of goals within that time
frame.

Had the assignment turned out as planned, 6 months

would in fact have been the sum and total of the launch
phase insofar as the author's involvement as a consultant
was concerned.

In addition, however, the activities encom-

passed during this half-year time period also roughly correspond conceptually to the stages in the OD process described
by Frohman and Kolb as Scouting, Entry, Diagnosis, and
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Planning (Kolb, Rubin, & Mcintyre, 1971).

In the Lippitts'

model, the activities encompassed include Phase !--Contact
and Entry; Phase II--Contract Formulation; Phase III--Planning for Problem Solving; and some beginnings of Phase IV-Action-Taking and Continuity.

In other words, although it

includes only the earliest months of a long-term project,
the detailed study is complete enough to comprehend many of
the phases of a full OD process.
the end of

In less abstract terms, by

months it was felt that the entry goals were

accomplished and action was under way in the subsystems considered strategically critical entry subsystems.
Data during this first 6-month time period carne from
the author's written notes made daily, audiotapes made almost
daily, plus much reference to other documents, such as
company records, letters, interview data, and the like.
The actual construction of the case up to this point
begins with an overview of the company, GMH, in Australia.
This is followed by a description of the author 1 s activities
and reflections on these activities during a period of about
1-1/2 months of

11

Scouting.

11

Two critical entry interventions

are then described, one at the top of the organization and
one at a plant level.

These in turn led to two other sub-

system interventions, one just below the top with an Executive Task Force and another at a plant.
tions are also described in detail.

These two interven-

Taken together, the

activities in these four subsystems constitute the core of
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the launch strategy.

A summary is then given of the state

of the process at the end of this time, i.e., the end of
July, 1975.
It would not be enough to stop there, however.

OD is

a long-term effort and only over time can some of its effects
be judged.

As Barber (Guest, 1972) said, "Time, of course,

is the crucial dimension.

It follows logically that the

data for studying change should be collected not at a single
unit of time but either continuously or at intervals.

Only

by comparing different structures in a time series can one

discover whether a system has manifested self-maintaining
processes or processes of change, short-term or long-term"
(p. 133).

Just such discoveries are important to this study,

thus a time series design.
The first post-initiation summary will be made at the
end of December, 1975, the next at the end of June, 1977.
These time periods, like the first, have a rationale beyond
being completely arbitrary.

In the first instance, the

author's role as consultant to the organization ended at the
end of December, 1975, after just less than 1 year on the
project.

As mentioned earlier, another consultant took over

at that point.

Therefore, in addition to being approximately

a first annual summary, this was the time of a most critical
incident in the life of the change effort.

Data for this

summary also came from the author's personal records as well
as other sources.
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The final snapshot of the process, at the end of June,
1977, was chosen because (1) it provides a 2-1/2 year perspective at the time of this writing and (2) a critical incident similar to the above occurred.

This latter incident

was the departure of the second consultant, who was not
replaced from the outside {i.e., the home office in the

u.SA.), but by Australian national resources internal to the
GMH organization:

thus, final

11

Termination" in the terms of

Frohman and Kolb, and the full gamut of the consultation
process.

During this latter period, of course, the author

was not living in the system and had only correspondence from
the consultant who replaced him, other friends, and some
company reports to go by.

In addition, he had use of some

survey data from one of the key plants involved.

This

2-1/2 year summary will make use of these materials.
Case Analysis
The focus of the case analysis will be on "process outcomes11 as opposed to organizational effectiveness outcomes.
In other words, it is the central purpose of this study to
contribute to understanding the process of change.

Thus

the effectiveness of the strategies and interventions
employed during the first 6 months will be analyzed as they
caused change to occur and to be maintained and institutionalized.

Although it is hoped that the change was for organ-

ization improvement, and some evidence will be provided as
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to the extent that it was, this is not the central concern
of this study.
Therefore, the activities of the first 6 months (hereinafter February 1, 1975, will be referred to as Time 1;
August 1, 1975, as Time 2) will be compared to existing
change models described in Chapter II and congruencies and
deviations noted.

These will then be checked for resulting

effects in December, 1975

(Time 3) and July, 1977 (Time 4).

conclusions will be drawn about (1) the effectiveness of the
launch strategies used between Time 1 and Time 2, and (2)

the usefulness of existing models in explaining or predicting
the effectiveness or lack of effectiveness of those strategies.

For the most part, the analysis is separate from the
case itself to focus greater rigor on the analytical process
and to provide clearer, more usable organization of the
report for the reader.

However, i t was neither possible nor

considered completely desirable to leave all analytical
reflection out of the case itself.

The author's reflections

on the experiences he was having are, in fact, part of the
data of the study.

"In participant observation, more than

in any other technique, analysis of the data should proceed
simultaneously with their collection . .

The observer's

understanding of the situation is likely to change as he
goes along.

This, in turn, may call for changes in what he

observes . . . • These changes in the content are the optimum
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use of participant observation.

But, if the data are not

analyzed as the observation proceeds, the observer is not in
a

position to make these changes as rapidly as he should 11

(Johoda, Deutsch, & Cook, 1951, p. 135).

Indeed, many times,

particularly during the Scouting Phase, the author's analyses
changed dramatically between the time he left work and the
time he returned the next morning.

It was considered impor-

tant that some of that phenomenon show in the case record.
However, as indicated, for the most part the analysis fol-

lows the case in a separate section.
The Model

Lippitt (1973) wrote the definitive book on the use of
models in planned change.
11

In it he defined a model thus:

A model is a representation of a phenomenon which displays

the identifiable structural elements of that phenomenon, the
relationships among those elements and the processes involved"
(p. 73).

As further explanation as well as rationale, he

added:

Basically, a model is a symbolic representation
of the various aspects of a complex event or
situation, and their interrelationships. A
model is by nature a simplification and thus may
or may not include all the variables. It should
include, however, all of those variables which
the model-builder considers important and, in this
sense, models serve as an aid to understanding the
event or situation being studied. The true value
of a model lies in the fact that it is an abstraction of reality that can be useful for analytical
purposes. In a way, models are analogies which
problem-solvers use to clarify their thinking
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about a relatively complex presentation. Through
the use of a model, they can predict performance
under predetermined conditions or evaluate the
consequences of various alternatives before committing themselves to a particular change plan or
course of action.
(p. 2)
By using models together with his skills as an
observer, analyst, and diagnostician the change
agent can become more effective . . • • At this
particular point in the development of the theory
and practice of changing • . . we are in real need
of models that will be helpful to change agents.
(p. 69)

It is the intent of the model developed in this study
to be helpful to change agents.

The model was developed in

accordance with Lippitt's three suggested parameters for
models of change:

graphic, two-dimensional, and nonmathe-

matical (p. ii).

Further, it could be defined as a dynamic

(as opposed to static) and analytic model.

It is graphic

because visualizing a process can be immensely helpful in
conceptualizing it (p. 9).

It is two-dimensional to increase

its utility through the printed page.

It is nonmathematical

because mathematical models "are generally so complex and
bewildering to the uninitiated as to discourage their use
by most change agents 11 (p. ii).
static model as

11

Lippitt (1973) defined a

graphic representation of a situation at

a given time 11 and a dynamic model as one which

11

illustrates

the interaction of forces and subforces, takes into account
the dimension of time, and has built into it feedback loops
that affect the input/output elements of a situation 11 (p. 77).
A model for initiating change, then, must be dynamic.
Finally, in contrasting analytic models to other forms such
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as game simulations and mathematical models, Lippitt said,
"It is the analytic model--using graphic presentation in
two dimensions--that is most feasibly adapted to the study
of change"

(p. 76).

Thus a graphic, two-dimensional, nonmathematical,
dynamic, analytic model was developed based on a review of

existing models (see Chapter II) and an analysis of a case
study of the initiation of change.

The actual process used to build the particular model
in this study is described in Chapter X.

Empirical valida-

tion was accomplished by applying the model to the real-world
situation described in the case.
The two main criteria used to assess the model as it
was being built and upon its completion were its usefulness
and relative simplicity.

On the first point, Lippitt (1973)

pointed out, "The visualized conceptual model

. . is

neither true or false, complete or incomplete.

It is only

useful or non-useful"

(p. 86).

Some sub-criteria in regard

to usefulness came from some students of model building:
How accurately can the model explain actual
observations of the system or situation being
studied?
How accurately can one predict reactions and
outcomes by using the model?
How well does the model fit similar situations?
How much insight or understanding of the system
or situation does the model provide?
(pp. 87-88)
In regard to simplicity, a model can be oversimplified,
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of course, and leave out critical variables, consequently
not meeting the usefulness criterion.

Trade-offs must be

made and optimal or relative simplicity sought.

As Lippitt

(1973) said:
The important principle is to keep the change

model in workable form and, therefore, possibly
to oversimplify.
If those making change models
attempt to be too literally true to the real
change situation, the result may be cumbersone
and so expensive in the use of time that it is

impracticable.

(p. 83)

The participant observer study presented in Chapters

IV through VIII should contribute to increasing the base of
empirical knowledge on planned change.

The analysis of that

case (in Chapter IX) and the Model for initiating change in
large social systems in Chapter X should contribute to further understanding of the planned change process, thus
expanding the theoretical base in this field.
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CHAPTER IV
THE SETTING
The following participant observer study will begin in

this chapter with an overview of the company in Australia.
I will then present an account of the scouting period.

Pre-

vious to my assignment to Australia, I had the opportunity
to co-consult on one project with Professor William Gomberg
of the Wharton School.

Gomberg's early and distinguished

career was with the International Ladies Garment Workers
Union and, in the course of working together, he told me
that he tried always to follow a dictum that had grown up
in the "sewing trades":

Measure ten times; cut once.

tried to follow that advice during my early days in General
Motors-Holden's {GMH).

Measure Ten Times.

Thus I call Cahpter V "Scouting:

11

By the same token, when it came time to cut, I tried
to follow another principle, namely, to find multiple entry
points.

Therefore, Chapter VI is "Entry:

Cut Twice."

This

chapter, then, covers two initial entry points, Dandenong
and the Executive Council.

Those two interventions led in

turn and built toward two others, the Executive Task Force
and Elizabeth, which will be covered in Chapter VII, "Entry:
Stage Two."

Taken together, the interventions into these

four subsystems constitute the entry strategy, the timing
82
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of which coincides with my first 6 months in Australia.
Summaries are then provided at two later time intervals:
11

Time 3:

One Year" and

11

Time 4:

Two and One-Half Years.

11

These make up Chapter VIII, "Diffusion and Institutionalization."

The case {especially the first 6 months covered in
Chapters V through VII) is written in a personal narrative
style, including my felt dilemmas, my reflections, and my
analyses as they occurred

~

process.

However, the more

rigorous retrospective analysis is left for Chapter IX,
11

Analysis of the Case."
GMH in Australia
The intention here is to sketch the national and company

setting in 1975 in which the following case took place.

It

is not intended to be a thorough socio-politico-economic
picture of Australia nor of the company.

Moreover, many

aspects of the country and the organization that affect the
case emerged in the development of the project and will be
discussed or reported at the appropriate points in the case
proper.
In regard to the general setting in Australia, a few
points which make the business environment in Australia
unique require highlighting.

The most critical of these are

(1) distance, (2) population,

(3) urbanization, (4) depen-

dence, (5) the political scene,

(6) trade unionism, and (7)
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the economic scene.
What has been called "Professor Geoffrey Blainey•s
indispensable work on Australian (Hazzard, 1977, p. 32), The
Tyranny

2i Distance focused on the first of the above issues:

distance, or what might better be termed isolation.

There is

probably no more pervasive fact about Australia, deeply
affecting its history as well as the present day, than that
it is a very long distance from almost anywhere, and especially from the developed world.

This initially afforded

some natural protection for new primary industry, and in more
recent times, as distance has diminished in light of modern
transportation and communication, the federated Commonwealth
has continued to provide tariff protection "in the name of
self-sufficiency and employment opportunities" {Byrt & Masters, 1974, p. 30).

Internally, distance is also important, and interacts
with population size and urbanization to present a unique
set of business conditions.

The dimensions of the country

are approximately those of the 48 contiguous states of the
United States.

Yet there was a population in 1975 of about

13-1/2 million, "almost precisely the figure of India's
population increase the same year" {Hazzard, 1977, p. 36),
and "the same as the 14 Southern California counties which
centre around Los Angeles" {Hay, 1971, p. 1).

However, this

population is not spread out throughout the countryside,
approximately a third of which is desert, but, indeed, has
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clustered itself into cities to the extent that Australia
is one of the most urbanized countries in the world.

"Sur-

prisingly about 80 percent of the small population in such
a large continent lives in communities with more than 2,000
residents--about half the population lives in Sydney and
Melbourne.

11

This results in large urban centers with vast

distances between them, making for high internal transport
costs, encouraging regional industry, and posing "severe
problems for the development of industries requiring national
markets 11 (Byrt & Masters, 1974, p. 31).

Part of the business difference, then, between the u.s.
and Australia is high cost of transport, both externally and
internally.

Another is

11

sheer size.

The United States

undeniably offers a much larger scale of operation. .

• In

Australia an 'average' company has sales of around $5 million
whereas an 'average' company in the United States has sales
of around $500 million.

In the United States in 1971 there

were 120 companies with sales greater than $1,000 million-in 1973

~

Australian company has come into that category

11

(Hay, 1971).

The above combination of factors also means, of course,
that it is impossible to realize economies of scale as they
are known in the

u.s.

One consequence is the relatively high

cost of consumer goods; another has been traditionally high
levels of employment1 another the protective tariffs referred
to above; and, finally, an aggressive immigration policy,
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especially since World War II, that accounts for about half
the 6-1/2 million population increase since the end of the
War.

These migrants are very much a factor in present-day

Australian life, and more than half came from continental
Europe as opposed to the British Isles--the chief source of

Australian population and culture up to that time.

Many of

these Europeans do not speak English or do so with difficulty.
This has added complexity to an already fascinating history

of "creating a predominantly Anglo-Saxon nation in the South
Pacific"

(Hazzard, 1977, p. 1).

Australia, and Australian business, with its roots thus
in the northern hemisphere and the Western industrialized
world, has been to a reasonably large degree dependent in
one respect or another on overseas culture, capital, legal
and political forms, and know-how.

Prior to 1941, according

to Blainey (Byrt & Masters, 1974), i t was "an echo and image
of Britain and an outpost of Europe"

(p. 32).

Since the

Second World War, in addition to European migration, there
has been increasing u.s. influence.

Byrt and Masters (1974)

summarized:
The American influence has been most marked.
American multinational corporations are playing
a large part in Australian economic activity.
The United States has become the largest overseas
supplier of capital and of managerial, technical
and strategic knowledge.
Up until the advent of
the Labor Government in the Commonwealth Parliament at the end of 1972, the United States was
the country on which Australia relied for its
military security and as the inspiration of its

foreign policy

0

(p

0

33)
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The Labor Government since its accession to power
. • . has announced its intention to stimulate an
Australian nationalism and to reduce the country's
dependence on overseas capital and enterprise. The

Liberal Party has recently expressed similar sentiments. Australia, however, remains a dependent
society.

(p. 34)

The accession of the Labor Government referred to was
very much the chief characteristic of the political setting
of the present case.

The Australian governmental structure

is fundamentally patterned after the British parliamentary
system and a coalition of conservative parties, the Liberal
and Country parties, had held power for some 23 straight
years prior to 1972.

In that year the Labor Party swept into

power with reformist if not revolutionary zeal.
11

After

twenty-three y"':!ars in the wilderness," as was the popular

saying at the time, they attempted to institute socialist
and social democratic "reforms" in a very rapid fashion.
These included the above-mentioned emphasis on nationalism,
a rejection of dependency, and an effort to "buy back Australia"--one of their political slogans.

It also led to a

major reallocation of national income to the public sector
and away from the private sector.

A governmental commission

formed to study "the rationalization of the automobile industry in Australia" concluded that there were too many local
manufacturers and that protective tariffs should be lowered
and the market forces then operate to force out the less
effective and efficient manufacturers, leaving the fittest
to survive.

While these recommendations were not enacted,
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they had much sympathy in Labor Party circles.

It would be

safe to say that the Labor Party was viewed by most in the
business world, including Australians, as anti-business, and
certainly they were viewed as anti-multinational.

The year

encompassed in the case, 1975, was the last frantic year of
that Labor Government and the Liberal-Country Party Coalition
resumed Government at the end of that year.
One cannot discuss the political scene of that time
without also discussing trade unionism, another important
dimension of the business environment that is different from
that found in the u.s.

In the first place, unionism is dif-

ferent from that in the U.S. because of its political tie-ins
with the Government.

Unions are officially and structurally

a part--and the major force--in the Labor Party.

At the time

of this case, for example, the President of the Labor Party
(i.e., head of the political

11

machine

11

of that party) was

also the Executive Secretary (i.e., chief executive officer)
of the Australian Council of Trade Unions, the central governing body of union activity in Australia.

Secondly, unlike

the union situation in the u.s. automobile industry, there
are a number and variety of unions to deal with in each location, including a supervisors' union which encompasses firstthrough some middle levels of management.

This phenomenon

is made more complex by the fact that the tradition is more
like the British trade union tradition, with strong power
vested in the steward on the shop floor, who may, and not
infrequently did, not comply with agreements, commitments,
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or decisions made by state or federal union officials.
These factors, combined with lack of enforceable penalty
provisions in the labor law, resulted in sporadic wild-cat
strikes and "stop-work meetings" wherein employees would
stop work, meet outside of plants on company property, hold
meetings, vote and go or not go back to work.

A third funda-

mentally different approach to the union-management relationship was compulsory arbitration by the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Commission, established at the time of
Federation.

According to Byrt and Masters (1974), "Many

agreements are reached outside the Commission but concilia-

tion and arbitration overshadows collective bargaining.
State Arbitration developed out of severe strikes late in
the 19th century which disrupted community life.

Both the

unions and employers have been so dominated by the traditions
of the arbitration system that they have failed to explore
creatively the alternatives"

(p. 43).

Finally, as regards the economic setting,

11

Australians

enjoy a high standard of living, though considerably lower
than U.S. citizens.

The acquisition of vehicles, consumer

durables, increased leisure and high proportion of horne
ownership reflect the aspirations of the people, most of
who are economically comfortable"
p. 41).

(Byrt & Masters, 1974,

The maintenance of full employment is a very highly

valued objective of the Australian economy, and one which has
pretty well been met (normal unemployment is below 1 percent)
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although in 1975, the year of this case, it rose as high
as 5 percent, as the world-wide recession peaked in Australia.
Because of both the high value placed on this objective and
the positive history--with the exception of the Great Depression of the 1930's--lay-offs, or "retrenchments" as they are
called locally, are far from the relatively accepted practice
they are in the u.s., and workers do not have the same layoff protection they do in the u.s. in the form of government
unemployment benefits or company-funded supplemental unemployment benefits.

Regular unemployment benefits exist, but at

a much lower level than in the U.S.
p. 43).

(Byrt & Masters, 1974,

Primary industry has been the backbone of the

Australian economy and international trade, representing 80
percent of exports which account for about 30 percent of the
gross national product (Byrt & Masters, 1974).

It is a

country rich in natural resources with the exception of
water.

The most deficient resource has been capital, which

deficiency "is reflected in the late development of sophisticated capital and money markets, the high incidence of
failure to generate Australian equity for development projects, and is part of the explanation of Australia 1 s attraction to foreign investors .. (Byrt

&

Masters, 1974, p. 44).

Thus far, I have attempted to summarize the Australian
scene as I entered it in early 1975 in terms of historical,
geographic, social, political, and economic forces.

As a

final characterization of the national scene I found, I refer
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to Byrt and Masters' (1974) summing up of the personalities
of Australian middle managers that have grown out of this
cultural milieu.

Based on a study of

11

Machiavellianism,"

it was found that "the great majority of Australian middle

managers tend to be
dependent on government; insular; lacking in
boldness and initiative; dependent on overseas
sources for capital, ideas and techniques; reasonably but not highly educated; masculine in
fact and in outlook; city dwellers, in particular of either Sydney or Melbourne; conservative;
fearful of radicalism in economics and politics;
egalitarian both socially and at the work place;
practical and pragmatic; opportunists rather than
planners; non-intellectual--some are antiintellectual; interested in leisure, social activity and family; critical of politicians and holders
of formal authority; versatile; materialist; nonaggressive; manipulative in managerial style; low
in Machiavellian characteristics.
(p. 65)
Byrt and Masters cautioned that

11

the above is a picture of

the majority of middle, not senior, managers; also there are,
of course, many of the former whom the description would not
fit.

Again, the picture is changing, and changing rapidly"

(p. 65).

With those cautions in mind, however, and with no

desire to stereotype, my own perception of my own experience
with Australian managers leads me to agree with the general
accuracy of that profile as well as with the observation
that it is changing.
One very significant factor in the change is the
increasing opportunity for overseas travel.

I scarcely met

an Australian at middle-management levels or above who had
not been overseas, usually to Europe and/or the

u.s.,

and
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their children were being encouraged to thus travel in even
greater numbers at high school graduation or university age.
It was my observation, without any attempt at documentation,
that the frequency of such travel would be many times more

than among a similar group in the u.s.
Further, as Byrt and Masters (1974) stated:

The influence of the Second World War on Australian
industry, and consequently on management, cannot be
overemphasized. The war provided a great impetus
in terms of growth. . . • The Second World War
foreign policy switch, which saw Australia look to
the United States as an ally, rather than to Great

Britain, was also followed up in the business arena.
At the same time, American businessmen began to see
Australia as not only a potential market, but also
a stable base for entry into the markets of Asia
and the Pacific. The forerunner was undoubtedly
General Motors-Holden, which set up its first plant
here in 1947-8. It was soon followed by other automobile manufacturers, consumer durable manufacturers,
raw material processors and so on.
(p. 66)
Through the sixties such industry thrived.

In the late

sixties through the mid-seventies, the time of this study,
the Australian economy

11

has experienced, along with many

Nestern nations, a period of economic •stagflation'

11

(Byrt

& Masters, 1974, p. 42), with the depths arriving about the

time I did at the beginning of 1975.
Thus was the environment which GMH found itself attempting to cope with at that time.
much of the above.

And the GMH story reflected

Historically, for example, the origins

of the company began with a leather and saddlery business in
Adelaide, South Australia, founded by James Alexander Holden.
This evolved into the firm of Holden and Frost, a carriage
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and body building company which became Holden's Body Builders
Limited in 1917.

The General Motors Export Company, already

in existence, negotiated an agreement in 1923 to use Holden's
Woodville plant in Adelaide for exclusive manufacture of
motor bodies in Australia.

The two companies merged as

General Motors Holden's Ltd. in 1931.

Late in 1944, on

request from the Commonwealth Government, the company submitted plans to General Motors Overseas Operations (GMOO) to
manufacture a car in Australia--the Holden.

After research

and development work, the first Holden model was announced
in 1948 and was known as "Australia's own car," a first in

Australian history.
This history in part explains the geography of the company.

From a purely rational business point of view, the

company is much more dispersed than it ought to be.

For the

most part, this resulted from General Motors originally being
located in Melbourne and Holden in Adelaide.

The major con-

centration of facilities is still found in and around those
two metropolitan areas.

The headquarters and most parts

manufacturing plants are located in Melbourne, with a Vehicle
Assembly Plant (known as a V.A.P.) and the parts distribution
functions located in the Melbourne suburb of Dandenong.

For

the most part, body manufacturing is still done in Adelaide-the home of the original Holden body works--and just outside
Adelaide in a planned community named after the current
British queen, Elizabeth.

There is also a V.A.P. in
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Elizabeth.

In addition to these major complexes, there is

a V.A.P. in Sydney, called the Pagewood plant, and in Brisbane, called the Acacia Ridge plant, as well as a proving
ground in Lang Lang, approximately 50 miles from Melbourne.
The latter two assembly plants were located away from Melbourne and Adelaide originally to accommodate regional
markets as well as to support Government policy encouraging
decentralization of population.

The regional market rationale

was largely obsolete by 1975, since, for example, one line

of cars was assembled only in Brisbane at the Acacia Ridge
plant and shipped throughout the country.
From 1948 to 1974, the company's average daily production grew from 10 passenger cars per day to 800, while
employment went from 7,560 to 26,515, and factory floor space
from 2,722,000 square feet to 10,166,186 square feet.

By

1975, there existed over 500 dealer outlets, the most extensive dealer network in the country.

Competing with two other

Australian manufacturers (also subsidiaries of U.S.-based
firms) and increasingly with imports (primarily Japanese),
GMH 1 s market share reached a peak of 50 percent in 1958,
continued in the mid-40-percent range to the mid-sixties,
and has shown a fairly steady decline to a low of 25 percent
in 1974.

Figures available on imports from 1960 show an

increase to the 1974 figure of a 44-percent share of the
market.

Although still holding the biggest share of any one

company,

G~rn•s

decreasing market share certainly was an issue
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for the organization.

This was in a market consisting, in

1974, of 587,186 total new vehicle registrations.

Holden's

total vehicle sales for 1974 were 190,447 (including trucks);
157,860 were domestic sales, while 32,587 were export.

Total

sales revenue in Australian dollars was $587,886,000, with

a net profit of $14,012,136.

The highest net profit in the

previous 10 years had been $30,840,002 in 1969 on sales of
$414,796,000.
The product range, consistent with basic GM product

policy dating back to the early days of Alfred P. Sloane,
attempted to cover all market segments, from economy to

luxury car lines.
Previously mentioned factors such as small population
(market} size and transport costs combine with the factors
immediately above to create a cost squeeze and the aforementioned lack of economies of scale.
There was a "wholeness" to GMH that one would not find
in domestic car divisions of the same corporation in the

u.s.

As mentioned in Chapter III, the car was designed,

engineered, manufactured, tested, and marketed by GMH in
Australia.

Nothing was farmed out to other feeder divisions

or corporate staffs.

Likewise, most parts were manufactured

by GMH rather than component divisions and what outside local
suppliers there were were largely developed by GMH when it
was the only Australian manufacturer of cars.
since it

~

Moreover,

General Motors in Australia, it felt the full
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impact of the Australian social and political environments
more than any one division of the parent firm would in the
U.S.

As a large company by Australian standards and, in

many ways, the very symbol of the American-based multinational
company, it constantly made headlines.
Structurally, GMH was organized along functional lines
with the Board of Directors consisting entirely of employee
directors who headed up operating functions.

They reported

to the Managing Director, as did a Manager of Reliability
and Quality Control.

This is shown in the chart in Figure 14.

Of the directors, four were Americans, six were Australians.
The Managing Director of GMH reported, in turn, to a

General Director of General Motors Far Eastern Region.

This

General Director lived and had his office in Melbourne; however, his region included New Zealand, Japan, Korea, Singapore, Malaysia, the Phillipines, and Thailand.

This office

and its staff were called GMOC--General Motors Overseas
Corporation.

The General Director reported to the General

Manager of GMOO--General Motors Overseas Operation--in New
York.
In regard to unions, by far the largest union (representing about 85 percent of the wages or hourly rate employees
of GMH) was the Vehicle Builders Union (V.B.U.).
union of major impact was the Amalgamated

r~etal

A second
Workers

Union (A.M.W.U.), which, though much smaller than the V.B.U.,
included many of the skilled trades workers who occupied

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Managing Director

_L_j_

Reliability and
Quality Control

8
Figure 14 o

Manufacturing

II

Engineering

II

Design

I

Ap~~~~~c!~w;~v~~fon ~~------1
General l-iotors-Holden' s Pty o Ltd. Board of Directors.

"'_,

98

strategic jobs which could easily shut down a plant or, for
that matter, the whole industry.

With these two major

unions, there were several other smaller groups including,
of special significance, the Association of Architects,
Engineers, Scientists, and Draftsmen of Australia (AAESDA),

representing the first four levels of management (foremen,
general foremen, shift superintendents, and superintendents).
Other characteristics of both the country and the company will emerge as they affect the change effort in the

course of reporting the case itself; however, some final
words need to be added here about the state of OD in General

Motors Corporation as a whole at this time since that made
up an important part of the context in which this case took
place.
By the beginning of 1975, GM had been formally involved
in OD for just over 5 years, starting with a pilot project
in four domestic plants late in 1969.

This first project,

done jointly with the Institute for Social Research of the
University of Michigan, led to diffusion of the general OD
approach, first to the General Motors Assembly Division (of
which two of the pilot plants were a part) and then to other
North American divisions.

The first few years this took

place without the involvement of the United Auto Workers,
but by 1973 this powerful union had given the approach its
enthusiastic support at the international officer level.
That year, a formal agreement was reached during regular
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triannual negotiations to establish a joint GM-UAW National
Committee to Improve the Quality of Work Life to encourage
and support OD activities designed to enhance the quality of
the working lives of represented GM employees.

This historic

agreement along with other substantial demonstrations of
high-level support furthered wide diffusion of OD in North
America despite the severe blow suffered by the industry due
to the world-wide energy crisis of 1974.
Relatively little had been done in overseas divisions,
however.

Some training in OD concepts had occurred in

Mexico and some effort had been made to get some activity
under way in European divisions, but little was actually
accomplished.

Thus, GMH became the first overseas division

to take on this approach to change in any substantive way.
However, the fact that the actions to be described in the
case were carried on in the context of a wider corporate
effort with considerable energy and momentum is of some
importance.
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CHAPTER V
SCOUTING:

MEASURE TEN TIMES

My scouting actually began some time before I ever

arrived in Australia.

The very process by which

eventually

arrived on those shores gave me some feel of the situation
I was entering, and I did some more active probing as well.
The first signal (though I confess that it was not sufficiently within my realm of immediate concern that I paid
much attention at the time) perhaps should have come when a
young man from GMH was assigned to our department (the corporate Organizational Research and Development Department)
as a GMOO Fellow.

General Motors Overseas Operations

annually selects a group of high-potential employees from
overseas units to come to the United States for a year of
work-study, the study taking place at General Motors Institute, the work in some domestic unit relevant to
employee's work history and career path.

'~;he

This man, obvi-

ously, had been chosen and asked to do his work and study
in the field of 00 even though no such function existed in
GMH at the time.
However, the first event that actually caused me to
take any notice occurred in September, 1974, when GM's
Director of Personnel Development, to whom our department
reported, came to my office one day and, in the course of a
100
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conversation that touched on a lot of points, offhandedly
mentioned that he had made a career decision for me that he
hoped I didn't mind too much.

He proceeded then to tell me

that GMH had requested my services for 3 months to help them
"get OD started. 11

He told them that

was too involved in

other important projects at the time and therefore was not
available.

The thought of spending time in Australia was

intriguing to me and I said so, though also indicating I
understood his decision.

then put the thought out of my

mind.

About a month later, I was working away from the office
with a group in a strategy-building session when I received
a message to call my office.

When I did, my department head

informed me that, if I were still interested, GMH had said
they were willing to wait until the first of the year, 1975,
and that our Director of Personnel Development had given his
OK to that.

I certainly was interested and called the appro-

priate person in the New York GMOO office who confirmed the
offer for 3 months beginning in January, 1975.

When I probed

for what would be expected, I got the same answer I had
before:

"to get OD started."

I went to New York in late October to finalize arrangements.

This was the fall of 1974, of course, and the auto-

mobile industry was in the final quarter of the year of the
Arab oil crisis and the first quarter of a recession-marked
model year of even worse proportions.

Ironically, the day
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I was in New York to conclude an agreement, a telegram went
out all over the world to GM operating units to reexamine
their budgets, tighten their belts, and reconsider all proposed projects.

It turned out that GMH had proposed two

related projects--one for me, and another for some management
training that would involve a training expert for the corporate Education and Training Staff.

In light of the telegram,

both projects would have to be reevaluated.

Therefore, I

returned to Detroit not knowing whether I would be going
and, in fact, seriously doubting that I would.
Nevertheless, I did find out that day a bit more about
GMH and why they might want the sort of help that someone
like me could provide.

I was given, for example, the type

of general information included in the

11

GMH in Australia"

portion of the previous chapter, including the worsening
competitive situation and decreasing profits on sales.

More

especially, though, I was told of increasing "people problems" at all levels including continuous union-management
conflict.

I was also told that the GMH Personnel Director

and Assistant Personnel Director had spent some weeks in the
u.s. the past summer, during the course of which the Personnel Director had attended a 2-day "Familiarization Seminar"
in OD and the Quality of Working Life that members of our
staff put on in Detroit.

As a result of that and some

enthusiastic endorsement these two men heard at one of the
domestic car divisions, their own enthusiasm grew.

As far
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as my source knew, this scenario, combined with the felt
need, led to the request.

I indicated, on the other hand,

that 3 months was a very short time, probably too short, to
get anything very meaningful and long-range going.

The offer

of even that, however, was now in jeopardy.
Time went on as I returned to my involvement in other
projects, and the more time that passed the less I thought
I would be going to Australia.

However, again while in the

middle of a session at a remote site during the first week

of December, 1974, I received a call asking how my family
and I would feel about showing up in Melbourne on February 1
for

i months.

It turned out that the project reassessment

led to the elimination of the training project and extension
of the OD project.
said yes.
My preparation then began.

I read everything in

libraries and encyclopedias that I could find on Australia.
I talked by phone to the GMH Personnel Director and Manager
of Training once, and though that call dealt primarily with
matters of personal concern such as housing and school for
our three boys, I did get to ask a few questions about the
organization.

I basically received confirmation of what I

had already heard including a reaffirmation of my charter to
start from scratch.

I probed the issue of how American

"visiting firemen" are received and was told it was not
usually much of a concern, that "Yanks" were given "a fair
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go" which only occasionally turned out badly when the Yanks
themselves botched it up.

I also asked how the Managing

Director felt about the project and was told that he and the
General Director were the ones who made the decision to drop
the training project and extend the OD project.

As a result

of this conversation, I was also sent some literature about
the company and a set of organization charts.
So far, I at least had some confidence that (1) I was
in fact wanted, at least by some one or more key people who

could cause such decisions to be made in light of very difficult circumstances, and (2) that I could start from a
fairly blank sheet insofar as OD activities were concerned
and not be involved in "undoing" previous false starts.
Both sets of conditions were encouraging to me.
The most systematic scouting I did at this time, however, took place in a 2-day meeting I requested in Flint
between myself and the three GMOO Fellows from GMH who were
in the U.S. at that time.

All three were young men from

the GMH Personnel Department, one in general personnel administration, one in management training and development, and
the third working in our OD department.

In this meeting

basically began probing for felt needs, readiness, and
support.

The general approach derives from Beckhard's (1969)

model with some flavoring of open systems (Emery & Trist,
1965).

first simply asked the three to identify problems or

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

105

issues or forces they saw impacting on the organization from
the external environment.

There were many.

They included

the unions, ranging--in the perception of these men--from

the V.B.U., which they saw as a relatively conservative union
interested in the bread-and-butter issues of wages and secur-

ity to the A.M.W.U., perceived by them to be radical with
openly communist leadership having high on their agenda
nationalization of the industry.

Other issues included con-

sumerism, rising nationalism (accompanied by increased antimultinational sentiment), a largely migrant labor force

(many

of whom were non-English speaking), and rising inflation.
Pressures from the Labor Government included the Prices
Justification Tribunal (P.J.T.) which ruled on all proposed
price increases, and general Government pressure for low
prices, high quality, full and stable employment and compliance with increasing regulations regarding safety and
pollution.

There was also the push, referred to earlier,

from the commission studying the "rationization" of the
industry.

From both the Government and some union leadership

was coming a still relatively low-level but increasing pressure for "worker participation."

It was here I first began

to realize a different mental model of "worker participation"
from my own.
11

In the U.S. at that time, when we spoke of

Workers participating" or, for example, a participative

system of management, we were typically speaking of operator
level employees being involved in decisions that affect their
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immediate jobs or work areas.

I found, beginning in this

meeting, and developing further as I went, that "worker
participation" in Australia was based on the European model
of co-determination, wherein workers are elected to worker
councils or to the Board of Directors.

This was a legislated

system and more legalistic generally than what I was familiar
with, but I began trying to get familiar with it.
To get at internal forces, I used a matrix based loosely
on Beckhard (1969) and developed and used many times pre-

viously by myself and some other internal GM consultants
with the help of Warren Nielson, consultant external to GM.
First I asked the three men to list all the key people in
the organization.

This resulted in a list of 66.

I then

asked them to rate each of these key people on three factors:
(1) their influence in the organization, whether through
formal position or through opinion leadership; (2) their
readiness for change as represented by an OD approach to
change; and (3) their capability for bringing change about.
The three reached a consensus for each person for each factor
using a rating scale of
a neutral rating, a
an unknown.

11

11 - "

for a negative rating, a

11

0'1 for

+ 11 for a positive rating, or a "? 11 for

Finally, to get at felt needs, I asked, in the

case of each key person, what would be the first wish that
person would ask for if granted three wishes by some magical
being.

When consensus was reached on the first wish,

granted a second; sometimes going to three, sometimes not.
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A matrix, as illustrated in Figure 15, thus developed for
66 key people in the GMH organization.

This would help, I

hoped, in identifying felt needs, supportive forces, opinion
leaders, and gate-keepers.
I then asked the three to develop a form of force field
analysis of the forces they saw that would help or block the
successful launching of an OD effort in GMH.

This is shown

in Figure 16.

Finally,

asked each of the three men to sum up in a

statement their general impressions.

received such state-

ments as "reluctant to make decisions";

11

rate of change is

too fast"; "dead wood"; "lack of dynamism and aggressiveness
and risk-taking at senior management levels";

11

formalized

inertia"; "concentration of decision-making at the top 11 ;
"bewildered, don't know what to do, lack of direction";
11

middle management morale undermined"; "closed system";

11

mistrust of the organization"; "no clear objectives at the

top or at least they're not communicated"; "no planning
group"; "can't cope with changes."

They all summed up with

a consensus statement that the overwhelming need was to
"make GMH more proactive."
I found the 2 days extremely worthwhile in giving me
a "feel" for the state of the system I was about to enter.
Of course, these three men were all relatively young in terms
of experience within the system, from the lower middlemanagement levels, from the Personnel Department and clearly
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Name

Mr. X

Position
Plant Manager

Influence

Readiness

+

-

Capability

Wishes
Promotion
Power
Autonomy
No Government

interference
Mr. Y

Production
Engineering

0

+

+

Productivity

More progressive
organization
More openness and
less politics

Figure 15.

Sample Scouting Matrix

...,
0

"'
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Helping Forces

Blocking Forces

Overall need, including basic need to
survive {10)

Established organization politics {7}
Norm of low risk taking (9)

Frustration with traditional solutions (8)
Lack of depth of talent (B)
Rapid rate of change (5)
Rigid hierarchy (5)
Political pressure (9) for
--Quality of work life
--Efficiency and low cost
--Better relations with unions
--Australian financial equity

Unions (7)
Turnover of talented people {4)
Belief in infallibility of the industry
and its technology (5)

Increasing number of risk takers {2)
Turnover and absenteeism (3)

Lack of business growth (6)

General Motors Corporation 00 efforts {7)

Norm of fire-fighting with no long-range
focus (B)

Mr. A - a key opinion leader seen as
very supportive (7)

Rigid departmentalization {6)
Mr. B - a key opinion leader seen as
very negative {9)

NOTE:

Numbers in parentheses indicate relative weights assigned based on
importance or strength of the force.

Figure 16.

Force Field for 00 Change

....

0

"'

llO
with a bias toward what might be called "rnodern
sive" management practices.

11

or progres-

These characteristics would be

enough for their views to be dismissed by many, and certainly

considered biased.

I took those characteristics into con-

sideration and vowed not to have my own opinions too shaped

by these and to keep as open a mind as possible until I
actually went to Australia.

But these were the best sources

I had available to me at that time.

In the past I had tried

walking into an organization cold, letting i t make its own
first impressions as well as trying to find out whatever
could about it ahead of time.

My own experience has led me

to conclude that I'd rather take the latter course--find out
whatever I can from whomever I can--and trust myself to sort
out the biases.

As it turned out (and more will be said

about this later) , I later concluded from firsthand observation that the three men were remarkably accurate in their
observations and insightful in their judgments.
I chose to detail these 2 days not only because of the
incident of the meeting itself--which in and of itself is
not so critically important in the context of other critical
incidents in the case--but because the framework outlined
became my basic mental model for scouting throughout my
initial contact period.

If I didn 1 t

always write later

observations and judgments down in such a form, I did always
have the same framework in my head and constantly filtered
data through that framework.

Also, as indicated earlier,
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this was not a new model for me, but one tested and developed
through my previous experience and, by this time, almost
intuitive for me.

Thus, the data and the model for organiz-

ing i t as just presented serve as an introduction to my
scouting approach.
Thus armed, and with a firm conviction to enter GMH
with a completely open mind regarding appropriate interventions, my family and I busied ourselves with passport pictures and physicals, arrangements with banks, post offices
and schools, selling cars, figuring out what to do with our
house, and above all, trying to persuade someone to take our
dog for 6 months.

Finally, we flew half-way around the world

and from near the top to near the bottom and arrived in Melbourne on Sunday, February 1, 1975.

With all my usual con-

fidence and with the sort of preparation alluded to, I
nevertheless felt some trepidation that day.
We were met by the Manager of Training and his wi-fe
and son, people who were to turn out to be most helpful and
gracious hosts to us throughout our stay but particularly
at the beginning.

This helpfulness was true not only in a

personal sense, but professionally as well.

As Training

Manager, he was assigned to be my chief internal contact
person and, very likely, to take over as internal manager of
the OD activity when I returned to the u.s.
Thus, a sort of partnership began the next morning when
I reported to his office at the headquarters in Melbourne
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(the location is known locally as Fishermen's Bend and the
headquarters frequently referred to as

11

the Bend").

After

discussing personal arrangements very briefly, the training
manager gave me some of his perceptions of the

11

force field"

facing me and quickly let his feelings be known that a primary obstacle to overcome was a very powerful source of
resistance in the form of the Director of Manufacturing (I
had also heard this in New York and in my meeting with the
GMOO Fellows) .

With little time for anything else, then, I

was taken upstairs for my first meeting with the top man
of the organization, the Managing Director.
This was a significant encounter in several respects
because it was the beginning of a couple of themes that subsequently ran throughout my scouting period.

The first theme

was the Elizabeth V.A.P. {Vehicle Assembly Plant); the second
related to understanding of my role.
Very early in our conversation, the Managing Director
(or "the M.D." as he was called and as I shall refer to him
hereafter) talked about the Elizabeth plant and what a
trouble spot it was in terms of never meeting production
schedules and constantly being the scene of serious industrial relations problems with the union (these kinds of problems were known locally as "industrial problems,,) .

This

theme, as I said, became a constantly recurring one no matter
whom I talked to in those early weeks, and it was obvious
my acceptance with the M.D. and a number of key people would
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have been very high had I cornmi tted right then "to fly over
to South Australia and spend my 6 months

11

fixing" Elizabeth.

However, I immediately had some reservations about that.

knew from experience as well as nearly having memorized some
principles from Harrison (197la) and Shepard (1975), referred
to in Chapter II, that there was potential disaster, if not
professional suicide, in taking that route.

Harrison

referred to trying to work with "relatively healthy parts

of the system"
2" of his

11

(p.

2), while Shepard, in "Rule III, Corollary

Rules of Thumb for Change Agents," said:

The physician-patient relationship is often
regarded as analogous to the consultant-client
relationship.
The results for system change
can be unfortunate.
For example, the organization development consultant is likely to be
greeted with delight by executives who see in
his specialty the solution to a hopeless situation in an outlying plant.
Some organization
development consultants have disappeared for
years because of the irresistibility of such
challenges.
Others have whiled away their time
trying to counteract the Peter principle by
shoring up incompetent managers.
(p. 3).
This was precisely the situation being described to me,
and I didn't want either to "disappear' 1 nor to "while away"
my time unproductively.
as a matter of reflex.

These thoughts occurred to me almost
Since it was my first meeting with

the M.D. and not a substantive "contracting session,

11

I did

not fully disclose these feelings but I did suggest broadly
that before efforts in such locations could be successful,
other conditions needed to be in place, such as top-level
understanding and support.

He agreed as he did with my
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general request for such support and help for the entire
effort, indicating that this was particularly critical in
trying to accomplish much in so short a time as 6 months.
This also relates to the second theme that began with
this encounter, that related to the understanding of my role.
I mentioned above that I had earlier by phone from the States
asked the Personnel Director what the M.D. thought about my
corning.

now had the chance to ask him myself.

I

actually asked was why he thought I was there?

What I

His response

was that I was there because the Personnel Director had personally lobbied so long and hard to get me there.

That

response took me back a bit and certainly did not encourage
me.

My experience was that projects in which top-line

management did not take ownership were on precarious grounds,
and even more especially so if the sole ownership was in the
Personnel Department.
The theme, however, that this began and which developed
through most of my meetings with people over the next few
weeks was that they didn't know why I was there or what sort
of function I represented.

I usually got blank stares when

introduced as someone from Organization Development.

Some

thought I was an expert in restructuring the organization.
Others knew of some of the more popularly visible aspects of
OD such as job enrichment or "worker participation" or "human
relations.

11

I was once introduced, somewhat facetiously but

somewhat "on the square," as "Dick Ault from the Corporation.
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He's the bloke who's going to solve all our people problems."
The man to whom I was thus introduced looked at me, then
back at the introducer, and replied, "Has he got a bloody
wand?"

That all contributed to my being viewed with some

suspicion by many.

I was once told by a friend in the Per-

sonnel Department that one of his employees had asked if I

"was the bloke sent out from Detroit to sack us all?
("Sack,

11

of course, means

11

11

to fire.")

While these two themes starting with the M.D. bothered

me mildly, they didn't completely jar me because neither is
all that unusual in OD practice.
as phenomena to be dealt with.

Primarily, they registered
In the first case, it soon

became clear that I would not, in my view, be doing an honest
job for GMH without somehow dealing constructively with
expectations around helping the Elizabeth V.A.P.
there was the "irresistibility of the challenge

(besides,

11 ) ,

while at

the same time knowing many other pieces would have to be in
place before that could be done.

In the second case, I knew

I would have to do something to help people understand OD
and my role in it, at least to the extent that this lack of
knowledge and understanding would not present a barrier to
the change effort.
Beyond those two issues, the M.D. and I talked about a
wide range of get-acquainted-with-each-other-and-theorganization topics, and I found him quite open with data
about the organization, its performance, and his feelings.
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My final request was for an understanding that I was free
to talk with people and work at all levels and in all parts
of the organization without worrying about chains of command
or other bureaucratic obstacles and, most especially, that
I be free to talk with him further whenever I felt that
necessary.

This request was enthusiastically granted.

On balance, therefore, I felt reasonably good about
this first meeting with the top man.

Some concerns were

raised, certainly, but some important expectations were surfaced both ways and nothing presented itself as an insurmountable obstacle.
The next weeks, then (actually most of the time from
February 1 through the first week of March), were spent in
similar get-acquainted meetings with key management people
in the organization along with some tours of facilities.
This itinerary had been prearranged by the Training Manager
and the Personnel Director and in the course of that time I
met and talked with about 35 of the most senior managers in
the company, toured all the facilities in and around Melbourne and Adelaide, and talked more informally with many,
many others--primarily in management.

The get-acquainted

meetings planned for me were planned for just that--getting
acquainted--but with my scouting agenda in my head I tried
to use them for some more systematic data-gathering than
that; for further determining felt needs and supportive and
resistant forces.

Since the schedule was built around
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getting acquainted almost as pro-forma social calls, there
often wasn't much time, especially between meetings.
frequently felt myself suffering from "data overload" but
would try in the few spare moments I could snatch between
meetings and always at the end of the day to spill my impressions into a tape recorder.

also always checked my per-

ceptions after meeting someone with the ratings given that
individual by the GMOO Fellows (I did not look at their data

before the encounters).
In addition to one-on-one meetings, I was also invited
by the Training Manager

(who, incidentally, accompanied me

on many--though not all--of these meetings and served generally as my

11

introducer") to speak to groups of managers

scheduled into one of three levels of week-long management
training sessions:

basic management (for first-level super-

vision), intermediate management (for second and third levels
of management), and advanced management (for senior management usually up to but not including the Director level).
My practice was to give about 10 minutes of background on
myself and then open it up for questions and answers.
always asked a lot of questions myself, thus taking the
opportunity to create a sort of group interview or "sensing"
session.
A critical one-on-one meeting was the one with the
Director of Manufacturing, a most powerful man with something
on the order of 85 percent of the organization reporting to
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him and responsible for about that share of the annual
budget.

Moreover, he was the man about whom I had often

been warned as the source of the greatest potential resistance.

In this first encounter, he was most gracious, though

obviously a man who knew he possessed considerable power.
He concluded by saying, "I really want to use you while you
are out here and learn from you.

11

To which I replied I hoped

it would be a mutual learning experience.
Perhaps

the most significant of those first meetings,

however, occurred on Thursday of my first week when the
Training Manager and I drove to just outside of Melbourne
to the suburban Dandenong V.A.P.

It was there that I met

the Plant Manager who was to play a most important role in
my stay, both professionally and personally.

The Training

Manager, the local plant Personnel Manager (whom I had also
just met and who turned out to be a long-term professional
and personal supporter), and I went up to the Plant Manager's
office and the conversation started in the usual way.

When

he was told I was an Organization Development consultant, he
asked me to explain OD.

I have never felt very comfortable

nor successful trying to do that in a few words across a
desk, but I made my usual fumbling effort.

After letting me

ramble a few minutes, he interrupted and said, "I'm not sure
I understand, but let me tell you what we're trying to do
here."

He then proceeded to describe his efforts since he

had been Plant Manager (only about 2 months) to install a

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

119

sense of teamwork--starting with his immediate work group,
some other key members of which were also new, either to
that plant or to their jobs--throughout the organization, to
improve communication, and to "get people involved.
replied that he had just defined OD.

11

At the same time, light

bulbs were going off in my head, lighting up visions of the
Greiner (1967) model of successful patterns of organization
change (see also Chapter II of this study).

There it was:

a new man at the top (plus others), a reexamination of past

practices, etc.

My enthusiasm was encouraged to wax further

when I found out he had been the personal choice for this
new job of the Director of Manufacturing--the one I had been
warned of repeatedly--and had a close and influential relationship with him.

Furtunately, I was more well versed in

the assembly part of the business than any other because I
had spent the first 4 years of my OD career exclusively in
assembly plants.

For these and other reasons, he and I got

along very well from the first and, as will be revealed a
bit later in this story, he turned out to be of immense help
and importance in getting OD launched in GMH.
In addition, that day he introduced me to a most pleasant Australian custom.

It was February, the counterpart to

a U.S. August in the Australian summer, and, I was told, the
hottest day of the year.

Thus, after our conversation and

a tour of both the passenger car and truck assembly plants,
we went to the executive dining room, whereupon the manager
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of food catering brought forth liter bottles of Australian
beer and a platter of cheese and what I called crackers but
was informed were "bickies"

(or biscuits).

That was the

first of my "beer and bickies 11 sessions at the Dandenong
plant, but only the beginning of a plant tradition that will
be referred to later in this case.

Thus, over beer and

bickies, the Plant Manager and I began to cement a relationship.

That relationship was professionally rewarding to both

of us, I
study.

believe, evidence of which will emerge in this
On a personal basis, this Manager and his wife became

the closest Australian friends my wife and I have.

This man was not one rated by the GrilOO Fellows because
he was not in a key position at the time they made their
ratings, having been promoted in the interim.

Certainly, at

my first opportunity, I added his name to the list and
awarded him three pluses.

There was a great temptation to

jump immediately to the conclusion that here was an appropriate entry point; however, it was only the first week of
my scouting and I was still committed to measuring 10 times
before I cut.

Thus I resisted the temptation temporarily,

but kept the data from this visit in an active storage core
for ready retrieval.
This represents another phenomenon fairly typical of
my pattern of behavior and thought during this early, getacquainted, scouting period.

That is, while I was firmly

trying to maintain a personal discipline regarding keeping
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an open mind and keeping options open, I nevertheless kept
developing tentative diagnoses, tentative analyses, and
thinking through tentative strategies.

These would have the

practical effect of hypotheses, developed almost daily to

be tested by the next day s round of interviews and meetings.
1

Usually I kept them only to myself because they were very
tentative and changing continually, and I didn't want to
prejudice any ultimate entry strategy.

However, I would

occasionally test a theory with someone I trusted to clarify
whether or not I was completely out of line.

Other times I

would pose one of my hypotheses to someone

was meeting for

the first time as a sensing question, thus garnering further
data from his response.
For example, one of my discoveries, pleasant though not
altogether surprising, was that there were people such as
the Plant Manager discussed above who were practicing or
attempting to practice approaches to management consistent
with OD principles.

It naturally occurred to me to want to

build on this source of support and potential strength.
Since I was just one person, from the outside, and leaving
in 6 months, I did not represent sufficient

11

Critical mass"

(Harrison, 197la) to sustain a change effort, but, I thought,
if these internal "users 11 were linked together (Harrison,
197la) there was a possibility that such mass could be
attained.

Therefore, I began formulating a list I called

"Potential Internal Network of Users."

By the end of the
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first month, I had listed 14 candidates for that network
from plants, the Supply, Financial, Personnel, and Sales
departments, and representing different levels and skills
such as manufacturing, systems development, and training.
Along similar lines, I continually noted potential pilot
demonstration projects as possible entry points including
several production departments in plants, and some central

staff activities.
I toyed with diagnostic cause-effect models, one, for

example, attempting to depict the dynamic interactive causeeffect relationships among the

11

Wholeness 11 of the company,

its low volume, scarce human resources and scattered geography, in combination with strong (actually rigid would be
more accurate) functional boundaries for problem-solving
and career development.

All of these factors were further

affected as an entire system as well as in each part by an
extremely rapidly changing social-political-economic environment.

This systemic analysis, tentative and first brush as

it was, led me to serious consideration of the potential
return to be realized in this organization by what O'Connell
(1968) called "economies of coordination" (p. 2).

Since the

traditional routes to economies of scale and specialization
were effectively blocked, this less traditional approach of
searching for efficiency through coordinative efforts seemed
to hold some promise and there was clearly much room for
improvement.

As indicated, problem-solving tended to take
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place up the chain of command within narrowly defined and
nearly impenetrable functional boundaries as did career
development.

Most Directors, for example, who were func-

tional staff heads, had spent their whole careers in the one
department which they now headed.

For this and other rea-

sons, it was very difficult for these individuals, when they
met as a group, to take off their functional hats to look at
the enterprise as a whole.

Further, there were comments

from throughout lower levels of management decrying the lack
of explicit and coordinated direction from the top.

In my

reflections on these matters, I dug out the following from
Lawrence and Lersch (1969) :
When units (because of their particular tasks)
are highly differentiated, it is more difficult
to achieve integration among them than when
individuals in the units have similar ways of
thinking and behaving. As a result, when groups
in an organization need to be highly differentiated but also require tight integration, i t is
necessary for the organization to develop more
complicated integrating mechanisms.
The basic
organizational mechanism for achieving integration is, of course, the management hierarchy.
In organizations with low differentiation, we
have found that this is often sufficient to
achieve the required intergroup collaboration.
However, organizations with the requirement for
both a high degree of differentiation and tight
integration must develop supplemental integrating
devices, such as individual coordinators, crossunit teams and even whole departments of individuals whose basic contribution is achieving
integration among other groups.
(p. 13)
Their description of an organization with the dual
requirements of high differentiation (due to a complex and
rapidly changing environment) and tight integration (for
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needed economies of coordination) seemed to fit GMH exactly
(or, to use an Australian expression, which I found myself
doing increasingly, the description was "spot on
fore,

I

11 ) .

There-

began to probe for and develop ideas for "supplemen-

tal integrating devices" as well as to look for ways of
improving integration within existing mechanisms.
However, I was still "measuring."
The concepts of Paul Lawrence were also helpful in
another significant "measuring
this first month.

11

or scouting expedition in

As I said earlier, the Elizabeth V.A.P.

and its troubles were described to me by virtually everyone
with the remotest interest whom I met during the first three
weeks of February.

This period of time was all spent in and

around Melbourne and, of course, the Elizabeth plant was
about 400 miles away in South Australia and I hadn't been
there as yet.

The Director of Manufacturing, whom I very

much wanted at least neutral if not as an ally, asked me to
visit the plant with him on February 27 to meet key people
in the South Australia operations (about half the company)
and particularly to begin to determine what might be done
to help this plant that was in such desperate shape.
On the way in the plane he informed me of something
that contained within it no little irony.

He said that it

was he who, some time ago, had requested that a Corporate
00

resource be brought to Australia to help with the "people

problems" of the company, especially those at Elizabeth.
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This came from the man I had frequently been cautioned about.
There was never an opportunity to conclusively resolve the
truth of that claim, but I attempted to capitalize on it
with him from that point on.
At the Elizabeth plant itself, the Director of Manufacturing introduced me to several key people and we concluded
the day with a meeting of the two of us along with the Plant
Manager, the General Superintendent of Production (second
from the top of the plant manufacturing organization), and

the two senior Industrial Relations people responsible.

The

Manufacturing Director was attempting to show to these key
people at Elizabeth his support of me and the sort of resource
to them that I represented.

Further, he attempted to steer

both them and me toward an intervention with the unions, ""ho
had been, in management's view, most troublesome--to put it
mildly--for some time in the plant.

(In fact, a shop steward

had, the week before, been "sacked" for support of sabotage.)
I saw great hazard in jumping to that sort of intervention
before a lot of other preparatory work had been done, as did
the plant people in the meeting.

All of us voiced some of

these concerns while at the same time assuring the Director
that we were willing somehow to work toward that eventuality.
"Somehow" describes the lack of focus their ideas or mine
then had as to how.

My main agenda item was to line up the

opportunity to return on my own for a more extended and
systematic scouting effort at a later time without committing
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myself to any particular course of action at this time.
It was arranged that I would so return for a 4-day visit
beginning about 2 weeks later, on March 14.
I had heard so much about Elizabeth by this time that
I began to form some impressions, and it struck me that so
much of what I had heard reminded me of a diagnosis made by
Paul Lawrence and Arthur Turner of one of GM's assembly
plants in the U.S.

Lawrence and Turner had been engaged as

OD consultants in 1973 in this domestic plant and as part of
their early strategy interviewed a diagonal slice of the
organization.

As a result of these interviews, they built

the cause-effect diagnostic model shown in Figure 17.
tially this model shows a number of

11

Essen-

Vicious cycles" an

organization can find itself in, stemming from the interaction of some fundamental causal variables.

It begins with a

standard assembly technology, inherent in which are repetitive jobs and the pressure of the line.

In this particular

plant, these forces combined with a fairly well-educated work
force to breed discontent over the years.

Add to this a

union that had become very strong and, as a result of negotiations over several years, high pay for the average auto
worker in the u.s.

These circumstances combine with pres-

sures corning from the top to make cars to a schedule "regardless" and to avoid disruptions.

Knowing this, the union

puts pressure on management to make "deals" or settlements
to reduce workloads.

The cycle of events or chain reaction
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begins there, leading to increased boredom, absenteeism,
and overtime to catch up.

This in turn leads to higher pay

(and even more absenteeism) and even further union power.
The union then increases its harassment, causing management

to make further

11

deals,

11

and the cycle begins all over again.

one result of the whole admixture of forces was a very low
mood on the part of local management consisting of a sense

of pressure, finger-pointing, reliance on expedient solutions,
and generally low morale.
As I say, what I was hearing about the Elizabeth plant

was, with some few exceptions and modifications, remarkably
similar to that dismal picture.

However, I wanted to test

that notion before I went to Elizabeth for my 4-day visit.
I arranged to meet with the Training Manager and one of the
training people who worked for him, a man who was viewed by
many as a keen observer of the organization.

I trusted the

judgment of both of them and, in addition, they both had a
foundation in behavioral science theory.

I simply told them

waht my impressions were and the story of the LawrenceTurner intervention and drew the model shown in Figure 17 on
a chalkboard explaining it as I went.

I asked them to chal-

lenge the diagnosis as they saw it applying or not applying
to Elizabeth.

They were in general agreement that the model

did apply; however, they pointed out other respects in which
it did not and additional critical factors which did not
appear on the model.

As a result, I went to Elizabeth on
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March 14 feeling I had a generally useful conceptual framework for my scouting efforts, but aware of the need to allow
for further inputs that might not fit the model as presently
conceived.
During my 4 days there, I met with and interviewed more

than a dozen of the top key managerial personnel involved.
A group interview of about 20, representing all levels and
functions of management, was also arranged.

In addition, I

had one of the most productive plant tours I had ever experi-

enced, the Lawrence-Turner diagnostic model corning in especially handy as I viewed the technological issues in the
plant.

Also, two key people--the Plant Manager and the Per-

sonnel Manager for South Australia--each offered, unsolicited
by me, and independently (without knowing the other was doing
it), a list of potentially ready, supportive, and capable
management people.

These lists later were very valuable,

as will be discussed in the

11

Elizabeth" section of Chapter

VII.
At the conclusion of that visit, I modified the diagnostic model in light of what I had learned.

Actually, over

the next few weeks it went through several iterations in my
mind as well as on a paper, until it looked as it is shown

in Figure lB.
It will be noted that there have been some additions
and modifications.

Significantly, in the cause-effect chain

starting from the top, there is no "people orientation 11 from
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top management.

Certainly, no evidence of such came from

my interviews or observations.

Another very important chain

begins in the lower left-hand corner and eventually rises up
to meet the technical causal chain.

Just about 2 years

before my arrival on the scene, it turns out, a "Rationalization Plan" had been developed by the top management of GMH.
That plan included closing down the Elizabeth Assembly Plant
and transferring its production to Dandenong--the V.A.P. just
outside of Melbourne--where a second shift would be added.
The official announcements were made and the plan enacted to
the point where some management people who were asked if they
wanted transfers from Elizabeth to Dandenong had sold their
old homes and bought new ones a thousand miles away.
a shocking thing happened.

Then

It was discovered not enough

people could be hired in the Dandenong area to man a second
shift and therefore the whole plan was scuttled.

The shock

waves were still strongly reverberating 2 years later.

The

direct effect of those developments on worker and management
morale and security were bad enough, certainly, and people
were not yet convinced that they might not receive similar
word of an imminent closing at any time.

Beyond the immedi-

ate psychological effect, however, were substantive effects
on the system.

Because there were plans to close the plant,

no maintenance was done on the tools or machinery for a long
period of time.

A structural problem contributed to continu-

ance of this problem in that the Maintenance Department was
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not, as was the case in other assembly plants, part of the
plant structure.

Elizabeth was a multi-plant complex, and

the Maintenance Department reported to another plant.
Therefore, the V.A.P. would have to "beg," to use their word,
for service.

These two factors combined with the fact that

almost as soon as the rationalization scheme folded, a recession began and there just wasn't money available for the
projects required to get tools and machinery caught up from
the deficit incurred by the plan.

The result of all of this

was that little or no preventative maintenance was done and
there were frequent assembly line breakdowns, which, given
the technical inflexibility of assembly line technology,
immediately and clearly resulted in not meeting production
schedules--the most acute of performance symptoms.

This

result, in turn, contributed to the self-fulfilling prophecies of doom and discouragement reflected in the mood of
local management, to which a few items were added to the
original Lawrence-Turner model.
One other matter of note was the apparently slight
revision relative to changing "Strong Union" to "Strong
Shop-Floor Union Tradition. 11
plant, was no minor change.

This, to the people in this
The community of Elizabeth was

a fully planned community, planned by the Labor Government
of the State of South Australia in the fifties.

Part of the

scheme was the active recruitment of migrants from England 1 s
industrial midlands.

Offices were set up in England with
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pictures and displays and new, inexpensive homes were sold
to people in England and generous financial assistance given
for relocation.

A man might even receive the keys to his new

home in England and open the door the day of his arrival in
Australia.

This resulted in the importation of the customs

of the area, including the labor custom of the strong and
independent shop steward who led his mates on the shop floor,
sometimes ignoring--and sometimes actually flaunting--state
and federal union leadership.

Thus was the state of my diagnosis of the Elizabeth
V.A.P., based on the Lawrence-Turner model substantiated

and/or modified by data from interviews and observations.
Except for my continuing ruminations on it, it was then
stored for use at a later time.
the "Elizabeth

11

This use will be found in

section of Chapter VII.

M:eanwhile, as the above was fermenting and developing
in my mind, other scouting went on.

Three more significant

aspects of the scouting period require discussion.
The first of these was a serendipitous development that
enhanced the chances for success considerably.

Shortly

after my arrival carne the news that a new Manager over all
of the Vehicle Assembly Plants was being brought out from
the U.S.

It turned out that this man was one I knew quite

well and had worked with in OD in the past.

Indeed, his

assignment just previous to this promotion and transfer to
Australia was Plant Manager at the most innovative plant in
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GM, a plant that was actively experimenting with everything
from innovating management structures to the elimination of
time clocks to team assembly of vehicles.
and Dandenong V.A.P.

1

5

Both the Elizabeth

reported to him, of course, and both

were most actively being considered for interventions.

After

his arrival we talked frequently and jointly built some

strategy, which will be discussed in the course of the case.
The second of these final aspects of scouting to be dis-

cussed here has to do with another key relationship.

I men-

tioned earlier that the Training Manager was my chief internal
contact person, the coordinator of my activities, and apparently the person who would continue in the OD function upon
my withdrawal from the system.

As a result, it should be

mentioned that for most of the above activities he and I
operated as a team; for example, going to interviews together
and reflecting on them.

He did not make the visits to Eliza-

beth with me, but, as already indicated, I did share the
Lawrence-Turner diagnostic model with him previous to my
visit, and did likewise with successive post-visit iterations
of the model.

We spent a great deal of these first couple

of months together.

I was very dependent on him for internal

contacts and arrangements, while, at the same time, I was
trying to help him learn with me in anticipation of his being
central to the continuity of the change effort.
Finally, a few words about MBO (Management by Objectives).

As indicated early in this discussion of scouting,
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one of the situations I faced was the lack of understanding
of my role.

While this provided, in my initial contacts with

people, some opportunity to establish rapport by explaining
myself, it is not an opportunity without hazards.

As

already pointed out, I have never been--nor do I know anyone
who has--very successful at briefly and satisfactorily
defining OD.

When I would begin trying, people often tried

to help by, as previously mentioned, suggesting the more
widely known manifestations of OD such as job enrichment,
team assembly, human relations and the like.

I would typi-

cally deal with this phenomenon with a response like,

11

Well,

yes, that can be one way OD is applied, but it s a broader
1

thing than that and we may or may not use that approach
depending on what's appropriate for the situation."

One

such sub-set of OD, however, I learned fairly soon was not
to be treated that way.

It seems that a couple of years

before MBO was started in GMH with great flurry and fanfare
and then unceremoniously collapsed.

I quickly researched

the history of the effort and found violations of practically
every principle of implementation strategy, including those
reviewed in Chapter II of this study.

This was viewed as

the ultimate exercise in futility by almost every person I
talked to.
or

11

Phrases like,

11

This is not another MBO, is it? 11

What makes you think your scheme is going to turn out

any different than MB0? 11 were strong indicators of a mood of
skepticism at best and outright cynicism at worst.

Many
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people seemed convinced nothing would help.

I admitted to

these people, most of whom thought MBO could be of some value
but who were decrying its lack of implementation, that MBO
could be considered as part of an OD strategy, but tried to

assure them that (1) they were not synonymous and (2) we
would try to avoid some of the mistakes of that previous
undertaking.

It was the catch-phrase, however, that could

immediately signal skepticism throughout the time I spent

in Australia.
Thus, as described in all of the above, I went about

''measuring ten times."

One can always measure more, of

course; there is always more information one needs or could
use, more reflection or analysis one should do.

However,

at some point measuring or scouting can become an excuse
for lack of action.

What's more, I was on a 6-month assign-

ment and a month and a half were gone.

From experience, I

knew that it always takes longer to cause things to happen
than one plans.

I was beginning to feel pressure to cut.
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CHAPTER VI
ENTRY:

CUT TIVICE

A meeting of the GM Overseas Administration Committee--

a group of the most senior people in the management of all
GM Overseas operations--was scheduled for Melbourne starting
Sunday, March 9.

On March 12, the General Director of Per-

sonnel for GMOO was to meet with the GMH Personnel Director
and his section heads for an update on Personnel activities
of the company.
11

As a matter of courtesy, knowing I was still

getting acquainted 11 and wouldn't have much to report, the

GMH Personnel Director asked me if I would like to be on the
agenda.

I hesitated a moment, feeling that the most logical

thing to say was no, but said yes.

I added that I wouldn't

have much to say but that I would take the opportunity to
bring the man from New York up to date on what I had been
doing.

In my own mind I was seeing it as an opportunity to

consolidate my own thoughts.
The weekend prior to March 12 then was Labor Day Weekend
in Australia, a 3-day holiday.

As I went about activities

with my family those 3 days, preparation for my presentation
was brewing in my head.

Finally on Monday, March 10, Labor

Day, my thoughts began to come together.

It was a lovely

day in the Australian autumn and I took a walk by myself.
was facing some personal dilemmas, most of them
137
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involving time.

On the one hand there were pulls, personal

and professional, to stay beyond 6 months.

Professionally

the challenge was certainly there and an ego that told me
that if given sufficient time I might make a significant contribution to the company in general and to tough situations
like Elizabeth V.A.P. in particular.

This was coupled with

a concern that relatively little could be done in the 4-1/2
months that were left.

Personally my family and I were

enjoying Australia tremendously and sharing a rewarding
family experience we didn't want to end for a while.
other hand, it was a 6-month assignment and

On the

had no reason

to think it might be extended, either on the part of GMH,
GMOO in New York, or my horne office in Detroit.

Moreover,

there were professional pulls to return home as well, not
wanting to miss out on challenging developments in the

u.s.

I also knew a truth about myself was that I always tended to
get overly involved and to want to

11

satisfied to do what can be done.

On the personal side, we

still owned a home in the
school chums, etc.

u.s.,

do it all 11 without being

had a dog there as well as

As I walked that day, I contemplated

those pulls and counterpulls and reached a decision that the
best and most feasible position I could take at that moment
was that I would be there for 6 months and 6 months only and
that it was important for me and for the organization--almost
as a matter of my personal and professional integrity--that
I and the organization keep that firmly in mind.

Therefore,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

139

I thought, I needed to develop some goals for myself and my
assignment that were 6-rnonth goals and not 2-year goals.
The question then, of course, was:

What are 6-rnonth goals?

By Wednesday, the day I was to be on the agenda with
the other Personnel section heads and the GMH and GMOO Personnel Directors, I had worked some out and had talked them
over with my internal partner, the Training Hanager.

The

latter immediately threw a monkey wrench into the machinery
of my firm integrity and resolve by telling me I ought to
forget about 6 months; that it was clear already that I'd be
staying longer than that.

I tried, however, to ignore that

and forge on with my commitment to "doing a 6-month job" for
GMH.

I also told the Training Manager that I was going to

make a couple of tentative "cuts" that week.
In my brief remarks to the GMOO Personnel Director on
March 12 (and actually to the management of the local Personnel Department as well, since they were also wondering
when and if I was going to do anything except poke my nose
into everyone•s business), I outlined four goals of "a
6-month job" as I saw them:
1.

To develop top management understanding and
support as a minimum and obtain their guidance
or direction setting for the effort as an
optimum.

2.

To build on what already exists, i.e., to
develop a network among those already managing consistently with OD principles so they
could share with, learn from, and support
one another.
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3.

To build internal OD specialist resource
capability.

4.

To help the organization make appropriate
plans for institutionalization of the OD
effort.

I added that we might engage in pilot demonstration efforts
but that these--although they should prove helpful as ends
in themselves--would primarily serve as means to the above
goals.
There was agreement from the GMOO representative as well
as the GMH people around the table that these were worthwhile

goals for the remainder of my stay.
The next day I made two cuts.
I went to the Managing Director and reviewed some of my

general impressions to date, the goals outlined above and the
rationale for them, stressing the importance of top-level
understanding and support.

As a concrete suggestion for

getting under way, I recommended a 3-day offsite meeting of
his staff--the Board of Directors or Department Head group-to familiarize them with OD, hopefully obtain their support,
and, if possible, get some direction from them.

He himself

was not very familiar with OD approaches, of course, and I
explained the sorts of things that might happen in such a
session and why I thought it might be helpful.

While

attempting to be supportive, he obviously felt some hesitation to commit his staff to 3 days--probably weekend days-away from their jobs and their families without their knowing
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(or his knowing, for that matter) more about what was
involved.

He finally asked if I would mind taking about an

hour in the Boardroom to make a presentation to the group
about OD and helping them to understand the need for a 3-day
offsite meeting.

In my head I wrestled with a dilemma.

Again, I didn't feel confident to get sufficient appreciation
of OD on a 1-hour stand-up presentation whereas I was confident I could in a 3-day session with generous use of

experience-based learning exercises.
(197la) guideline:

There is Harrison's

"Develop confidence and credibility on

the part of organization members through situations where
the OD unit's unique expertise shows to best advantage"
(p. 2).

I knew from experience that the sort of 3-day session

I had in mind would be consistent with that guideline.
hour in the Boardroom likely would not be.

One

However, it was

a perfectly reasonable request and it looked like as much as
I could get at the moment.

Therefore, I gulped and took it.

We set up the time for the last part of the afternoon of
March 20, and I left unsure of whether I had moved forward
or backward.

If the presentation turned out badly, it could

have effectively blocked future progress.

I went directly

from the M.D.'s office to the Personnel Director's, told him
what had happened and my mixed feelings about it.

He con-

soled me to a degree and assured me I had made the right
decision.
The same day as the above encounter, I was scheduled to

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

142

go out to Dandenong to speak to one of the training classes
I talked to from time to time.

I went out early and met

with the Plant Manager of the Dandenong V.A.P.--the man whom
became so enthusiastic about my first week in Melbourne.
chose to try to enter through him for a number of reasons.

Some are obvious from my discussion of the previous meeting.
He was a new manager, already trying to sweep with a new
broom and the broom was similar to an OD broom.

other new managers in key slots as well.

There were

The plant had

apparently been under fairly repressive management for some

years and was in third place out of the four assembly plants
in most performance measures, with Elizabeth being the only

plant in worse shape.

Yet, with the new management team

in place only about 3 months, there was obvious momentum
toward turning things around.

Enthusiasm was catching through-

out the plant and people were, under the new leadership,
beginning to learn they could do some things successfully.
All in all, it seemed to fit the Greiner (1967) pattern of
successful change to a T, and I thought it was the perfect
spot for me to play a catalytic role to help them capitalize
on their momentum, at the same time developing a demonstration of a "winner" for OD, thus meeting the Harrison principle
stated above.

A·t the same time, this Plant Manager, as I

have already said, was the choice of and had influence with
the Director of Manufacturing, one of the most, if not the
most critical combination gate-keeper/opinion leader in the
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system.

Moreover, it was an assembly plant, and a success

there, I reasoned, would aid in obtaining appropriate support
from him and other key people for an overall GMH strategy
but more specifically for the Elizabeth V.A.P. situation
when and if that needed to be approached.

(As already indi-

cated, I felt some responsibility to tackle the Elizabeth
project before I left, but I did want to get other pieces of
the puzzle in place first.)

All roads, it seemed, led me

to the Dandenong V.A.P.
I very frankly and openly explained all of the above
to the Plant Manager, with whom, as I described earlier, I
had already established a pretty good relationship.

I summed

up by telling him very honestly that I would like to "use
him and his plant" (and that's the expression I employed)
as a means for establishing credibility for me and OD; at
the same time, I said I thought I could help him.

He was

eagerly receptive, indicating he was hoping to use me.
(Consistent with research, he, as an innovative type,
eagerly used resources wherever he could find them provided
they made sense to him and, given his ego, didn't detract
from the clear understanding that it was his plant.)
We then went on to explore options together.
explained many of the intervention "families 11 discussed in
Chapter II, especially those I thought might have some fit
for his plant's situation.

The one he preferred was to

begin with a Beckhard (1967) "confrontation meeting," an
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approach to organizational goal-setting and problem-solving.
Designed as it is for large groups and for fast action so as
to develop at many levels, all at once, "broad and deep support for change" (Fordyce & Weil, 1971, p. 95), it had great
appeal for this man who was already trying to do just that
and do it as fast as he could.

Moreover, it is such a

straightforward, no-frills process that it usually makes just
good, practical sense to managers.

It was also my preference

though I conscientiously tried not to bias the decision too
strongly, because I too needed a quick winner and though the
other approaches we discussed may have worked, they didn•t
promise results with the same efficiency.

Therefore, we

agreed to begin that way and he called in his secretary then
and there and dictated a letter to the Director of Manufacturing requesting approval to go ahead, since it would
involve weekend time and participants would need to be paid
overtime.

The preparations for the meeting and the meetings

themselves will be covered in the "Dandenong

11

section of

this chapter.
The next day I went off for my extended visit to Elizabeth which I have already described.

While on this visit

I also had to prepare my presentation to the Board since it
would take place late on the day after my return.
The day of that critical presentation came on March 20.
Basically the presentation consisted of the Beckhard (1969)
definition of OD--"an effort (1) planned, (2) organization-
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wide, and (3) managed from the top, to (4) increase organization effectiveness and health throughout (5) planned interventions in the organizations processes, using behavioral
science knowledge"

(p. 9)--that I took apart and expanded on

the key points by using real-world examples, mostly from

General Motors experience, which I believed these men would
find credible.

I particularly stressed "managed from the

top" and, based on Harrison (197la) , discussed three possible
levels of involvement from them, the top of GMH.

I said that

as an absolute minimum they needed to give "permission for
change to occur"

(p. 2), for others in their organization to

experiment under a reasonably protective umbrella.

Without

that, I said that I might as well return to the U.S. and save
time, energy, and frustration for all of us.

The second

level, less than ideal but better than the first, is "support
and encouragement for change 11
ideal, is

11

(p. 2), and the third, most

active participation in change in which higher

management actively involves itself in the change process. 11
I indicated that though the last level was obviously preferable to me, I felt something productive could develop whichever level they chose, but, to be fair to both me and others
in their organization it was important to know from which
level we were operating.

I also showed them a cafeteria line

of options for ways they might get involved, which included
but

~ ~

means

~

restricted

!£

a 3-day offsite meeting.

Indeed, by the time of this presentation, I had decided that,
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while advantageous,

and the effort could in fact go on

whether or not such a 3-day event occurred.

When I discussed this ahead of time with the Personnel
Director, he had been disappointed.

He was of the view

that I should strongly sell the 3 days and felt strongly
that the group would choose not to engage in such a meeting

if they weren't pushed to do so.

He reluctantly allowed me

to do it my way.
When I concluded the presentation, without any specific
recommendation beyond the list of options, the Managing
Director told the group of the meeting he and I had had and
how he wanted them informed and part of a decision regarding
a 3-day event.
cussion.

He then turned it over to the group for dis-

The ensuing 15 minutes were among the highlights

of my work with GMH.

Spontaneously, without the slightest

reluctance or feelings of duress, individuals began talking
of the need they felt for that group to get away and take a
look at themselves and their organization, where it was, and
where it was going.

The conversation bounced from man to

man in the liveliest fashion and felt needs were expressed
that I had been hearing from other parts of the organization
for almost

months and, in fact, even before that when I

was still in the U.S.
chosen.

Calendars came out and dates were

Because the M.D. was going to be in the States for

an extended time, it was necessary to put it off for over a
month, but a Friday, Saturday, and Sunday in May (May 9, 10,
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and 11) were chosen.

The preparation for this meeting and

the meeting itself are covered in

11

The Executive Council"

section of this chapter.
Two cuts had been made and, for better or for worse, an
entry strategy was in motion.

Dandenong
As stated earlier, the Dandenong Plant Manager was eager

and somewhat impatient.

As soon as he received approval from

the Director of Manufacturing, he was ready to hold the Con-

frontation Meeting.
"user" in GMH.

He was especially anxious to be the first

In my opinion, however, I thought it better

if he wait until after the Board held its 3-day meeting and,
hopefully, established some course of direction for the GMH
OD effort.

The action plans growing out of the Dandenong

meeting could then have been shaped to be consistent with the
more general company strategy.
and logical process to me.

This seemed a more rational

However, the Board session had,

as indicated above, been put off until !-!lay and the Dandenong
Plant Manager didn't want to wait that long.

What's more,

he persisted in wanting to hold his session before the Board.
He persuaded me and we went ahead.

As it turned out, I

believe this was the better approach in that it actually
gave OD a

11

winner 11 before the Board session and added to my

credibility prior to that all-important meeting.
In preparing for the Dandenong Confrontation Meeting, I
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met first in a planning session with the Plant Manager, his
immediate reporting staff, and the Personnel Manager.

I had

sent them copies of the Beckhard (1967) and Fordyce and Weil
(1971) materials on this approach and asked them to be prepared to raise questions regarding it and to make final plans
for the meeting.

After answering their questions, which

served as an opportunity both to educate them further as to
the process and their roles in it and to quiet some of the
anxieties they had about going in to such an unknown venture,
they made several decisions--a process which served to
increase their sense of ownership in making the meeting successful.

The first decisions had to do with the size and

makeup of the group.

Beckhard {1967) suggests the meeting

is designed for 40-100 people.
with was 45.

The most I had ever done i t

It was decided that they really wanted to

include all levels of supervision and as many functions as
possible.

This meant about 130 people.

I gulped, but agreed

so long as they understood the trade-offs and the administrative difficulties.

The latter

cons~deration

led to offers of

much administrative assistance, and P.A. systems, and instant
transparency makers in lieu of chart pads, etc.

They also

believed it to be absolutely critical that the Quality Control function be in attendance even though the Plant Manager
did not have direct control over that function.

Right in the

meeting, then, the Plant Manager caJ.led the GMH head of
Quality Control, explained the situation and asked if it was
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all right to involve the plant Quality Control supervision.
The QC Department Head, part of the Board group to whom I

had made a presentation and who committed to the 3-day meeting, responded enthusiastically in the affirmative.

The

local plant QC Manager was then immediately invited into this
planning meeting.
several things.

(This little anecdote is illustrative of
One is the issue of inter-organizational

boundaries that existed and how one had to proceed up and
over channels to get another function, interdependent but

outside strict reporting lines, involved.

Two is the inclin-

ation of the Dandenong Plant Manager always to take direct
and immediate action, a trait that sometimes caused him
problems but in my case of trying to develop an early demonstration of success it was most helpful.

Three is that here

was the first instance of even a small degree of synergy
resulting from interventions with two subsystems and a concrete instance of support from the top.)

Thus, the Confron-

tation Meeting would be participated in by about 130 representing all levels of management and the following functions:
production, materials, industrial engineering, and maintenance.
Financial and Personnel were not included basically because
of numbers.

Several people from Personnel attended, however,

to assist with administration.
A second decision was to hold the meeting over two consecutive Saturdays for approximately 4-1/2 hours each of the
two Saturday mornings.

The more standard approach would be
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to do it all in one day or an afternoon and the following
morning.

Spreading it out was decided on because of the

logistics involved with such a large group, and, more importantly to be sure, Australian Rules Football season was just
nicely under way and no one--including me--wanted to miss
the "footy

11

on a Saturday afternoon.

Third, it was decided that the name "Confrontation Meeting 11
might have connotations that could frighten some participants.
Therefore, the name "Dandenong Problem-Solving Meeting 11 was
chosen.
Finally, it was decided to hold a "Beer and Bickie" gettogether for all participants after the shift on the Thursday
prior to the first Saturday meeting (which was to be
announced by means of a letter from the Plant Manager to all
participants) •

This was designed to allow the Plant Manager

to assure all participants of his sincerity and enthusiastic
support and to allow me to explain the process in greater
detail and answer questions.

This, it was hoped, would

reduce potential anxiety in the group and make it easier for
them to approach the meeting with enthusiasm.

Financial and

Personnel departments were also invited so that, though they
would not be participating, they would understand what was
going on.

At the beer and bickie session itself, I walked

them through the process in detail including reading them
their exact task instructions for the two Saturdays.
On the first Saturday the group, in general session,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

151
was given the following instructions:

1.

There may be some people in your group who don't
know each other at all.
There will certainly be
some who don't know each other well. Take whatever steps the group feels would help you to get
better acquainted with each other.

2.

Select a recorder, someone who can print clearly.
The recorder should feel free to participate in
the discussion.

3.

The main task for your group is this: Arrive at
a list of changes that would make the plant both
more effective and a better place to work.
Changes may be suggested in any area: objectives,

organization structure, relationships, management
style, procedures, performance, formal and infor-

mal policies, etc., etc., etc.
4.

After arriving at your list of suggested changes,
select a spokesman to report your list in the
general session. He or the recorder should get
the list produced as a transparency.
The spokesman need only prepare to say enough about each
item on your list to make sure that its meaning
is clear to others in the general session.

They were then divided into diagonal slice groups-mixed functions and levels, nobody in a group with his supervisor--in which they worked on those tasks.

About mid-way

through the morning, they reassembled and reported.

There

were over 100 proposed changes ranging in kind from "Eliminate bird droppings and subsequent damage" to "Achieve maximum profits by optimum volumes in normal hours at stable
rates."

There were also comments to the effect that simply

getting together like this and learning to understand each
other's problems was worthwhile in and of itself.

However,

there was also some skepticism as to whether anything would
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actually get done.
During the week between meetings, a committee met and
purged the list of proposed changes of overlapping items
only, without removing any actual items from the list.

The

resulting 71 items they then sorted into these categories:
Organization, Scheduling, Quality Control, Working Conditions, Maintenance and Tooling, Communication, Materials,
Engineering, Personnel, Production, and Other.
Another critical event occurred between meetings.

For

the second Saturday the group was to be divided, for prioritysetting and action-planning purposes, primarily by production
departments, i.e., body shop, trim, paint and vehicle, or

final assembly.

Service department staff would meet with the

production department they served, in effect creating small
11

business units" or "business teams."

Since the superinten-

dents of these units would be leading the small group meetings and had little preparation for doing so, I met with them
ahead of time.

During that meeting we discussed how the

Saturday small group sessions might be made more successful,
with emphasis on how openness might be encouraged.

That

group developed the following list of "Helps" and "Don'ts 11
which they published under the heading "Aid to Discussion"
to be handed out at the Saturday meeting:
HELP
BE REALISTIC.
BE ENTHUSIASTIC.
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METHODOLOGY:

--Go through list of categories.
--oepn discussion.
--Does department have equity.
--Is it a serious problem.
Start it with a topic you know will interest
people.

Moderate discussion--keep it moving.
Emphasize follow-up will be carried out.
DON'TS
PASS THE BUCK.
AVOID ISSUES.
SUPPRESS OPEN DISCUSSION.
RIDICULE IDEAS.
EMPHASIZE LEVELS OF POSITIONS.
DWELL TOO LONG ON ANY ONE ISSUE OR SIDE ISSUES.

At the second Saturday session, the following instructions were given:

1.

Go through the entire list and, as a group,
select the three or four items most important
to your department. Determine what specific
actions your department will take on these
items and when you will start. Consider the
assignment of follow through responsibility
to insure it gets done. Be prepared to
report your action plans in the general
session.

2.

Go through the list again and select those
items which you think top Plant Management
should give highest priority. (These should
be items your group can•t deal with.) Prepare to report these items in the general
session.
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3.

There are people who will be affected by the
results of this meeting who are not in attendance. Develop a plan for communicating what
happened at this meeting to those not in attendance. Prepare to report your plans in the
general session.

Each group then worked on those tasks.

Action plans

were then reported by each superintendent in a general session.

Standing up and committing himself and his department

in front of his top management, his peers, his subordinates,
and 130 people in all, had no little impact.

The Plant

Manager then stood up and offered words of support and
encouragement for those commitments that had been made and,
more importantly, committed himself and the top management
group to specific follow-through plans regarding items
referred to them.
It should be noted that the actual conducting of the
two meetings was done by the Plant Manager 1 s Administrative
Assistant.

I made some remarks at the beginning of the first

meeting and, at the Plant Manager 1 s request, at the close of
the second.
11

In between, it was completely conducted by

insiders. 11
In my experience, I have found the Confrontation Meeting

a fairly fool-proof approach in that it has never been a
failure.

It may not get at a sophisticated diagnosis nor

hidden, sensitive issues, but is not designed to.

As a

straightforward process of getting a lot of people involved
on a nuts-and-bolts level, however, it gets something
accomplished.

The degrees of success, however, depend on
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follow-through.

Even after the second meeting, which gener-

ated much enthusiasm, I still heard the next Monday of comments such as "Aw, it 11 all just go in one ear and out the
1

other ...

Never, though, in my experience, have I seen follow-

through occur as I soon did at Dandenong.
The Plant Manager was a bulldog on follow-through--again,
a trait that contributed to my decision to use this plant as
one of the entry points.

He had a follow-through meeting of

his top group the following Monday and every Monday after
that to (1)

take action on items referred to the top group

and (2) review progress on departmental action plans.

Each

production department began holding its own weekly "problemsolving meeting" as well, inviting appropriate service
department people to attend and contribute.

The second Sat-

urday meeting had been April 19, and on April 24 the Plant
Manager had a letter out to all participants on top management action on four items referred to the top.
were so many

11

Soon there

action reports 11 floating around that Industrial

Engineering took responsibility for putting together status
report notebooks for everyone, thus building in a control
system.
Action did indeed occur, changes got made, and problems
got fixed.

Even the problem of bird droppings was remedied.

Two weeks after the meeting, I was walking through the
plant on my own and I was frequently approached by participants with anecdotes.

One of the more significant, I
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thought, had to do with an action plan made by the Maintenance Department to form an "Interdepartment Task Force 11 to

investigate and fix difficulties associated with productivity
and efficiency in the "underbody area 11 of final assembly.
The group was made up of an area production foreman

(first-

level supervisor), a mechanical project engineer, an electrical project engineer, a maintenance foreman, a tooling man,
and an industrial engineer.

They investigated, implemented

a number of actions, and developed plans for equipment

changes.

The area was already running smoother and more

efficiently than it ever had.

That was all reported to me

by my informant--one of the task force--but, he said, "the
main thing was that we learned we could do it together, as
a team.

We want to try it again somewhere else, now."

Thus,

not only was an immediate technical problem fixed, but a
more permanent learning had occurred.

With this success,

other such "multi-department trouble-shooting groups," as
they were called, were formed.
Because the sorts of structures were put in place that
I referred to above, such results were widely shared throughout the plant and synergic reactions occurred.

Also because

of these structures, momentum was maintained beyond early
enthusiasm.

Normally, a follow-through meeting of the whole

large group is held 4 to 6 weeks after the initial meeting.
In this case, by mutual agreement, no such meeting was held
because of the numerous other follow-through mechanisms.
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The plant, even before these meetings--as has been mentioned--was in a

11

turn-around" process and momentum toward

success had already been building.

However, the "Problem-

Solving Meeting 11 seemed to help everything to jell, and
within a month the plant was the best of the four assembly
plants in efficiency, schedule, and quality, the latter being
an indicator that had been progressing more slowly than the
others.

I had heard and read the word "catalyst" applied to

OD and change agents.

I understood what that meant intel-

lectually and had had some experience with it as well.
Never, though, had I seen or experienced it to the degree I
had in this case.

It was clearly a matter of catching the

momentum caused by many elements at the right time, and, with
the addition of one more element, seeing a synergic "explosion" take place.
A review of the state of this plant will take place in
the summaries for Time 3 and Time 4.

However, in this con-

text it is important to say that enough of the above had
occurred prior to May 9 to help with the meeting of the top
group of GMH scheduled to begin on that day.

That will be

reported next.
Executive Council
Between March 20, when I made the Boardroom presentation
to GMH 1 s top group, and May 9, there was much preparation to
be done for their 3-day seminar in addition to

carr~ing

on

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

158

projects such as that described at Dandenong.

The Training

Manager and I spent a good deal of time bouncing ideas off

one another.
We finally each drew up a set of long-term goals we
thought required intervention at the top.

His were goals

for the company which he wrote as follows:
1.

The need for realistic company, departmental

2.

A need for a sound understanding and applica-

and sectional objectives to be understood by
all concerned.

tion of our financial systems and controls to
every aspect of our operating.
3.

The importance of quality in everything we do

and its effect on our market performance.
4.

The managerial styles that help bring people
together in a committed team effort to achieve

company, etc., objectives, and at the same
time experience reasonable job satisfaction
and personal growth.
My goals I titled

11

0bjectives of Interventions at the

Top 11 and they were as follows:
1.

Build a consensual approach to developing the
organization on a 5-year basis.

2.

Design a strategy or process for involving
other levels.

3.

Develop a team that
--integrates long-range goals and directions
for GMH.
--confronts and works through problems, as a
total team, toward solutions that are good
for the whole organization.
--fights fair and openly, on top of the table,
for integrative solutions and unifies around
those solutions.
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--is NOT one which avoids or buries problems,
tries to fix blame, or fights behind the
back.

These were long-range objectives, of course, and not
intended to be accomplished in one 3-day meeting.

They were

designed, though, to help us put that one 3-day meeting in
perspective.
Of course, those were our goals, as the change agents.
There would certainly be a problem if we designed toward them
and those were not goals shared by the participants.

To help

get clarification on their expectations, for their benefit
as well as ours, I wrote each a letter asking him to respond
with an anonymous letter to me regarding two questions.

The

first was simply to tell me his expectations of the 3-day
session.

These data, I said, would be summarized and returned

to everyone, without attribution, prior to the meeting so that
all could share what individual and group expectations there
were.

The second question was regarding any other background

information they thought it might be helpful for me to know,
including any personal feelings they might have.

These data,

I said, would not be shared but would be strictly for the use
of the Training Manager and myself in planning for the meeting.

I received these, sorted them, and wrote the following

letter which was sent to each participant:
SUBJECT:

ALBURY MEETING

Let me begin by thanking you for your very helpful responses regarding your expectations for the
Albury meeting. I would summarize them first of
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all by saying there were remarkably similar common
threads running through all of them. Though words
might have been different, the ideas certainly had

enough in common to indicate we have a fairly unanimous set of expectations, which should help in
getting the job done.
I broke these expectations
down into three main themes:
1.

The expected content or purpose of the meeting.

2.

The expected process.

3.

The expected atmosphere or climate.

Following is a brief summary by these three themes
along with a sample of typical comments in each
case:
1.

Content or Purpose--The recurring pattern here

was that everyone seems to recognize a need to
figure out where GMH is going. This breaks down
further into {a) the expectation that we will
attempt to arrive at decisions regarding longterm goals and (b) that we will establish some
sort of continuous process or strategies for
moving toward these long-term goals. A few
typical comments:
a.

Long-Term Goals
11
•
•
•
establish our objectives for, say,
the next five years covering such diverse
areas as Corporate image, market penetration, product quality, consumerism, and
employee relations."

" . . . to develop the kind of organization
this company will need to have to capably
handle the changes in the nature of the
business we expect in the next five years."
"Should we be looking at our business as
two distinct activities . . . one being the
manufacture and wholesaling of vehicles, and
the other being component manufacture for
ourselves and other O.E.M.'s and the replacement market? Should we confine our interests
to automotive components or diversify?"
"We must . . . organize for changes, because
change is the one element in the business
that will continue."
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b.

Strategies

"How should we organize to study the various possibilities on a continuing basis?
11

" • . • develop team sessions to study segments of the environment--economic, political, market opportunities and consumer
desire . .

. and develop from the studies a

plan to work towards our goals . . . using
the 'clean sheet of paper' approach."
11

•••

appointment of task forces."

"Development of an organizational approach

for solving these problems as in the normal
course of business."
2.

Process of the Meeting--The commonly expected
process of the meeting includes analysis of present and anticipated future problems and trends,
includes understanding inter-departmental issues
from a total company perspective, the pooling of
available information and some self-examination.
As a result of this process, then, arriving at
decisions as to goals and strategy.

Comment sample:
11 Leading
up to this, of course, there must be
some appreciation of the changes we do expect
in terms of corporate structure, political
and union influences and social changes ...

11 As
a management team we need to look at ourselves in a most critical and searching manner ...

A better understanding .
departments ...
11

3.

of other

Atmosphere or Climate--There can be no mistaking
your expectations here. You repeatedly and clearly
called for a meeting characterized by teamwork,
frank, open, candid discussion carried out in a
spirit of helpfulness, and the avoidance of undue
individual departmental self-interest.
Comment sample:
"Discussions undertaken with frankness . . .
essential that each participant approach the
subject in a spirit of full cooperation."
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"Devoid • . • of overemphasis on departmental objectives or issues."
.

. absolute need to conduct the meet-

ing in a manner which will facilitate open
and frank discussion.
11

• . an atmosphere in which uninhibited

proposals and individual initiatives are
encouraged."

Based on these sorts of expectations, a program has
been designed along the following lines:
Thursday, May 8--0n the train on the way up to
Albury (see attachment for timetable), in addition to dinner, we will engage in activities
designed to begin building the atmosphere that
you have said will be necessary. This will
include an exercise in listening (a requisite
for productive open discussion) and some group
examination of the characteristics necessary to
building an effective team. This should be concluded on the train, and we don't anticipate a
work session that evening at the motel.
Friday, May 9--The main thrust of the Friday
session will involve engaging in a process sometimes called 11 0pen Systems Planning 11 in which
we will analyze the present state of the GMH
system by looking both outside of the organization into its wider environment and looking
inward at the internal state of the organization. Based on this analysis and projection of
trends plus some general analysis of healthy and
unhealthy systems, we will try to arrive at a
statement of what a desirable future would look
like.
In the latter part of the day, including
the evening, we will again look at top management as a team and its role, individually and
collectively, in moving toward this more desirable future.
Saturday, May 10--The main purpose of Saturday
(and Sunday as well) will be planning strategy
to move in the direction of the goals you will
have determined by that time. After beginning
with a learning exercise that deals with the
issues involved in planning for others, I will
attempt to describe a few illustrative models
of long-range strategy approaches and discuss
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some basic principles of sound strategy planning. Following this, just before lunch time,
the group will hold a planning meeting to decide
how best to approach the task of developing your
own strategy, including how best to allocate the
remaining meeting time.
(I might insert here
that I see the role of the Training Manager and
myself from Thursday night through to this meeting Saturday noon, as including being moderators,
meeting facilitators and, on occasion, teachers.
By noon Saturday, we will have concluded any
major input we intended to bring to the session.
From that point on, the expectation is that the
group will move on to make whatever strategy
decisions you deem desirable, with our role
becoming a much less active one of being available for consultation when and as the group feels
we might be helpful.)
Saturday afternoon is set aside as free time for
R and R.
Saturday evening is designated as a work session
devoted to strategy planning and decision-making
as has the time after breakfast on the Sunday
train trip horne.
It will be up to the group to
decide how to best use these times. We will
plan, however, a short summary and evaluation
session for about the last half to three quarters
of an hour on the train Sunday.
The above agenda has been worked out to facilitate
the meeting of your stated expectations as far as
possible within the allotted time frame.
However,
I think i t is important to view this meeting as a
critical beginning of a process of moving toward
your stated expectations rather than the beginning
and end.
So while I hope we can make important and
substantial progress, I believe it will only lead to
frustration to expect one meeting, even of this
intensive nature, to clean up all the issues.
I hope this letter has clarified to some extent what
sort of program you will be involved in. What the
Training Manager and I would like to do is to have
the opportunity, after you've had a chance to read
this over, to visit with each of you individually
for a maximum of an hour to answer other questions
you might have and to discuss your expectations
further.
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We added a suggested meeting time and a number at which
we would be reached to change it if necessary.
(It will be noted that, by this time, a Thursday evening
session had been added to the original plans.

A "conference

car" had been arranged for, to be attached to a regular train
traveling to the meeting location, a motel in Albury, a city
in southern New South Wales.

Thus, we would travel together

on a 4-hour train trip to include dinner and some time to
work.

We also would have the 4 hours coming back on Sunday

morning for breakfast and work.)
The follow-up individual meetings referred to in the

letter were designed, as indicated, to clarify expectations
further, but also to attempt to relieve any anxiety through
answering their questions and to reemphasize the need for
openness, thus raising the level of consciousness about this
not so familiar norm.

We gave them, at that time, which was

during the week immediately preceding the conference, a copy
of all expectations that had been sent to us--anonymously,
of course.
Two changes in plans occurred the day before the meeting, one relatively minor, one not so minor.
The first was news that the two most key people in the
group, the M.D. and the Director of Manufacturing, were
called on an emergency basis to meet on the Friday with one
of the Government Cabinet Ministers in Canberra, the capital
of Australia.

We certainly could not proceed as scheduled
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without them there.

As it turned out, we rescheduled the

R and R time from Saturday afternoon to Friday afternoon,
started earlier Friday morning, and the two men scheduled
a chartered plane to and from Canberra.
The second was the word passed on to us by the Personnel

Director that the Training f-lanager would not be allowed to

attend.

This came as quite a blow.

with me every step of the way.

ment in being there.

He had been involved

He had high personal invest-

And he was programmed to be the inter-

nal specialist resource for the ongoing company effort.

When

we questioned the decision, we were told that at least one
person in the group felt strongly that the presence of anyone
from inside the organization but not of the group itself
might possibly inhibit the desired candor.

Both the Training

Manager and I felt terrible about this turn of events.
felt my integrity was somewhat at stake and told the Training
Manager I would ask for a meeting of the group and confront
the issue, including taking the position that I would not go
through with the meeting without him.

He said no, and,

indeed, said, "This may be the single most important meeting
for this organization in ten years and I would not want anything to interfere with it . .,

Therefore, I went ahead,

although I did raise the issue later, as will be reported.
The meeting itself went about as summarized in the above
letter with the exception of the rearranged R and R time.
The group worked very enthusiastically and hard, long hours.
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There were ups and downs and very difficult issues were surfaced that were not easy to deal with.

The dominant running

theme in their own discussions had to do with their own need
to act more as a strategy group and less as operating department heads.

I discussed two examples of strategies with them

that I thought they might find relevant.

One was an approach

taken by a GM domestic division based on Zand's (1974)
lateral organization 11 technique.

11

col-

The GM division's use of

it was called a "Parallel Business Strategy Planning Organ-

ization" and, as such, addressed their felt need for improved
strategy planning.

The second strategy example I used was

more relevant to their acute industrial relations problems.
It was a summary of the approach taken by Shell U.K., as
reported by Hill (1971).

After these discussions of specific

strategies, I handed out and discussed the following strategy
design checklist which I put together especially for this
meeting.

The reader will note that it follows the format of

Watson (1969), as reported in Chapter II, and incorporates
ideas of others also reported in that chapter.
credited at the end of the handout.

These are

No attempt was made at

this time to make this a complete and comprehensive checklist, but, rather, it was a matter of including those items
I thought this group would find most relevant.
11

Entitled

General Motors-Holden's Pty. Limited Checklist for Designing

a Strategy, 11 it read:
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A.

Who is Involved?
1.

Do the top officials of the respective
system feel the strategy is their own--not
one devised and operated by outsiders?

2.

Does the strategy clearly have the wholehearted support from the top officials of
the respective system?

3.

Does the strategy provide for working with

the forces in the organization who are
supportive of change and improvement rather
than working against those who are defensive and resistant?

B.

C.

4.

Does the strategy, wherever possible,
involve relatively healthy parts of the
organization which have the will and
resources to improve?

5.

Does the strategy involve individuals and
groups which have as much freedom and discretion in managing their own operations
as possible?

6.

Does the strategy link together people who
are trying to improve organization functioning so their activities reinforce and
complement one another?

What Kind of Change?
7.

Will people who need to participate see
the change as reducing rather than increasing their present burdens?

8.

Will participants feel their autonomy and
security is not threatened?

9.

Is the proposed change in accord with
values and ideals held by the participants?

What Steps or Procedures are Used to Institute
the Strategy?
10.

Is there provision to create sufficient
"awareness and understanding" through mass
media approaches?

11.

Is there provision for trial and adoption
by opinion leaders?
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12.

Does the strategy provide for several layers
of the organization to engage in fact finding,
diagnostic efforts so they can agree on the

basic problems and feel their importance?
13.

14.

Does the strategy provide for multiple "entry
points"--that is, coming at the objective(s)
from a number of different directions?
Does the strategy develop "critical mass" in

each project--that is, sufficient investments
of resources to move the system beyond its

natural iriertia (particularly critical in
early stages)?
15.

Does the strategy recognize that new approaches
are likely to be misunderstood and misinterpreted and is provision therefore made to get
feedback on how people see the project so clarification can take place as needed?

16.

Is there provision to hear objections and take
steps to remove those obstacles as they appear?

17.

Is the strategy kept open to revision and reconsideration (are there choice points?) if experience indicates changes would be desirable?

18.

Is there provision for trying out new solutions
and ideas on a small (e.g., pilot) scale before
an attempt to widen the scope?

19.

Is there provision to measure the results of
these small scale trials?

20.

Does the strategy take advantage of opportunities
where change is already occurring or soon contemplated--e.g., where a new technology or new
organization structure is being introduced, or
where a problem requires close collaboration
across functional lines, or where the organization is expanding or contracting rapidly, or
where there is a managerial change?

21.

Is there provision to make known the efforts
participants are making, particularly where
there are successes to report?

22.

Is there provision to reward and encourage
people for the effort of changing and improving,
in addition to rewarding them for short-term
results?
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23.

Is there a way of obtaining tangible

intermediate results?

----

24.

Is there a realistic, long-term time
perspective?

25.

Does it avoid the following Conditions
of Failure?

--A gap between what top management
says and what it does.
--A big program of activities without
any solid base of change goals.
--Confusion of ends and means.
--Overdependence on outside help or
inside specialists.
--Trying to fit a major change into
an old structure.

--A search for "cookbook" solutions.
April 1975
Note:

The above was derived from the research,

experience, and thinking of well-known authorities

in the field of organization change.
Items 1, 2,
7, 8, 9, 12, 15, 16, and 17 were developed by Goodwin Watson.
Items 3, 4, 5, 6, 13, 14, 20, and 21
come from Roger Harrison.
Items 10 and 11 come
from Everett Rogers.
Items 18 and 19 come from
Lawrence Greiner.
Items 22, 23, 24, and 25 come
from Richard Beckhard.
As for results of the meeting, in addition to the
catharsis that a process such as this can provide (of no
little importance in this case), there were some concrete
outcomes.

Firstly, a broad statement of a "Preferred Future"

was developed in terms of three categories:
"job" or role,

(1) their own

(2) the GMH organization, and (3) the environ-

ment external to GMH.

It follows:
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Preferred Future:

Our Job Content

1.

Involved in strategy instead of operational
activity.

2.

Greater delegation of authority and control
to permit more time on policy, direction, and
forward planning in all aspects.

3.

Greater contact with outside influences and

4.

Give more consideration to those aspects of
the business that will keep us in the
business.

5.

Be personally and actively involved in recruitment and development of department personnel.

6.

Involved in development of own department goals
based on mutually agreed company goals.

sectors.

Preferred Future:
1.

Organizational Setting

Well-understood organizational structure with
good staff-line relationships.

2.

Well-defined departmental responsibilities.

3.

Multi-level interdepartmental working relationships.

4.

Given authority consistent with responsibility.

5.

An effective approach to the management of our
human resources.

Preferred Future:

External Environment

1.

An atmosphere where private enterprise can
operate effectively.

2.

A growth or "Larger Pie" atmosphere.

3.

Recognizing external forces and effectively
dealing with them.

Secondly, it was decided to form a task force of people
from just below this top level to which certain tasks would
be delegated.

The selection process was for each department
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head to nominate a candidate from his function, but final
selection was to be made by the total Board by consensus.
Criteria were:
1.

Are the nominees influential; particularly,
are they influential with their respective
department heads?

2.

Are the nominees people who would support this
sort of endeavor?

3.

Are the nominees the sort of people interested
in and capable of long-range thinking and planning in considerable depth?

Further, it was decided that this task force, as a
group, would report its efforts to the Board as a group,
thus minimizing functional control and emphasizing integrative solutions.

Tasks for this new group were derived by

the Board looking at the Preferred Future statement and
dividing it into tasks they thought they should do themselves
and tasks they thought could and should be delegated to a
lower (though still high) level group.

Because technically

their own group could not be called "the Board" since some
members were not full-fledged Directors, and since to call
themselves the Department Heads would emphasize a role they
were trying to minimize, they decided to call their own group
the

11

Executive Council" and the newly created group the

"Executive Task Force."

Thus, the first list of tasks given

below are those they reserved for themselves as an Executive
Council; the second is a list of those tasks delegated to
the Executive Task Force.
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Executive Council
1.

Guide the organization towards its objectives
by setting policy, giving direction to operating groups, and to initiate forward planning
in the fundamental aspects of the business.

2.

Define those aspects of the business which

require overall policy and direction.
3.

Develop well-understood organizational structure with good staff line relationships.

4.

Give authority consistent with responsibility.

5.

Maximize H.R.M.

6.

Encourage private enterprise in all areas and
to identify and deal with external influences
affecting the achievement of company objectives.

Executive Task Force

-----

1.

Have developed written statement as to depart-

mental responsibilities.
2.

Develop the process that would review major
system changes and insure efficient implementation.

3.

Analyze the purpose, charter, and composition
of each Committee. Define responsibility and
authority of each Committee Member.

4.

Analyze and define staff line relationship in
our organization including central office
relationship.

5.

Review and improve multi-level interdepartmental
relationship to assist delegation of authority.

All of the above lists are in the participants' own
words.

"H.R.M." in item 5 of the Executive Council list

refers to "Human Resources Management," a system developed
by General Motors Corporation for the systematic selection,
development, and promotion of qualified individuals in the
company.

This particular system was relatively new to

m-1
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at that time and had not been formally implemented at all
in

G~lli.

On the train trip back, at the conclusion of the 3 days,

raised the issue of the Training Manager--how both he and
I felt when we learned he could not participate--and asked
the question as to how much of what went on in the meeting
I was free to communicate to him since it was my understanding that he would be carrying on in the overall effort.

One

of the participants volunteered that he had been the one who
thought that this first time problems needed to be aired

"within the group" but that from now on he saw no difficulty
and that I should feel free to communicate everything that
had occurred.

The others agreed.

Finally, I asked for a

simple reaction evaluation in the form of anonymous responses
to two questions (Burke, 1972).

These participant evalua-

tions are given in Figure 19, the number in parentheses over
the scale indicating the number of people selecting that
rating point.

Comments added are also given.

Although these ratings express generally positive
feelings, formally the decision was reached on the return
train trip that they would communicate to the rest of the
organization that they had had an effective meeting and
would be continually evaluating OD as an approach.

That is,

they were satisfied so far, but clearly there was not as yet
any firm long-range commitment.

Nevertheless, I returned

home to Melbourne on that Sunday, Mother's Day, happy that
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1.

To what extent do you believe anything will be different
as a result of this meeting?
(1)

1

(5)

( 3)

(1)

2
To some
extent

No

difference

To a very
great extent

One 6 rating indicated a 3-5 year time frame, another
6 said 2-3 years; a 5 rating said 3 years.

Other comments:
--In the long term if it is followed through.

--Hopefully attitudes to each other.

2.

At this point in time, what is your degree of optimism/

pessimism about the future of your organization?
(1)

1

(2)

(3)

(4)

4

H~gh

Nelther

pessimism

optimistic
nor
pessimistic

H~g

optimism

One

rating commented, "I am nonetheless hopeful."

One

rating said 2-3 years.

One 6 commented, "This optimism was not greatly affected
by the session. I guess it is my faith in GM and its
world-wide future. This session could make it happen
easier.
11

Figure 19.

Participant Ratings of Top Management Three-Day
Meeting.
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some significant first steps had been taken.
A week later, my family and I were off for a week's
holiday to Sydney and the Gold Coast of Queensland.

Entry

had been made with reasonable success, I thought, and 2
weeks later was to be the first meeting of the newly formed

Executive Task Force.
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CHAPTER VII
ENTRY:

STAGE II

Executive Task Force

The actual existence of a Task Force was a result of my
suggestion to the Council.

Strategically I wanted, as indi-

cated in Chapter V, a network of supportive opinion leaders

for purposes of critical mass and diffusion.

When the Coun-

cil was deliberating on means to move forward toward their

Preferred Future, it seemed to me that such a Task Force
would help serve both the Council's felt needs and mine.

It

would, I thought, bring opinion leaders together for a nonthreatening purpose in the sense that they would be working

on important organizational tasks, not being sold an OD program.

I

hoped, however, that as they worked together in "an

OD fashion 11 on these tasks and learned the value of OD
approaches, they would take, individually and collectively,
some ownership in the OD effort in GMH in general and perhaps
encourage further trials throughout the system.
If the Council had not seen the Task Force idea similarly as a means to their ends, however, it would not have
come into existence, of course.

The charter of the Task

Force (their list of tasks as outlined in the previous chapter), the notion of a group reporting to a group, and the

176
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allocation of time--an initial full work week (5 days} of
training followed by up to 20 percent of their time there-

after--to Task Force members (critical men in the organization) for Task Force work were decisions made by the Council
and are indicative of their level of support of the idea.
Most indicative of all, however, was selection.
Actual selection came a week after the return from
Albury in a special meeting of the Executive Council for
that purpose.

I was away on vacation and not in the meeting,

but I was extremely interested in the results.

To say it is

important to choose influential, capable, and supportive
people is one matter; to do it when it means releasing one
of your key subordinates for up to 20 percent of his time is
quite another.

I was convinced that good selection was the

key to the success and credibility of both the Task Force
and this first concrete act of top management to be judged
by the rest of the organization.

I referred to the lists

of key people I had been keeping and made my preferred selections--keeping them to myself and a couple of trusted colleagues, who also shared their preferred lists, much as we
might pick our favorites in a horse race.
extremely satisfied by the selections.

In the end, I was

I was told by Coun-

cil members that they worked very hard at the process,
including some relatively uncomfortable confrontations in an
instance or two.

The process was for each Director to place

the name of one of his subordinates in nomination and then
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for the whole Council to discuss the nominee and reach
genuine consensus relative to his inclusion.

In most cases,

I was told, the nominees were accepted enthusiastically.

In

two cases, however, Directors apparently tried to get by with

nominees who were "easy to spare," men who were close to
retirement and already on "special assignment."

Normally

among this group of individuals who zealously guarded their
respective
pass.

11

turf,

11

such behavior would have been allowed to

But this was their first opportunity to test them-

selves against some new norms that had begun to be built at
the Albury meeting and they confronted the issue.

As it

turned out, both Directors involved were somewhat surprised
at the conviction evidenced by their peers, both in the high
quality of nominees put forward and by the challenge to their
own nominations.

Once realizing that the Council as a whole,

·with strong leadership from a generally not aggressive l'-lanaging Director, meant business, each of the two switched to
very acceptable nominees and seemed to do so, I was told,
with renewed commitment themselves.
The resulting Task Force, then, was made up of influential, capable, and supportive people from high levels of
each of the major functions of the organization.

Manufactur-

ing ended up with two representatives, one from Melbourne,
and one from South Australia, since it was believed important
to represent both of these very large installations.

Finan-

cial also had two because that department consisted of two
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distinct functions:

(1) accounting and general finance;

and (2) Management Services, a data-processing systems group
that serviced all other functions.

Thus the Task Force was

selected and the Training Manager and I prepared for their
first get-together, a 5-day training program.
Our goals for that training were (1) to facilitate a
psychological contract between the Task Force and the Council
as to the charter of the Task Force and the parameters within
which it was to work and (2) build a Task Force team capable
of performing their charter.

To accomplish these goals, we

believed they needed to understand their role, functions, and
tasks; to "become a group"; to understand some principles of
strategy; to understand a systems approach to organization
analysis and design; and to understand OD.

We designed 5

days toward these ends.
Half of the first morning was spent with the entire
Executive Council present.

The Managing Director opened

with a review of the Council 1 s experience at Albury, their
statement of a Preferred Future, and their decision to
appoint a Task Force.

He presented them their charter and

explained the rationale for it.

The group was then split

so that two Task Force members could interact with two
Council Members (though not their own department heads)
regarding the charter and its parameters.

This was done on

an informal question and discussion basis.

Finally, repre-

sentatives from the Task Force were seated in the middle of
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the room to feed back what their understanding now was.
Council members then clarified any final points, though there

seemed to be a consensus of understanding by then.

The

Council then left and the Task Force went to work.

We used experience-based learning exercises then for
approximately the next 2 days to help the group understand
OD, develop a team, and develop their own operating guide-

lines with respect to their role.

After each exercise, for

example, we would ask them to discuss and list implications

of that exercise for the role of the Task Force.
The third day focused on an introduction to open systems planning, including a scan of the present internal and
external environments of the GMH system and a projection of
both a realistic and idealistic future.
Day 4 focused on departments, each participant providing
an overview of his department's responsibilities.

Differen-

tiation/Integration theory (Lawrence & Lersch, 1969) was
introduced in this context.
The last day, I outlined a

11

blank sheet 11 or systems

approach they might take to work on their charter, and then
they spent the rest of the day in planning general strategy
and next steps.
At the end of that day, the Council returned to hear a
report on the week and to review Task Force plans.

This

was intended as a continuation of the contracting process.
The following minutes, written by a member of the Executive
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Council, and the accompanying

11

Statement of Direction 11

(based on the open systems planning exercise) and

11

Achieve-

ment Strategy'' summarize the results of the 5 days:

Report on Meeting of Executive Council & Executive
--- -

Task Force ~ June

1,

1975 -

The first part of the meeting covered the impres-

sions of various members of the Task Force on the
analyses and exercises they had carried out, some
of which were similar to those carried out by the
Council during the Albury visit. There.was complete unanimity on the benefits from this work and

the Task Force considered executive groups in all
plants should undergo this work.
The second and greater part of the evening was
taken up in a presentation by the Task Force of
their Statement of Direction and Achievement Strategy, copies of which are attached.
Members of the Executive Council sought clarification of certain points and then unanimously endorsed
the Statement of Direction and Achievement Strategy.
Statement of Direction
The Task Force has given due consideration to the
changing environment both within and without GI-IH.
It has reached a broad consensus about the goals
and philosophies that would be appropriate in order
effectively to respond to these changes.
The preferences expressed obviously imply real dissatisfaction with many aspects of our present situation.
We acknowledge that there are no easy solutions.
Nevertheless we are convinced that GMH must now
make a determined effort to preserve or recover its
traditional position of "leadership" in all areas
of its operations.
The following illustrates what is meant by "leadership" and what we believe is necessary to achieve
it:
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1.

Products:

a.

The Company must have--

The ability to adapt in order to provide
the products the market really wants,
when it wants them.

b.

Accuracy and insight in market forecasting.

c.

A deserved reputation for product quality,
reliability, safety, value for money.

d.

A deserved reputation for product innovation.

e.

A deserved reputation for fair dealing,

f.

An open mind about opportunities for
diversification--even outside the trans-

g.

Maximum use of entire product resources of
the corporation.

good customer service.

port business.

2.

Management:
a.

Management must not only be responsive

but exhibit initiative to change and not
be resistant to it.

3.

b.

The organization should be such as to foster
people capable of top jobs throughout GM.

c.

A greater degree of multilevel interdepartmental cooperation and understanding is
needed.

d.

The decisions must be made in time and must
involve all levels of the organization,
with greater delegation of authority consistent with responsibility while retaining
the principle of accountability.

e.

It should be characteristic of our management style and approach to make optimum use
of all available resources, and ensure that
those-resources are the best available.

Employees:
a.

A regeneration of employee pride in the
company, its policies and products.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

183

b.
c.

A greater awareness of employee needs and
wants and a more flexible response to them.
Improved communication between company and

employees.
d.

GMH must provide a total work environment
which will enable it to attract and retain

talent.
This includes amenities, money, a merit
system which rewards performance.
GMH should have a high reputation for these
qualities.
4.

Relations with Outside World:
a.

More constructive relationships with govern-

ment and community organizations are necessary.
b.

Greater real involvement by the company with
the community is needed.

c.

The company must be less reticent about communication with the community, in particular

through the news media.
Achievement Strategy
Having established the philosophy and goals, the
initial steps toward a detailed approach to achievement of these ends are as follows:
Overall scan of company operations to determine
Input

Throughput

Output

Continued review of:
Total function
Preferred organization
- in the light of task, time, structure,
and relationships
Definition of sources of input
- drawing on all available resources
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Determine priorities for action with
reference to task force charter
Apply appropriate techniques to evaluate
possible action plans
e.g., trial or pilot applications
Define timing needs and methods of providing feedback

Initial brief coverage within departments
More detailed interdepartmental presentation at later date

Progressive feedback to be arranged in
parallel with development of analysis
The meeting of the two groups outlined above concluded

with a dinner and a very euphoric mood held sway.

Two very

senior groups of the organization had come together, now
sharing some common growth experiences and a diagnosis that
led to very similar conclusions as demonstrated by one
group 1 s statement of a "Preferred Future" and the other's
"Statement of Direction."

Some common sense of direction

had thus been developed at the top and some early steps
under way for movement in that direction.
Over the very next few days, Task Force members presented their Statement and Strategy to other members of
their repsective departments and sought feedback and suggestions.

Thus, other people and other levels became

involved.

At the next Task Force meeting, the feedback and

suggestions were reviewed.

Task Force members reported

basic agreement of their departments with the Statement of
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Direction.

They said there were some

11

queries" as to

whether "we were really deficient in all those areas" but
that there was "strong positive agreement in some areas."
Based on the feedback, the Task Force concluded that:

1.

Groups of informed and trained people were
needed to assist development of the strategy.

2.

OD training needed to be extended.

3.

Priorities were needed so as to effectively

marshall resources.
4.

l4ore detail was needed in the overall plan.

5.

The need had been reinforced for a "blank

6.

Organization Development needs to be seen
to be working.

7.

Pursuant to 6, there was a necessity for

sheet" approach.

tactical development of concrete efforts-11small winners."
As a result, the general strategy of the Task Force
was modified.

They would continue, on the one hand, to pur-

sue a "blank sheet," thoroughgoing analysis and design
approach themselves.

On the other hand, they would determine

some specific tasks for "action research" in which they would
involve others in the organization.

They had been granted

this power to "co-opt" others for specific purposes by the
Council.

They then brainstormed 30 ideas for small-scale

action research projects and chose 5:
effort in a section of Engineering,

(1) job redesign

(2) development of a

"communications package" for employees,

(3) a survey-feedback-

action planning project in a section of finance,

(4)
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establishment of a ''dealership

11

for GMH employees to ease

their product discount purchases, and (5) an analysis of

the warranty return system.

It was intended that one Task

Force member would get each of the above activities initiated
by involving non-Task Force members of the organization and

letting them "run with the ball."
these "small-scale trials"

With the beginning of

(Greiner, 1967), the Task Force

launched what they termed their "Two-Pronged Strategy" of

basic analysis work coupled with action research.

This

strategy was reported to and approved by the Executive
Council.
Thus was another major building block of the entry

stragegy for the overall GMH effort in place.

At about this

same time (June) , I was officially asked by GMH, with the
approval of GMOO and my home office, to stay on until the
end of the year (1975).

I was happy to say yes.

In fact,

I was beginning to think we were about ready for the Elizabeth Vehicle Assembly Plant Project.
Elizabeth
In addition to the foregoing developments that led me
to feel some degree of readiness for launching the Elizabeth
effort, some other critical pieces were falling into place
in regard to key support people.
First, there were significant developments in regard
to internal staffing of the OD function.

When I was asked
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to stay on longer, I requested that both of the GldOO Fellows
then in the

u.s.

be placed in OD upon their return in August.

One of them was already working in my home Organizational
Research and Development Department at GM central office,
and it had always been assumed that he would return to an
OD position.

The other, however, had his Fell<Jwship assign-

ment in Management Training and Development and had been
scheduled to return into the GMH training activity.

I knew

him to be a most capable young man with a genuine long-range
professional interest in OD.

I also was quite sure, the way

the OD effort was moving, that having them both full time
would still leave the resources stretched.

The request for

the full-time services of both of them beginning in August
was granted.

Moreover, the Personnel Director (who was to

retire at the end of July} and his assistant and successor
decided that the OD activity should be structurally separated
from the Training section per se.

Therefore, the Training

Manager, with whom I had been teaming up to then, would be
disengaging himself from OD activities more and more and
concentrating on Training.
A second critical support factor was the entry of the
new man from the
assembly plants.

u.s.

who would be Manager of all four GMH

I discussed earlier in Scouting (Chapter

V) his experience and supportiveness with OD as a line
manager in the States and my previous relationship with him.
He was just getting settled in Australia in May and June.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

188

It so happened that his office was located in Elizabeth,
though he frequently carne to Melbourne and we often talked
during this period of time.

In May he held his first meeting

of all the assembly Plant Managers and the heads of two support functions, Industrial and Production Engineering, who
reported to him.

He scheduled it as a 2-day meeting and

asked me to take all of the first morning to familiarize
these men with OD.

I did that and the Dandenong Plant

Manager supported my presentation by proudly talking about
his plant's experience with their "Problem Solving Meetings."
This all clearly indicated to the other managers that their
"new boss" was supportive of OD.

After all, it was the very

first part of the very first meeting he ever held with them.
I was especially pleased for the Elizabeth Plant Manager to
get this message.
This new man and I also talked one-on-one about Elizabeth on occasion.

I waited until after he had a chance to

gather his own information and impressions and then I shared
my diagnosis {see Figure 18) with him.

He said he thought

it was both an accurate picture and a means of additional
insight for him.

We would then, from time to time, talk

about action ideas.
The third key support came from the Director of Manufacturing, the potentially key resistant force in the whole
system.

By this time, of course, he had traveled with me

to Elizabeth; he had seen the results at Dandenong and had
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heard about that story directly from the Plant Manager,
his personal choice; and he had participated in the Albury
meeting and subsequent activities with the Executive Council.
In none of these respects had he been resistant.

Therefore,

before I went to Elizabeth to attempt to initiate an active
effort,

I

went to him and told him I had in mind starting

at Elizabeth with an offsite intensive session with the top
plant management group.

I asked him if he would be willing

to open such a session with either a telegram or a video
tape of support.

He startled me by exclaiming "No!"

He

then went on to say he thought it was too important for that.
He wanted to go to South Australia and do it in person.

I

couldn•t have been more pleased, of course.
I felt then that I could hesitate on Elizabeth no
longer.

It was, in my judgment, the only piece missing from

the entry strategy.
I traveled to Elizabeth in June, the first time I had
been there since the scouting expedition in March that led
to the diagnostic model in Figure 18.
some acquaintances.

Thus I had to renew

I spent most of one afternoon with the

Plant Manager, getting myself updated and discussing with
him the possibility of a 2- or 3-day offsite meeting with
his senior people.

Much of the discussion was around who

should be included with him leaning toward greater and
greater inclusion.

It was obvious he was somewhat beleaguered

by the rigid functional lines and felt difficulty in getting

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

190

cooperation across boundaries when staff activities didn't
actually report to him.

Further, there were some names on

the list of key people he had alerted me to earlier (see
Chapter V) that would not have been included if we had
strictly followed an organization chart.

created something called

11

Therefore, we

The Elizabeth Assembly Business

Team," an interfunctional group of 22 people representing
about the top three levels of Production, Production Control,

Personnel, Quality Control, Maintenance, Finance, Industrial

Engineering, Equipment Engineering, and Production Engineering.

He then "teed up" a meeting of all these men for the

next morning.
At that meeting, I reviewed some of the OD progress in
GMH, emphasizing the activities at the top with the Executive
Council and Executive Task Force and using visuals showing
the Council's

11

Preferred Future" and the Task Force's "State-

ment of Direction."
11

I also briefly mentioned Dandenong--a

Competitor" plant that they were well aware had made sig-

nificant performance improvement--but I deliberately played
that activity down.

It had been my experience that plants

on the bottom did not appreciate it when the success of
plants at the top was flaunted before them and such flaunting
was not usually an effective diffusion approach.

Mainly, I

wanted them to know that top management of the company was
supportive and involved in the effort and the two formal
statements also gave explicit recognition from the top to
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some issues

I

knew were of concern to the men in the room.

I also was quite frank with the group about the fact that
from my first day in Australia I had been pushed to work at
their plant.

This was no surprise to them.

Finally, I pro-

posed a 3-day offsite meeting, explaining it would be a combination familiarization, diagnostic, and strategy-building
session.

They readily agreed.

It was set up for a Friday,

Saturday, and Sunday in July.

The Thursday before we were to begin, the Director of
Manufacturing flew with me to South Australia to meet with
this same group to offer his encouragement and support.

On

the way, I discussed with him my feelings that much of the
energy for the early stages of the effort at Elizabeth would
have to come from sources outside of the plant, since those
inside were full of the frustration of having unsuccessfully
beaten their heads against the wall for years.

This energy

I saw residing in people like himself, myself, and the new
Manager of all assembly plants.

He agreed, as he did with

my subsequent request, consistent with this judgment relative
to energy, that he return for a progress review in September,
about the time I thought they might need another shot of
adrenalin.
At the plant he gave a marvelously sensitive "pep talk."
He demonstrated empathy and understanding for the situation
they found themselves in and emphasized some of the things
they had done well.

This was not done, however, in a
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rose-colored glasses fashion.

He used facts and hard data.

In fact, he was very well prepared with visuals full of performance data that clearly showed Elizabeth was not doing
well overall and had not been for some time; however, he
didn't punish them with those figures but encouraged them
to learn and analyze and begin "to manage the business again ...
It was obvious--to me, but more importantly, to the group-that he had taken his role of starting things off seriously
and had come well prepared.

All in all, it was a masterful

job and was received as such by the group.
The next morning we all assembled at a motel in Adelaide.

There we began with another "kick-off" talk from

their "new boss,

11

the new Manager of Assembly Plants.

He

encouraged them to "be bold, be innovative, take risks''--a
phrase that stuck and, I am told, is still used at Elizabeth
years later.
The first day and evening was spent in learning exercises designed to familiarize the group with OD, to help
them begin to examine themselves as a team, and generally
to build a sense of community and norms of openness and
cooperation.

I began Day 2 by walking them through the

diagnosis shown in Figure 18.

In the previous instances

cited in this case (e.g., Dandenong and the Executive Council
at the Albury meeting) , the diagnosis was actually performed
by the client system itself with my playing a process role.
In this instance, I believed I must take a more "expert" role
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in regard to both diagnosis and action planning, since,
again, these men had been wrestling with alligators so long

it was difficult for them to even see the swamp, let alone

drain it.
Therefore, I explained the origins of the diagnosis and
how it evolved, including as I went through it step by step,
comments I

had heard from them in my previous interviews

that led to the conclusions in the diagnosis.
make it more of a

11

This helped

joint process" in that it represented

ordering of their data.

~

As I went through it, I asked them

not to be concerned too much at that time with whether they
agreed or disagreed, but rather to focus on understanding
the model.
went.

I entertained questions for clarification as I

When I had concluded and all questions appeared to be

answered, I then asked them to deliberately try to find fault
with the diagnosis.

They were divided into four small groups

with instructions to disagree with, add to, or modify the
model.

When they returned, they reported unanimous agreement

that it not only depicted their situation but that i t helped
them understand better where they were.
almost all documentation of the model.

Their additions were
A significant testi-

mony to their ownership came later that day when I made
reference to "my diagnosis" and one of the men scolded me,
saying,

11

I wish you'd quit saying that, mate.

diagnosis.''

That's our

That made me feel a lot more confident that I

wasn't simply "laying something on them."
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we moved then to the development of a sense of future
direction.

To summarize the way they wanted to go philo-

sophically, one member put it this way:
Let us resurrect two great Australian characteristics: "Mateship" and "Fair Dinkum." They
may sound corny in this rather cynical world today,
but I make no apologies.

They still have a lot

going for them.
"Mateship,
regardless.

11

that old idealism of helping out

Remember the early days of the Holden

when we were all pitching in, proud to be associated with the achievement of building the first
all Australian car? With success we grew too big,
too competitive between departments. We forgot
our neighbor in the paint shop, in the trim shop,
etc.
Let's get 11 Fair Dinkum" again, get back our
integrity, regain our trust, be fair and honest
with ourselves, our associates and our Workforce.
To begin to bridge the gap from the situation represented by the diagnosis to concrete action steps for moving
toward a future as described above coupled with increased
business success, I presented a simplified version of the
Likert (1961) model that I had previously found useful with
plant managements.

It is represented in Figure 20 below.

Employees 1 Perceptions
of Management Behavior
Figure 20.

~

Results

Simplified Version of Likert (1961) Model.

The explanation was that there is great risk in trying, as
is so often the case, to manage at the results end of this
model.

They are, indeed, results and as such we are always

managing "after the fact."

This model suggests that what
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11

Results" are a result of is the attitude of employees.

Neither, I said, can attitudes be managed by management;
rather, only the employees themselves can manage their own
attitudes.

In this model, the only thing that can be con-

trolled by management is management's behavior.
I am aware that there can be some legitimate quarrel
with this model in strict scientific terms, but, as I said,
it had proven useful in the past and I thought it very relevant to the Elizabeth situation.

Moreover, I had also given

them a copy of an article by Dowling (1975), which goes into
the Likert model more thoroughly.

I also explained the

notion of time lag as it applied to the three variables in
the model.
This theory was then linked to the diagnosis by looking
back at the box in Figure 18 labeled "Mood of Local Management.11

If it were true, as they testified it was, that local

management at all levels was characterized by such low
morale, pressured behavior, finger pointing, and expedient
solutions, how must their behavior be perceived by employees
and what would be the affect on employee attitudes and consequent results?
This flow of logic led then to my recommendation that
their action strategy begin by focusing on

11

raising the mood

of local management 11 and not business results such as
schedule performance or interventions at the hourly employee
level.

Only, I said, after management had learned they could
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do something right, had some renewed sense of security,
felt some support and a general sense of rejuvenation would
the ground be prepared for experimentation at the wages or
hourly level and only then could consistent improvement in
business performance be expected.

I suggested a basic

strategy of "starting a lot of little fires 11 (Shepard, 1975),

that is, to begin a number of small-scale trials, particularly in areas and with problems where it was felt they had
a good chance of success.

Thus, i t would be hoped that a

"success momentum" could be built.
To manage this action research strategy, I suggested
they develop an internal resource group that could be a continuing learning community as well as an instrument for
sponsorship of the mini-projects or experiments.
here that I experienced some irony.

It was

As action planning

was under way, I sensed that there was some 11 behind-thescenes maneuvering 11 going on.

Eventually, someone proposed

a 11 Steering Conunittee 11 consisting of 11 people selected
from the Business Team who would meet weekly to manage the
strategy.

There was one representative per function plus

one from each production department (four).

The person pro-

posing this actually put forward a list of nominees that he
said

11

a group of us thought would make a good steering com-

mittee.11

The proposal was accepted.

It turned out that

there had been some lobbying going on outside the room.

The

ironic part of it was that the list of names had remarkable
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overlap with the lists furnished me independently back in
March by both the Plant Manager and South Australia Personnel
Manager (as reported in Chapter V) .

They were also people

whom I would have listed, now that I had met and observed
them, as being influential, supportive, ready, and capable.
By some mysterious political process, a consensus had emerged.
The remainder of the session was spent deciding on
specific actions.

Consequently, many "pieces" of a strategy

were decided upon, but they delegated to the Steering com-

mittee the job of integrating these pieces into a logical
flow of events.

This was to be done a week later at the

first meeting of the Steering Committee.
Finally, the Assembly

Plant~ ~1anager

returned at the

end of the session to hear them report on their progress
and plans and to offer his continuing encouragement and
support.
The next week, I attended the first meeting of the
Steering Committee.

As we were chatting before the meeting

got under way, I was told that "things are already beginning to happen."

It was only 1 week, but they reported a

number of anecdotes to me as evidence of increased cooperation and commitment.

I suggested that they should be docu-

menting those occurrences, that they were part of the "action
research strategy," and that it was important for the momentum of the strategy as well as feedback for learning that
they document both successes and failures.

A member of the
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group responded that a system for similarly documenting
industrial relations incidents already existed in the form
of "Industrial Relations File Notes.

11

Since they had experi-

enced so much "industrial" turmoil over the years, they had
developed at all levels of management that habit of jotting

down a paragraph or so every time an incident occurred that
might some time flare up into an "industrial 11 problem.
were collected into notebooks of "I.R. File Notes."

These

He sug-

gested the system be adapted for use in documenting OD incidents.

Thus was born an "OD File Note" system, an approach

to the critical incident technique of assessment of such
efforts.

Some of these will be reported later.

The primary agenda item for this Steering Committee
meeting, however, was the integration of specific action
plans developed at the

11

Park Royal Seminar 11

(the label given

to the 3-day meeting at the motel) into a logical strategy.
This was done and a flow chart developed to depict the
strategy.

This in turn was taken to the entire Business

Team for their review and sanction.

The strategy as approved

appears in Figure 21.
Without getting into the detail of Figure 21, I would
point out that the strategy was generally divided into two
phases.

The goals of Phase I, to begin immediately, were

to (1) create and foster a climate for change;

(2) raise

the mood of local management; and (3) prepare, or lay the
groundwork, for Phase II.

Conspicuously absent from this
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list of goals was any mention of business performance
results.

They

~

listed, however, for Phase II goals.

As shown, this second phase was not to begin for some months
and was to be aimed at (1) further developing a climate for
change with a focus on management-employee (hourly) relations;

(2) improving efficiency, quality, and schedule out-

put; and (3) achieving a cooperative atmosphere among all
employees to improve the quality of work life.

Action

details for this second phase were to be left for later
development.
Considerable detail was developed for Phase I, however.
The stream of activities at the top were designed to "demonstrate a positive future" to counteract the aftereffects of
the earlier debacle when there was an attempt to close the
plant;

thus, such actions as establishing stepped-up preven-

tative maintenance projects, getting action on some Manufacturing Change Requests (M.C.R.'s) that would show some
financial investment in the plant as well as make for technical improvements.

All of the GMH assembly engineering func-

tion was being transferred to Elizabeth, and they wanted
that made visible so that it would be seen that "people are
moving in instead of moving out."
At the bottom of Figure 21 is shown a stream of activities involving organization changes such as getting maintenance structurally assigned to the Plant Manager as it was
in other assembly plants.

This was also true for quality

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

201

control.

The "mainstream," however, was in the middle.

It

included the formation of the Steering Committee, 2-day OD
familiarization seminars to be conducted with all management
employees and salaried staff, and the initiation of a survey-

feedback-action planning process.

11

Mini-projects 11 (as shown

in number 16 in Figure 21) in quality, paint, line down-time,
body damage, and mechanical build were the beginnings of the
"little fires 11 of the action research approach.
Finally, it will be seen that as the planned time of
Phase II approached activities were to begin that would pre-

pare the organization for the involvement of hourly employees
and the unions.
Thus was the Elizabeth strategy built.

There will, of

course, be discussion of the progress cf this strategy in
the summaries of the later stages of the overall GMH effort.
Once this Elizabeth plan was developed, however, I felt all
the pieces of the entry strategy were in place.

It is time,

then, for a sununing-up of the state of the effort a.t the end
of the first 6 months, or Time 2.
Time 2:

Six Months

Six months were up--the time originally allotted to my
assignment and the time frame within which I had been working
to initiate a process of change in this large organization.
Even though my time had now been extended, it was against the
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6-month deadline that we had been working up until nearly
the end of that time.

What had been accomplished during

that initiation or launch phase of the effort?
A number of critical events had occurred, of course.
These major elements in the entry strategy are shown in
their time frame in Figure 22.

However, in reflecting at

the time on where we had come, I went back to the
a 6-month job 11

11

goals for

(see pp. 139-140) I had developed in March

for presentation to the GMOO Director of Personnel.

1.

To develop top management understanding and
support as a minimum and attain their guidance
and direction setting for the effort as an
optimum.

certainly, the efforts with the Executive Council and
Executive Task Force had contributed toward this goal.

There

was considerably greater understanding at high levels of the
organization than evidenced in the puzzled looks and questions I received from so many quarters during the early
scouting days.

Further, I was no longer hearing the sim-

plistic explanations I had heard earlier regarding, for
example, OD as job enrichment, or human relations.

Above

all, perhaps, there was no longer any issue at top management
that OD was going to be another MBO exercise.

Support had

been shown in behavior such as the creation of the Task Force
and the great encouragement given the launching of the Elizabeth effort.

There was, of course, the reservation put on

support in the statement that came on the train ride back
from Albury when it was concluded that "we will continue to

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

February

Scouting

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0.

0

Goals for "6-Month Job"
Established
o o o o o o o ••
0

0

•

Presentation to Board

o

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

o o o

o

o o

•

o ••• o o

Dandenong Problem-Solving
Approach . o • • • o . o o . o . o . o o o .

o o

Albury Meeting and Formation
of Executive Council o o o o o . o o

o

•

o • • o Jo

o o

o

April

May

June

July

V' '''''';'''''''I
1

o •

March

1 f'77]
o •

o

o o

o ••• o

o

o o o

o olo o

ULl
o~

o.

o. o

olo o

o o

o

o o

ol• o o

olo o

o

o o

o o

olo o

o o

o

o

Executive Task Force
Elizabeth Vehicle Assembly
Plant Project . o o o . o . o o o o o o .

Figure 22.

o

o o

o o

o o

o o.

Major Elements in Entry Strategy.

"'w
0

204
evaluate OD."

The support, then, helpful as it was, was

still considered provisional.

Concrete evidence of guidance

and direction setting from the top could be found in the two
formal statements:

the Council's Preferred Future and the

Task Force's Statement of Direction.

Other examples were

more informal and evidenced in day-to-day behavior.
2.

To build on what already exists--i.e., to
develop a network among those already managing consistently with OD principles so they

could share with, learn from, and support
one another.
11

Building on what already exists" began with the Dan-

denong intervention which really simply caught a wave and
rode it, although hopefully adding to the momentum and force
of the wave in the process.

Both the Executive Task Force

and the Elizabeth Steering Committee represented attempts
to link supportive and influential forces into networks for
mutual learning, support, and diffusion.

Movement in the

direction of diffusion was already occurring through sponsorship by the Task Force of small-scale action research projects.

The Elizabeth Steering Committee was serving a similar

function in their plant strategy.
3.

To build internal OD specialist resource
capability.

This had been a difficult goal because the situation
had been unstable.

My initial assumption had been that the

Training Manager was to be the central internal OD resource
along with the one GMOO Fellow working in that field in the

u.s.

There wasn't much I could do about the man in the

u.s.
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except send him letters keeping him up to date, which I did,

and, by letter also, encouraging my colleagues back horne in
Detroit to help him all they could.

With respect to the

Training Manager, however, we did spend a great deal of time
together in the early months and tried to work as a team on
most matters.

There was a great deal of sharing between us

during that time and, I would say, a mutual learning experience.

Primarily, I was learning from him about the organiza-

tion and its Australian environment and he was learning from
me about OD, although, for that matter, he was fairly knowledgeable about OD before I arrived on the scene.

As time

went on, however, it was increasingly apparent that his
superiors were not as committed to that course as we had
thought and he was increasingly pressured to concentrate on
training activities and being pulled away from spending time
with me on OD activities.

This culminated when I went to

see both the retiring Personnel Director--to whom the Training Manager reported--and his designated replacement and
inquired as to whether or not the Training Manager was indeed
to represent the continuity for the internal OD effort.

This

query seemed to be greeted with some surprise as though they
thought it had already been made clear that such was not to
be the case.

When I said that i t wasn't thus clear either

to me or the Training Manager, the Personnel Director convened a formal meeting at which i t
fact,

~as

~

made clear and, in

asked to create a formal description of the OD
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function and the Training Manager was asked to do the same
for the Training function.

The difference was then institu-

tionalized.
All I could do on goal 3, then, was to request the ser-

vices of both GMOO Fellows as I have already reported, and
keep them up to date through the mails until their return to
Australia in August.

In addition, however, I was working on

getting one full-time internal OD coordinator appointed at
Elizabeth since I thought that rather massive effort could

use someone there on the scene all the time.
4.

To help the organization make appropriate

plans for institutionalization of the OD
effort.

All of the above discussion of internal OD resources
is applicable here as well.

Much of the institutionalization

would rest with the internal resources who would remain after
my withdrawal.

Moreover, there were formal mechanisms in

effect to aid with institutionalization such as the Executive
Council, the Executive Task Force, and the Elizabeth Steering
Committee.

The latter two met on a regularly programmed

basis while the Council was holding frequent meetings, though
timed

11

as necessary ...

Finally, it was my feeling that insti-

tutionalization would be aided by diffusion, and mechanisms
such as the Task Force and Elizabeth Steering Committee were
formed with that purpose in mind as well.
Institutionalization was far from complete, of course,
as one would expect in only 6 months.

My goal had been to
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11

help the organization make plans

11

in this regard.

The

extension of my time was most helpful in this matter.
frankly would not have been confident that the mechanisms
that had been started would have been maintained had I left
at that point.

Internal maintenance and renewal was a goal

yet to be accomplished.

Chapter VIII will dwell further on diffusion and institutionalization as it summarizes the state of the effort at

Time 3 (1 year after my assignment began) and Time 4 (2-1/2
years after my assignment began) .
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CHAPTER VII I

DIFFUSION AND INSTITUTIONALIZATION
Introduction

Using constructs from the field of adoption and diffusion of innovation, we might say that by the end of Time 2
we were at the

11

trial stage...

we now, in that framework,

needed to move toward adoption and diffusion.

In attempting

to bring about large-scale change in the large social system
labeled GMH, however, I find it more useful to think of
11

adoption" as "institutionalization" and "diffusion" as

actually part of that institutionalization process.

The

reasoning for this latter position is that the change process
(OD) would become, it was felt, more a part of the "institution11 and more difficult to dislodge, the more widespread
it was throughout the system.

This diffusion and institu-

tionalization process will be described in this chapter.
Summaries of the effort will be provided for two points
in time--Time 3:
Years.

One Year; and Time 4:

Two and One-Half

The format for each time period will be to begin

with a progress review of the four building blocks of the
entry strategy (Dandenong, Executive Council, Executive Task
Force, Elizabeth) and specifically to discuss progress or
lack of progress regarding diffusion and institutionalization.
208

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

209

Time 3:

One Year

Dandenong
This assembly plant, the site of the first intervention,
continued to lead all assembly plants in performance measures
such as volume, efficiency, cost, and quality.

The enthusi-

asm at all levels appeared, in my informal observation, only

to keep increasing.
one.

My role became an increasingly inactive

They had made weekly "problem-solving meetings" a way

of life and had, as a matter of natural evolution and without

program or fanfare, begun involving hourly employees in those
meetings.

To some extent, a close was brought to the formal

or programmatic aspect of the intervention when, in September,

a

11

Supervisors• room" was christened.

The proposal for a

combination locker room/recreation room for supervisors had
been made to top plant management back in the original
problem-solving meeting in April.

It became something of a

symbolic test of management's sincerity in the overall effort.
If that room got built, management would be considered

11

fair

dinkum"; if it did not, then "they didn't really mean it.

11

I was invited, along with the Director of Manufacturing and
the Plant Manager, to throw one of the first three darts at
the dartboard in the christening ceremony.
There was rich potential for more innovation in this
plant, of course, but the management was well aware of this
and moving on its own.

There were more urgent calls on my
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time and my role at Dandenong became one of increasingly
infrequent visitor, stopping in once in a while either to
encourage them in their efforts or to find encouragement

for me in mine.
Executive Council
Although key individuals in this all-important group
continued to be most supportive of efforts elsewhere in the
organization, there was, from July to December, some marked
diminution of energy from the group as a whole toward its
self-appointed tasks.

Although there was much competition

for their time and attention, I frankly believe the fault
was largely mine.

The first task they set out on--a decision

which I influenced--was the development of a comprehensive
statement of objectives.

A drafting committee was formed

and rather promptly framed a draft statement.

This was pain-

fully examined over the course of five meetings in 4 months,
and closure was never realized.

Further, the group's invest-

ment in the statement went down and, to some extent, this

in turn caused, I believe, some feeling in the group that
they were letting each other down with regard to the psychological compact they had developed with each other in the
Albury meeting.

believe there were several reasons.

begin with, it may simply have been the wrong task.

To

After

all, they already had their statement of a "Preferred Future"
and this may have met the need for the moment.

Moreover,
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the focus of their energy had been on changing their role
from operating department heads to members of a strategy
planning body.

It may have been much more productive to go

with this energy and make use of role clarification/role
negotiation interventions.

Actually, I was probably "blinded 11

to this option by two factors:

(1) I had conceptually

"locked in" on the neat rational logic of starting with
objectives, and (2) I was not well versed in role interventions at that time.

Thus there were blinders of both bias

and lack of sufficient repertoire.

Finally, I allowed my

attention to be pulled away from this group by the many other
demands of a burgeoning OD activity.
However, the Council did continue in some other very
positive ways.

have already alluded to the support of key

members of the OD effort in other parts of the organization.
They also, as a group, continued to support the work of the
Executive Task Force in concrete ways.

For one, they acted

positively on the first formal proposal brought to them by
the Task Force.

(This proposal will be discussed in the

"Task Force" section.)

In addition, they continued to guard

selection to the Task Force carefully.

When one of the

original members of the Task Force was promoted and geographically transferred and another left the company, they faced
a test of the high standards and resolve that they held when
making the original selections.

However, in the first case

a highly qualified replacement was named.

In the second,
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the responsible Department Head nominated a highly qualified
candidate, but requested that the nominee be allowed to
serve on the Task Force only part time, pleading that his
department was already so shorthanded that no one could be
spared for all of the Task Force meetings.

This proposition

was refused by the Council as a violation of the integrity
of their commitment to the Task Force and the Department Head
was asked either to nominate someone as a full member or not
at all.

He chose the latter course.

Further encouraging behavior took place regarding the
Council and its members taking a more proactive stance
regarding the external environment.

Prior to Albury, they

had been guilty, by their own admission, of a closed system
reaction to most outside forces that I labeled "ain't it
awful."

From that point on, they began visibly to take part

in more activities such as employer groups and governmentsponsored study commissions.

An anecdote provided me with

personally satisfying evidence of the growing permeability
of organizational boundaries.

I saw the Director of Manu-

facturing in the corridor one day and he said that he had
been with the Managing Director the day before when the M.D.
made his speech at the Australian Institute of Management
conference on "Understanding the Management of Change" in
Canberra.

When I showed my surprise, he asked, "You mean

you didn't see it in the paper this morning?
would be right up your alley."

thought it

I quickly found a copy of
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The Australian (1975), a national newspaper, and saw this
headline splashed across the top of page 3:
ing, Firms Told."

Below was the subhead:

with Govt. intervention.

11

"Quit Complain"Learn to live

The accompanying report of the

speech by the GMH Managing Director, known publicly in the
past as one of the complainers, went on to quote him as suggesting "it was time big business struck up a dialogue with

government" and "we are witnessing . . • the development of
a new political and philosophical debate about the role of
big business.

Get used to it, and become accustomed to its

terminology and preoccupations."

Most pointedly satisfying

to me, however, was the line quoted near the end of the
article which read,
not saying:

11

Let me make something clear . . . I'm

'Ain't it awful?

111

Formal acknowledgement of Council support for the overall OD effort carne in October.

A day-long Council meeting

was held at a Melbourne hotel on Sunday, October 19, for
purposes of reviewing the state of OD in GMH and making some
plans for the future.

Three concrete outcomes resulted.

One was the formal decision, written into the official minutes of the meeting, that the Executive Council was no longer
taking a

11

trial 11 approach to OD but was committed to i t for

GMH on a long-term basis.

Second (and pursuant to the first

decision), they decided that meetings of the Executive Council
for purposes of managing the OD function would take place on
a regular monthly basis during normal hours and be placed on
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the calendar just as regular meetings of such other committees they served on as the Product Planning Committee or the
Engineering Review Committee.
2 more years.

Third, I was asked to stay on

(I eventually turned down that opportunity,

as will be explained later.

Nevertheless, that request was

a behavioral indication of a long-term commitment.)

Executive Task Force
The Task Force's "two-pronged approach 11 had much more
strength in one prong than the other.

There was both inter-

nal and external pressure to zero in on a need felt strongly
at upper levels of the organization and represented in the
third task in their charter:

"Analyze the purpose, charter,

and composition of each Committee.

Define responsibility

and authority of each Committee member ...

Critical decisions

of the Company were made by a variety of committees modeled
after the GM Corporate committee system pioneered by Sloan.
Members of both the Council and Task Force served on many
of these committees and there was a widely shared feeling
that the committees were not formed or structured appropriately, did not function well, and wasted valuable executive
time.

Thus the work of the Task Force during these months

really focused on this felt need, while the action research
aspect of their strategy languished a bit.
In regard to action research, an interdepartmental group
did enact an effective cross-functional approach to product
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problems that occur in the field called "CURE"--an achronym
for

11

Combat Unresolved Reliability Errors. 11

Also, projects

were started in Engineering and Financial with support and

leadership from an individual Task Force member in each
case, but these were considered OD projects separate and

distinct from the Task Force effort per se.

Other action

research efforts started and stopped fitfully.
The major focus was, as noted, on the company 1 s committee system, and dedicated hard work characterized this
activity.

During the months included in this section, almost

all of this work was directed toward clarifying and modifying
the system as it applied to what they labeled the "product
conception" phase of the business, i.e., the decision-making
apparatus for making the fundamental decisions about what
products to manufacture and sell.

After weeks of painstaking

analysis, they made a number of proposals for changing the
then-existing system toward a system that would (1) more
clearly separate meetings on policy from meetings on operating, and (2) provide better interfunctional coordination.
In defining the responsibilities of each member, they listed
both external influence and internal influences that the
member would be expected to represent, thus reflecting an
open systems mental model.

The actual number of relevant

committees was reduced though one new one was added.
Finally, a new position was created designating a full-time
product coordinator.

Criteria submitted for selection of a
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person for this new role included ideas from the Lawrence
and Lersch (1967) article, "New Management Job:
grator."

The Inte-

As indicated earlier, the Council approved these

proposals enthusiastically.

As a matter of fact, they even-

tually selected one of the Task Force members to be the
first to fill the important new product coordination position.
In addition to these important tangible Task Force
results, the Managing Director once commented on another
important though less visible benefit.

In the course of one

of the Council meetings, he mentioned that a man from the
Corporation in the u.s. had recently spent time in

G~lli

trying

to get some new worldwide corporate system installed and had
remarked on how much easier it was to get interdepartmental
cooperation on the system in GMH than in other divisions he
had worked with.

The visitor had told the M.D.,

because of that Task Force you ve got working.
1

11

It 1 s

11

Elizabeth
Much activity had taken place at the Elizabeth V.A.P.
by December, 1975.

In September, they presented their

diagnosis and strategy to the Director of Manufacturing,
some members of his staff, and all South Australian department heads.

They received overwhelming moral support and

the Director of Manufacturing made it more tangible with some
financial support for needed projects.

A video-tape of this

presentation was shown to the Executive Council at the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

217
October 19 meeting which both further educated the Council
and obtained even stronger high-level support for Elizabeth.
Two-day Familiarization seminars were conducted until all
salaried people in the plant were familiar with OD concepts
in general and diagnosis and strategy for Elizabeth in particular.

They were also provided the opportunity in these

sessions to add their ideas to both diagnosis and strategy
with the results of their inputs recorded, compiled, and
factored in.

In the final week of October, a corporate

survey titled

11

The Organizational Description Questionnaire,"

a well-researched instrument based on "The Survey of Organ-

izations11 out of the University of Michigan•s Institute for
Social Research, was administered to all salaried people as
well, the results to be fed back after the first of the new
year (1976).

(Some results of this and a subsequent admin-

istration a year later will be discussed in the "Time 4"
section of this chapter.)

Additional team building and other

training was done with the Steering Committee as a continuing
learning group.

Included was training in goal setting, sub-

sequent to which they developed more specific goals than
originally in performance areas such as schedule achievement,
quality, productive labor costs, indirect labor-wages, losseserrors-and-defects, morale, lost time-industrial disputes,
cost reduction, accident frequency, and absenteeism.

They

also had appointed and were using the services of a full-time
internal OD coordinator.
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Although the goals for Phase I had not included performance results, such results were occurring, although
subject to much question regarding cause-effect and Hawthorne
effect.

Nevertheless, for whatever reasons, the plant did

achieve schedule more frequently than ever before, efficiency
had risen from a low of 67 percent to a high of 83 percent,
and A$206,444 had been realized in a cost-reduction program.
Quality for the first time surpassed corporate standards for

acceptable quality cars.

In fact, the leader of the team

that traveled the Far East regularly auditing the quality
levels of GM products produced in that part of the world
remarked to me one day on the great improvement he had seen
in both Dandenong and Elizabeth.

He said he had told the

newly appointed Managing Director in New Zealand about it
and emphasized that, in his opinion,

11

the way to get quality

is through working with people the way they are at Dandenong
and Elizabeth in Australia.

11

Anecdotal evidence continued to be collated fairly
systematically through use of the "OD File Note" system.
This method was particularly useful for tracking the smallscale trials so important to the action research approach.
For example, one small cross-functional group named the Door
Trim Damage Committee began in September to investigate ways
of reducing damage to door trims and scrap.

By October 15,

actions implemented by the group brought about a reduction
in scrap from 8 percent of all door trims used to 2.8 percent
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which represented an annual savings of A$6,912a

The "V.A.P.

Downtime Committee" looked into causes of excess line downtime in the final assembly area and concentrated on improving
the maintenance and performance of a number of key pieces of
equipment.

For example, members of the group came up with

a re-design of the drive unit for a conveyor which meant more
efficient operating of the conveyor and an estimated annual
savings of A$2,720.

The number of cars lost from the

schedule due to line breakdowns in this final assembly area
for the 3 months before and after the establishment of the
committee in August are as follows:
110
210
94
65

May • •
June
July

August

September
October •
Similarly, the

11

0

24

Paint Processing Committee" implemented

actions between August and November that improved paint
quality by 25 percent.

An internal plant report put out on

November 6, 1975, summarized by saying,

11

It is felt that

the improved attitude of these groups contributed to the
V.A.P. meeting schedule more consistently over the past three
months.

The quality index is being met more frequently and

consistently, too, and a significant achievement has been
the total elimination of 20 point items in the quality audit
over this period."

(The "20 point items" referred to are

major faults found in a completed car which result in 20
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demerit points being subtracted from a perfect quality
rating.)
The major point to be stressed through all of the above
data, however, is not the savings made here or there, or a
few points on the quality index rating.

The main point was

that management was learning that it could do some things
right after all, that they could achieve success, and that
they could do it by working together with mutual ownership
of problems and solutions rather than finger-pointing.

In

the final meeting of the Elizabeth Assembly Business Team
that I attended before leaving Australia (held December 1,
1975), they reviewed their progress to date and then asked

me for observations on where they had come and where they
were headed.

My basic observation was in reference to the

meeting I had just witnessed.

I said, and they agreed, that

they could not have participated in such a meeting 6 months
prior--that the degree of openness, problem ownership, constructive confronting of conflict, and healthy use of humor
just were not present back then.
was most striking of all.

Perhaps the use of humor

When I first met with the business

team (before they even knew they were being labeled that),
I was introduced to individual members in the most sarcastic
ways, such as,

11

This is Mr. X from Production Control;

they're the ones that keep us in trouble all the time.

11

By

the time of this final meeting, such a comment would not have
been heard.

They now laughed together rather than at each
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other's expense.
Thus, there was some evidence of progress on the goals
of Phase I to foster a climate for change and raise the mood
of local management.

This had been, and to a large extent

still was, a very troubled plant, but things were looking
up.

Although it was still early, some thought was being

given to the involvement of hourly workers and the unions
in Phase II.

A cross-level, cross-functional committee was

formed to begin the planning.

Diffusion
It was important to diffuse lest the fragile trials
under way become isolated and risk consequent lack of support {see Ketchum, 1975).

diffusion had taken place.

By December of 1975, considerable

Following is a brief description

of several other projects under way at this time:
1.

General Accounting--A survey-feedback process
guided by a diagonal slice planning committee.
Active consideration of flexible working hours.

2.

Foundries--Process consultation with three
key operating groups.

3.

Personnel--A review of role, structure, and
increased use of computerization.

4.

Plants 1 and 5, Fishermen•s Bend--Familiarization sessions held with management, leading to
preliminary diagnosis and proposal for weekend
offsite meeting in February.

5.

Parts, Power, and Appliance--Objective-setting
and action-planning.
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6.

Human Resources Management--Consulting with
the HRM Steering Committee on development of
effective strategy for introducing HRM into

7.

Pagewood V.A.P.--Plans for intensive offsite
team-building/strategy-planning session with

8.

Supply--Familiarization/team-building session
for section managers scheduled for last week
in January.

9.

Sales--Plans for survey-feedback project.

the organization.

top plant management.

10.

Systems Development--Developed and implemented
an innovative approach to employee appraisal.

11.

Experimental Engineering--A project focusing
on both job design of the project engineers

and their interface with other Engineering
activities, particularly Design Engineering.
Diffusion and the demands being placed on our resources
for even greater diffusion were, in fact, becoming increasingly difficult to manage, an issue which will be addressed
under "Institutionalization" both in this section and the
Time 4 section.
Institutionalization
Some critical factors affecting institutionalization
have already been discussed such as action of the Executive
Council to formally and in writing make a long-term commitment to OD, to schedule Council meetings as a regular part
of managing the enterprise as they did other committees, and
to approve restructuring proposals of the Executive Task
Force.

Other important institutionalizing mechanisms such
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as the Task Force and the Elizabeth Business Team and Steering Conunittee were also strengthened during this time.

More-

over, diffusion was going on at a rapid pace, making it
increasingly difficult for the whole effort to be discontinued.

In addition to all of the above, however, the primary
institutionalization activity of this second half of Year
was the development of internal OD specialist resources.
The two GMOO Fellows had returned from a year of work/study

training in the U.S. in August.
in all of the above projects.

They quickly became involved
In the early stages, this

involved co-staffing with me on projects already under way.
Increasingly, they took these projects over themselves and,
in fact, initiated and carried out projects such as the
Experimental Engineering, Foundries, and General Accounting
projects virtually without assistance from me.

We jointly

developed a Project Management System in which each of them
was the Project Manager for about half the above projects.
I was Project Manager for just two:

the Executive Council

(they were not sufficiently confident of their credibility
at this level and asked that I maintain that project) and
the project of their own development.
In this latter regard, most of their development was
11

on-the-job training" with coaching and counseling from me.

However, we did schedule some day-long training sessions
wherein I designed and involved them in consulting skills
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learning experiences.
The full-time OD coordinator who had been appointed at
the Elizabeth plant also participated in these sessions.
Having had virtually no previous training, his role was
largely a paraprofessional one.

At the beginning he was

charged largely with documenting the Elizabeth activities-accumulating archival performance records, recording and
distributing minutes of meetings, coordinating the collection
and distribution of OD file notes, and other administrative
duties.

During this time, he received some training and

spent much time observing either myself or the other two
men in our work.

The Elizabeth Project Manager spent quite

a bit of time coaching and counseling with this plant coordinator.

Gradually he was taking on more of the role of a

consultant, for example, helping conduct Familiarization
seminars and acting as Process Consultant for the Steering
Committee.

However, at Time 3 he was still very much a

paraprofessional.
Despite the fact that there were increasingly competent
internal resources, however, I was, as indicated earlier,
asked to stay on 2 more years.

Key members of the Executive

Council told me this was because they felt the internal men,
though competent, just would not have the same credibility
that someone like me would have at the top management levels.
This was attributed to their ages (relatively young), relative lack of experience, and the fact that they were
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"prophets in their own country

rather than an "expert

11

twelve thousand miles from home.

11

My family and I considered the offer seriously but, for
a number of personal and professional reasons, could not
accept.

I

recommended a most capable colleague of mine from

the Organizational Research and Development Department in
Detroit, and he was invited out to Australia in November
while I was still there.

After 2-1/2 weeks of orientation

to the state of the OD effort, meeting many people, and

visiting many places, he decided to accept the opportunity.
In doing so, he characterized the process to date as "Phase
!--getting things started," and observed that a great deal--

almost too much--was started.
manage the process."

11

Phase II,'' he said, was "to

This was to be the major objective

for him, an institutionalization objective.
By no means did that appear to be easily accomplished.
In addition to the multitude of demands that already existed
and the still fragile nature of some of the main building
blocks, significant personality changes were about to take
place.

During the time this new consultant was visiting in

November, it was also announced that the Managing Director
and Chief Engineer were being promoted and transferred.
They would be replaced by men from one of the European units
of GM.

The new consultant left at the end of November with
plans to return with his family in mid-January.

He had to
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contemplate both the management of an ongoing effort and
the starting all over again with new characters in key roles.
Time 4:

Two and One-Half Years

Dandenong

This plant continued to lead all assembly plants at the
end of June, 1977.

The Organization Description Question-

naire (ODQ) had been administered to a random sample of
hourly and salaried employees in November, 1976.

The results

were reviewed with all employees and their union representatives.

In October, 1977, the top management team went off-

site for team building and planning for maintaining the
integrity of their OD efforts.

The Plant Manager, so instru-

mental in this endeavor, was promoted in April, 1977, to the

new central office position of Manager of Manufacturing Planning, but indications were that his successor (who had been
Production Manager in that same plant) would continue the
activity.
Executive Committee
One of the first changes in the functioning of the
Executive Council upon the arrival of a new Managing Director
was the changing of its name to the Executive Committee.

The

new M.D. knew little of OD when he arrived, but expressed
willingness to learn and keep an open mind.
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Early in both his tenure and the tenure of the new consultant from the U.S., the Executive Committee showed further
evidence of a commitment to
it from the top.

11

own" the OD function and manage

On February 18, 1976, they acted as a group

on recommendations from the three-man OD unit to establish
priorities for OD activities for the 1976 year.

The priority

projects chosen were the Dandenong, Elizabeth, and Pagewood
V.A.P.'s; the Executive Committee itself; the Executive Task
Force; the Foundries; and the Systems Development group.
Thus, the job of managing the increasing project demand was
eased with explicit top management sanction.

They also

approved the following criteria for future project selection:
1.

Extent to which the potential client system
is aware of problems in its organization and
wants to do something about them.

2.

Extent to which the project could have a direct
positive influence on the Company 1 s profitability.

3.

Extent to which the potential client system
has the freedom to manage its own affairs.

4.

Strength of forces within the client system
that are supportive of improvement efforts/
new ideas.

5.

Potential to develop sufficient momentum to
make the project self-sustaining within the
system.

6.

Extent to which the project could (if successful) promote the organization development effort
generally.

These criteria not only eased the difficulties of managing the diffusion demand, they also discouraged sham in the
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sense of someone buying into the OD process simply "to look
good" or because it was the "popular thing to do."

This

helped maintain the integrity of OD.
During this period they met regularly every other month
for 2 hours, although they would occasionally meet longer
when the task required it.

This was the only meeting of this

group for which it was unacceptable to send a substitute.

If

the member could not attend, he was simply absent.
In addition to meeting on a regular bi-monthly basis as
an Executive Committee, the M.D.'s staff also had a tradition
of regular Monday morning meetings over breakfast just as
update, information-sharing, and coordination meetings.

The

new consultant (and later, one of the internal OD staff) contracted to serve as a Process Consultant and participated in
that role in each of those meetings over the 1-1/2 year
period.
When the Director of Manufacturing retired and was
replaced by a man from one of the U.S. divisions, that meant
6 members out of 11 of the Executive Committee had not participated in the original Albury 3-day offsite session.

For

this and other reasons, they held another such intensive
meeting away from the office October 15-16, 1976.

This meet-

ing focused on role, using Harrison's (197lb) "Role Negotiation" design.

They further defined three roles of the

Executive Committee as a whole as being to:
1.

Review the short- and long-term company
objectives.
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2.

Recognize and define problems affecting com-

pany operations which are outside the scope
of existing committees and develop strategies

to effect correction.
3.

Analyze needs and promote activity to develop
the effectiveness of the total GMH organization.

This group also continued to give formal support to

proposals from the Task Force, and the Department Head who
previously had said his department could not spare a fully
participating Task Force member had changed his mind as he

experienced a feeling of being "left out of the action.

11

They also supported Elizabeth's proposal for a pilot effort
launching Phase II of their strategy.

Both of these will

be discussed below.
At the end of June, 1977, the auto industry in Australia
was in dire straits, facing a very depressed market.

Through

this, this Executive group, according to testimony from the
now departing U.S. consultant, was maintaining its increasingly proactive stance and supporting OD more strongly than
ever with leadership from a now strongly committed Managing
Director.

Improvement in the dimension of mutuality of rela-

tionships among this group was noted in that there was
increasing understanding of the distinction between accountability and responsibility.

For example, previously the

Manager of Quality Control felt--and largely was regarded by
others in the group--both accountable and responsible for the
quality of all products when in fact his responsibility was
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to see that service was provided--primarily to manufacturing--to aid the production of quality products.

Moreover,

it was observed that individuals in this group were increasingly able to put aside their functional hats in Executive
Committee Meetings and that this role set carried over to

other meetings they attended where personnel matters were
concerned.

Both of these developments helped meet the need

for greater integration.

However, functional hats still

seemed to reappear in contexts where the main issues were

technical.

Evidence of increased boundary permeability

included the decision taken in May, 1977, that all Department

Heads were free to and in fact should speak directly to the
press and not, as had been previous policy, avoid responses
or wait for a response from the public relations function.
Executive Task Force

---- -----

The Task Force by July, 1977, had undergone numerous
changes in membership.

The Executive Committee had made it

a practice to ask members to serve about 1 year with overlapping terms so that about half the group changed at one
time.

Nevertheless, it continued to meet all day every

Friday.

At the time of each membership change, more exten-

sive time was set aside for training and orientation of new
members.

As of February, 1977, Task Force proposals had

been positively acted upon by the Executive Committee in
regard to Product Policy, Quality, and Cost Reduction.

They
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had consciously dropped any attempt at the action research
strategy, feeling the task was inappropriate given time
constraints.

Moreover, tasks were now assigned by the Exec-

utive Committee rather than developed from the original
charter.

In May, 1977, it was reported by the u.s. consul-

tant that

11

the status of the Task Force has, if anything,

gone up in the last six rnonths.

11

It was also serving as a

training ground for those destined for the very top positions
in the company, as indicated below in an excerpt from a
report from the Managing Director to the GM Overseas Administration Committee given in April, 1977:
We believe that the Executive Task Force has provided our younger and frequently geographically
isolated managers with an opportunity to work
with others in high positions on company-wide
issues. This process increases their development
of a broader perspective on our company's efforts
while modeling increased delegation from above
for the rest of the organization. Most department heads have also reported that membership in
the Task Force ha.s increased a member's willingness to cooperate and coordinate his activities
with other departments and we feel that these
changes have also brought about a flow-on of
these attitudes to lower levels of management as
well.

Elizabeth
In regard to Phase I goals focusing on raising managernent morale, some measurable progress was made.

The

11

0rgan-

izational Description Questionnaire, .. which had first been
administered in October, 1975, was readrninistered to all
salaried people in December, 1976.

This survey is divided
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into the following major indices:

How You See Your Organ-

ization (including opportunity for advancement, general

organizational "health, 11 concern for employees, and employee
commitment); Your Supervisor (concern for employees, concern

for performance, building a work team and help in getting
work done); Your work Group (supporting each other, concern
for performance, working as a team, helping each other, and
having clearly understood and accepted objectives); Your Job
(freedom and resources); Organizational Practices (effort,
information-sharing, cooperation, influence, decisionmaking); and Organizational Performance Indicators (satisfaction, turnover, absenteeism, work group performance).
Surveying the total population of 140 in 1975 and 128
in 1976, the total survey mean showed a T value improvement
of .70 on the second survey.

The greatest improvement in

the major indices was shown in "Your Supervisor"
"Organizational Practices"

(1.72).

recorded in "Your Work Group"

(1.09) and

Slight losses were

(-.36) and "Your Job"

(-.02).

To the extent that a T test of the difference between means
applies when total population samples are included, none of
the above T values are statistically significant at the .05
level of confidence.

However, it can be argued that when

using total population samples, inferential statistics are
not meaningful and that any difference between means is a
difference subject only to judgment as to the practical
significance of that difference as well as the usual caveats
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with respect to error of measurement.
Nevertheless, statistically significant (at .05)
improvements were recorded in regard to the supervisor's
perceived concern for performance (2.00); the extent to
which needed training was provided (2.53); the supervisor's
willingness to listen to employee problems (2.14); the extent

to which supervisors set a good example by working hard
themselves (3.70); the extent to which top management is
aware of problems at the employee's level (2.43); and the

influence of divisional management on what goes on in the
employee's department (2.56).

Statistically significant (at .05) negative T values
were recorded in the extent to which the employee's work
group pays attention to what the employee is saying (-2.05);
and the extent to which the employee 1 s job provides freedom
from daily routine (-2.32).
While not statistically significant, the overwhelming
preponderance of individual items showed improvement including overall satisfaction with the organization (1.26), and
a feeling that the organization was "run better now than in
the past 11

(1.38).

In interpreting these results, it must be remembered
that the survey was administered primarily for feedback and
action-planning purposes rather than measurement.

In fact,

the first administration did not take place until over 3
months of major organization improvement efforts had been
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under way.
Conservative as this would cause interpretation to be,
however, there was certainly some evidence for concluding
that the mood of local management had been raised.

Further,

the clarification regarding accountability and responsibility
that started at the Executive Committee level was filtering
down and was changing at this plant as well.
Important progress had also been made on Phase II, a
major goal of which was to involve hourly employees in
developing ways to improve the quality of their work life.
This took longer to get under way than the Steering Committee
first anticipated, but that is not unusual.

The Phase II

Planning Committee developed a proposal for a pilot project
in sociotechnical systems analysis and redesign which was
sanctioned, in turn, by the Elizabeth Assembly Steering Committee and Business Team, the Manager of Assembly Plants,
GMH Industrial Relations Department, and, finally, in September, 1976, the Executive Committee.

The objectives were to:

1.

Provide all employees the opportunity to be
involved in the planning, decision-making,
problem-solving, monitoring, and controlling
of group and operating performance within
their work groups.

2.

Provide the two-way flow of information necessary to achieve objective 1 (for example, standaT.d times, budget, work group operating
problems).

3.

Provide opportunities to all employees to
develop and expand their potential so that
they may participate more effectively both
as a member of a work group and the communtiy.
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4.

Provide all employees with the opportunity

to share in the success of the Elizabeth
Assembly Plant by ensuring that members of
the plant are adequately and fairly compensated for improvements in plant performance.
5.

Develop a sound relationship between employees,
management, and unions which will provide
security for all parties.

6.

Develop the supervisory function to that of
being a group leader coordinating and support-

7.

Further develop safe working conditions in a

ing the activities of a work group.
healthy environment.
8.

Learn from and evaluate the implementation of
these objectives by applying them in one pilot
area in preparation for further extensions
within the plant.

It was further proposed and approved that administration
and control of the project be entrusted to joint managementunion committees including a Pilot Site Selection Committee,
Pilot Group Design Committee, and Elizabeth Quality of Work
Life Committee.

It was further to be understood that activ-

ities undertaken not be precedent-setting for other areas,
that no evaluation be undertaken earlier than 12 months from
project inception, and any decision to terminate the project
be a joint union-management decision.
While all of the above was sanctioned by all appropriate
levels of management, the extremely sensitive task of getting
all the appropriate blessings and involvement from the multitude of unions was not yet fully accomplished by July, 1977.
The largest difficulty was the V.B.U.'s desire to make the
project a bargaining issue--something the company wanted to
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avoid.

The South Australian Government, a Labor government

viewed by many as the most progressive state government in
Australia, had also shown an interest.

Their Unit for Indus-

trial Democracy--the only such state unit in the country--was
involved and offered the full-time assistance of a consultant

who was a part of such experiments in Sweden.

To some

extent, this very process of attempting to obtain sanction
and appropriate involvement from all relevant groups was

the beginning of Phase II.
Diffusion
Although most projects reported on as diffusion projects
at Time 3 continued or expanded, diffusion also took on a
somewhat different character during this latter period.
Of the 11 projects reported earlier in this chapter,
fairly intensive activity continued in General Accounting,
the Foundries, Systems Development, and Experimental Engineering.

This latter activity was deemed successful enough that

it had spread to the rest of the Engineering Department as
a data confrontation approach under the leadership of the
new Chief Engineer.

Pagewood Vehicle Assembly was continu-

ing, though with uneven effort.

The Supply project was con-

sidered complete with the one intervention described.

The

Personnel project was considered unsuccessful and a frustrating experience for all concerned.

The Plants

and 5

project and the Parts, Power, and Appliance project reqUired
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low-level OD involvement to begin with, and even this
involvement diminished as other priorities took their place.
Plans for a survey in Sales became a part of wider organization survey plans.
In addition, three other important developments expanded
the comprehensiveness of the overall GMH effort:

(1) the

development of a training program in problem-solving skills
to be offered widely throughout the organization; (2) the
conducting of 2-day Familiarization seminars on a regular
basis for wide dissemination of basic OD concepts; and (3)
the administration of a "Quality of Work Life" (QWL) survey
to all salaried employees of GMH.

This latter survey,

recently developed by General Motors Organizational Research
and Development Department, was administered in May of 1977
to 3,381 GMH employees.
Moreover, diffusion was taking place less as "project
diffusion" and more as "behavioral diffusion."

Two examples

that have already been mentioned were the diffusion of new
role behavior by members of the Executive Committee from
meetings of that specific group to other meetings, and the
filtering down of their increased understanding of accountability/responsibility distinctions to plant levels.

A

specific diffusion was the formulation of the Personnel
Relations Policy Committee.

This committee was formed by

the Executive Committee (and is comprised of the same
members) to meet monthly specifically to act on those items
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in the original Executive Committee charter having to do
with personnel.

Acting as a sanction group, they enacted

policy supporting experimentation with flexible working
hours.

As a result, General Accounting and Engineering were

engaging in trials of flexi-time.

They enacted policy sup-

porting the development and promotion of women in the work
force.

They also instituted a process for the early identi-

fication of management potential.
Another sort of diffusion along these lines was

increased use of ad hoc cross-functional task forces for many
purposes.

Significantly, many past Executive Task Force

members were members of these new groups and it became customary to call on the OD unit for team building early in the
life of these task forces.

In fact there was even some dif-

fusion of this approach beyond the shores of Australia.

A

task force made up of representatives from GM units in
Australia, Brazil, Germany, and England were assigned to
investigate an EDP system for purchasing in the
the spring of 1977.

u.s.

during

The Australian contingent was considered

the lead group in this project and, having had experience
with this approach, requested that I conduct a 2-day team
building session with the entire task force on the second
and third days of their several months of work together in
the

u.s.
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Institutionalization
All of the above represents some evidence of institutionalization, especially the actions of the Executive Committee to continue to manage the OD process and such activities as organization-wide surveys.

Further, a publication

was started called the Holden News File.

This newsletter,

circulated to all employees, was a joint undertaking of the
public relations and personnel relations departments and was
designed not only to keep employees up to date on the state
of the business, but to publicize OD activities in the organization.

Perhaps most relevant, however, is the issue of

internal staffing.
Sufficient progress had been made in this regard that
in January, 1977, it was mutually agreed by the U.S. consultant and the Executive Committee that he could return to the
U.S. about 6 months earlier than expected without sacrifice
to the effort.

He had been originally scheduled to complete

his assignment in December, 1977, but now it was decided that
he could leave in July.

Coupled with that decision was the

decision to name one of the two internal specialists as his
successor to head the OD function in GMH.

This man was thus

named and that decision announced to the organization nearly
6 months before it was to take effect.

Such early announce-

ments are unprecedented in that organization, but it facilitated a much more orderly withdrawal and transfer of
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responsibilities process than otherwise would have been
possible.

It further gave explicit top-level credibility

to the internal man and allowed him to function with that

degree of sanction for several months before the u.s. consultant's departure.

Included in these functions was the

previously mentioned process consultant role with the
Executive Committee.

Moreover, another man from within the line organization
was added to the internal OD staff, bringing with him sub-

stantial manufacturing credentials.

In addition, a woman

was being trained on a GMOO Fellowship in the U.S. to return
in August as a full-time internal OD practitioner.
In summary, it would seem that OD was alive and well in
GMH in July, 1977, though once again at a potentially critical juncture.

This juncture represents an end point for the

present study, even though the process of change goes on at
GMH.

It is difficult to capture a dynamic process at a

point in time just as it is difficult for a photographer to
capture an event in motion with a still camera.

The two

"snapshots" just presented for Times 3 and 4 represent
attempts to do just that.

As such, there is the danger that

the reader will gain the impression of a static situation
when in fact it is very much in motion.

In many ways, the

process has just begun.
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CHAPTER IX

ANALYSIS
Introduction

The preceding account focused in detail on the first
6 months of a long-range on strategy applied in a large system.

This period constituted the launch or entry stage of

that strategy, a time period labeled "Time 1 to Time 2."

As

indicated in Chapter III, this analysis of the preceding case
description will treat two main issues:

(1) the effective-

ness of the launch strategy employed, and (2) the usefulness
of existing models in explaining or predicting the effectiveness or lack of effectiveness of the launch strategy.

Data

presented in the case from Times 3 and 4 will be used as
support for the analysis and the conclusions drawn.
Effectiveness of the Launch Strategy
Whether or not one considers the launch process as
described in this case effective depends, of course, on
one's criteria, which, in turn, depend on one's mental model
of OD or organization

change~

Those with Utopian social

system models would find much to be desired in GMH in both
Time 1 and Time 2 (as well as Time oo , it could be suspected) •
So also would those holding a Marxist model (cf. Brimm, 1975).
241
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However, even people with less grandiose schemes in mind
would justifiably find their singular ax not ground.

For

example, job enrichment advocates will note only peripheral
nods in that direction; likewise with worker participation
in the European mode; or, for that matter, anyone who views

the only legitimate focus of OD to be on blue collar workers
and the quality of their work life.

Although such desirable

outcomes were certainly in mind as an eventuality and progress was demonstrated in this direction between Times

and

4, most assuredly such progress was painstakingly slow:

some

evidence of unprogrammed involvement of hourly employees at
Dandenong and Elizabeth and one proposal for a planned pilot
project at Elizabeth still not completely sanctioned by all
relevant unions.

This would especially violate criteria held

by most unionists, of course.
oriented toward

11

On the other hand, those

business criteria 11 of success may not feel

completely satisfied either, though there is more promise
in the data in this regard.
Allison (Brimm, 1975) sums up the point with a brilliant
analogy:

11

Conceptual models not only fix the mesh on the

nets the analyst drags through the material in order to
explain a particular action; they also direct him to cast
his nets in select ponds, at certain depths, in order to
catch the fish he is after 11

(p. XI-5).

Quite obviously, the

author considers thG launch strategy employed to be reasonably
to very effective.

This inference would be made with no
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great difficulty by anyone reading the case.

Moreover, i t

is most likely that he would have selected another pond in
which to cast the net of this study if he did not consider
it effective.

Therefore, the only question becomes the basis

on which he considers it effective; the conceptual model on

which he bases his judgments; the mesh on his nets; the fish
he is after.

(While thus admitting to blatant bias, however,

an important reason for presenting the case itself in such
detail was to provide a pond to drag through with other anal-

ytical nets for those so inclined.

Ponds described from such

a personal change agent perspective are not abundant in the
literature, perhaps because of the risk one runs of having
one's pond dragged through by fishermen who do not share the
same perspective.)
The author indicated his criteria to some extent in
Chapter III when declaring his intent to focus on process
outcomes rather than organizational effectiveness outcomes
since the central purpose of the study was to contribute to
an understanding of the process of change.

Some analysis

of the evidence of organizational effectiveness outcomes
will be provided first, since it obviously is hoped that the
change was for the sake of improvement, but the central questions to be answered deal with whether or not change occurred
and was maintained and institutionalized.
There was some increased business effectiveness reported
for the two key plants in the entry strategy, Dandenong and

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

244

Elizabeth.

Both need to be interpreted cautiously, however.

In the case of Dandenong, its new leadership was already
causing improvements to occur before any formal OD intervention and might well have--in fact, no doubt would have-achieved its status as the best performing assembly plant
in GMH without the Confrontation Meeting and its subsequent

follow-through activities.

At best, the intervention helped

the organization arrive more quickly and systematically at
the destination toward which they were already inexorably
moving.

The business results at Elizabeth, on the other

hand--such as meeting schedule and quality standards--were
fitful throughout the 2-year period from the initial intervention there (just prior to Time 2) to Time 4.
depended on the degree of

11

Much

industrial 11 peace or unrest.

During periods when the unions were quiet, the plant seemed
to be performing better subsequent to the initiation of oo
than in the past.

When the unions stirred things up, the

plant seemed much as it did before any intervention had been
made.

However, savings and efficiencies realized from the

action research "mini-projects" were permanent ones and as
clearly an affect of OD interventions as one could ever
claim when trying to determine cause-effect in these matters.
Such attribution is even more difficult on the more comprehensive level of analysis known as GMH.

The external

environment continued to be most volatile throughout the
period of this case.

Therefore, though sales and profits
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were up from 1974 for both 1975 and 1976 and drastically
down at mid-year of 1977, little cause if any could be
attributed to OD.

Similar results were obtained through

the industry and obviously were largely a function of the
state of the whole Australian economy.

Moreover, so many

changes had occurred other than those related to on--especially the changes in key leadership--that, even without
external considerations, cause-effect questions become
hopelessly confounded.
There were some effectiveness outcomes, however, toward
which we definitely did target ourselves.

They are basically

encompassed by Alderfer's (1976) formulation of critical
system phenomena to be treated in the change process:
boundary permeability and relationship mutuality, or what
Greiner and Barnes (1970) referred to as (1) the organization's level of adaption to its environment and (2) the
internal behavioral patterns of employees (p. 2).
Work with the two top-level groups--the Executive Council and the Executive Task Force--both had, as one of the
major goals, more effective coping with the external environment or more optimally open boundaries.

Evidence that such

"opening up" occurred was cited in regard to the Council
(or later, the Committee) with respect to the increased participation in employer and government study groups and the
speech delivered by the M.D. regarding industry's response
to government intervention.

There was less saying "ain't it
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awful" although that never entirely disappeared nor is ever
likely to.

On the other hand, there was a genuine attempt

to anticipate environmental forces and proactively deal with
them.

This was most clearly demonstrated in the work of the

Executive Task Force in the analytical approach they used
to develop proposals with regard to such critical matters as
product policy.

As mentioned, they used an open systems

approach and structured committees and their membership so
as to take all external forces into account that were deemed
relevant to a given decision area.

Further, the Elizabeth

Phase II proposal clearly represented an attempt to make the
boundaries more permeable in one most important domain, that
of the unions.
Internal boundary rigidity was also softened, which
enhanced relationship mutuality.

More was instituted in

this regard, probably, than any other.

This reflected the

diagnostic observation during the scouting period of the
need for better integration and the potential payoff for
economies of coordination (see Chapter V of this study) •
In addition to the attempt to build mutuality of relationships by team-building interventions, integrating devices
to supplement the management hierarchy were widely implemented.

These included the Executive Council and Task Force,

the Elizabeth Business Team and Steering Committee, the
11

Business Units 11 created for problem-solving at Dandenong,

the design of the

11

product conception 11 committees, and the
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creation of the position of Product Planning Coordinator.
In addition, a number of cross-functional task forces were
created for ad hoc tasks as part of the Executive Task Force,
Elizabeth, and Dandenong strategies.

Moreover, the HRM sys-

tem was being implemented to enhance the likelihood of crossfunctional career development.

Some measurable evidence of

relationship improvement was derived from the survey results
at Elizabeth, and there was the testimony given by an outside

visitor (see Chapter VIII) as to the interdepartmental cooperation he attributed to the Executive Task Force.
On the other hand, it was the author's judgment, as
reported, that relationships had not improved a great deal
by Time

with respect to the Executive Council.

Whether

because of the inappropriateness of the interventions--certainly a contributing cause as this observer sees it--and/or
other reasons, that group was still engaging in internecine
battles when the author departed in January, 1976 (an observation he shared with them shortly before he left).

This

apparently improved considerably by Time 4, what with the
new consultant, new Managing Director, other new personalities, and interventions such as the process consulting at
meetings and the offsite meeting that included role negotiations.
There is some evidence, then, of improvement in organizational effectiveness:

in operating effectiveness at the

plant level, but most particularly in boundary permeability
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and mutuality of relationships in the organization as a
whole.

Let us turn now to the central issue of process

outcomes.

It is believed that it can be objectively said that
change did, in fact, occur.

Some evidence for this statement

is found in the above discussion of effectiveness outcomes.
But more to our point, such changes as thus evidenced ar.e
partial demonstration that the organization had moved from
a state at Time 1 of lack of awareness of OD at best or outright resistance at worst to a state of widespread trial and
even adoption at Time 4.

Perhaps the bottom line testimony

is that, at the end of 2-1/2 years, OD still existed in GMH
despite the fact that it was launched in the context of
extremely tight economic circumstances and that the organization faced such circumstances again in this latter period.
Moreover, it survived major changes in the leadership of
both the organization and the OD function.

All of the

above--economic bad times, changes in organizational leadership, and changes in consultant resources--have frequently
led to the downfall or discontinuation of OD efforts in other
cases.

In the present case, they did not.

Why?

One important reason must be the continuing active
involvement and leadership of key individuals at the top-such as the Managing Director--and the top group as a whole-the Executive Committee.

Despite key personnel changes in

this group and some early let-down after their initial
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enthusiasm, it continued to take an active role in managing
the process as well as modeling adoption behavior in at
least three ways:

(1) regular monthly meetings on OD,

(2)

use of an OD resource as a process consultant, and (3)
intensive offsite sessions in which they reexamined their
own behavior.
Another important factor contributing to survival of

the change process was the development of structural mechanisms--what might be called instrumentalities--that served as
agencies for maintaining the process once started.

These

included the Executive Committee, the Executive Task Force,
and the Elizabeth Business Team and Steering Committee.

In

the case of the Executive Committee and Elizabeth Business
Team, it was primarily a matter of making use in the OD process of existing power groups and institutionalizing their
OD role.

In the case of the Task Force and the Elizabeth

Steering Committee, it was a matter of creating new roles
for new structures and, most importantly, using them as
opportunities to link supportive opinion leaders from all
functions.
This linking phenomenon also had critical impact on
another factor contributing importantly to the continuation
of the change process to Time 4 and, hopefully, beyond:
widespread diffusion.

From our earliest experience in

General Motors as well as from reading (Ketchum, 1975;
Walton, 1976) and hearing about the experience of other
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organizations, we have learned that diffusion is not the
simple, rational process one might believe.

Logic would

seem to say that if a pilot project is clearly successful,
especially in terms of clearly superior business performance,
then all practical managers in the system will want to emulate that demonstration.

Again and again, however, it has

been shown that such is not the case.

In reality, diffusion

is a much more complex socio-political process.

In the case

of GMH, there was an attempt to anticipate diffusion needs
and to build in synergic diffusion mechanisms before there
was indeed anything to diffuse.

Chief among these was the

Executive Task Force, as pointed out in the case.

It was

the intent that these opinion leaders would, based on their
Task Force experience with oo, encourage trials elsewhere
in the system.

In addition, of course, other diffusion

forces were at work as well, sometimes acting interactively
with the Task Force phenomenon, sometimes independently.
Did this diffusion strategy succeed?
of the results.

Figure 23 shows some

In this model, the major diffusion projects

that developed between Times 2 and 3 (the period of most
rapid diffusion) are shown in the middle, surrounded by the
major diffusion forces.

In the upper left-hand corner are

shown some key forces in the entry strategy which, among
themselves, had some interaction effect.

That is, the Dan-

denong V.A.P. pilot success had some positive influence on
the Director of Manufacturing and the Manager of Assembly
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Plants; these two men, in turn, had a great influence on
getting the Elizabeth V.A.P. project under way (as did the
Dandenong success itself); once Elizabeth got off to a very
good start, it, in turn, strongly reinforced the ownership
in the process of these two men who then went on to influence
the start-up of other projects.

It was reported in the case

that the author periodically spoke to some of the regularly
scheduled management training classes, especially during the
scouting period.

This is shown, in the lower left of the

model, to have directly influenced two trials.

The Executive

Council (or members thereof) shown in the lower right contributed toward influencing other projects.

However, i t can

clearly be seen that the most overwhelming force for diffusion was the Task Force.

In 10 out of the 12 diffusion proj-

ects, Task Force members played a key role, either as the
single strong initiator of the project or as strong support
for it.

They would even have some slight claim in influenc-

ing HRM through their Statement of Direction; however, this
was most clearly brought about by the Council as a whole and
one of its key members, the Personnel Director.

Further, the

list of projects does not include some of the action research
projects the Task Force had initiated.

All in all, they were

certainly a potent force for diffusion.
Finally, in terms of process outcomes, it is important
to examine the development of internal resources.

This

process had some ups and downs during the first 6 months as
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a result of lack of clear understanding of roles and players.
This reinforces the frequent advice to consultants continually to clarify their contract, psychological or otherwise.
However, once those issues were cleared up, there was fairly
steady progress made toward capacitating those inside the
system--in terms of their skill, experience, credibility,
and access to all levels of the organization--to assume full

responsibility for the OD resource function and permit the
orderly withdrawal of outside consultants.

This steady prog-

ress was only interrupted temporarily at Time 3 with the
change of outside consultants and the resulting need of the

new consultant to spend some time developing his own
credibility.
One question that could legitimately be raised regarding
internal resource development, however, has to do with the
issue of time:

should it have taken 2-1/2 years to accom-

plish this orderly withdrawal?

Some circumstances unique to

this case confound the answer.

For example, the initial

misunderstanding regarding the role of the Training Manager,
as well as the fact that the two men who eventually did
become the key internal resources were in the U.S. during
the first 6 months of the effort effectively precluded any
progress on this goal for that period of time.
The second 6 months, however, were a different matter,
and have important implications for change strategy more
generally.

This period, it will be noted from the case, was
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the period of most rapid diffusion.

Thus, while there was

some internal consultant development through observation,
coaching, and counseling on the job, and, very infrequently,
formal classroom experiences, the primary focus of activity
was trying simply to staff the burgeoning project load and
cope with increasing requests and demands.

Consequently,

consultant development was often compromised.

The rapidly

rising diffusion rate for this period is, of course, consistent with Rogers 1

(1962) s curve for adoption rate reported

in Chapter II and, therefore, may be a predictable phenomenon
in change efforts.

This finding could be of great importance

for the staffing of change efforts as well as for planning
for resource development.

This matter will receive some

further consideration both in the ensuing section of this
chapter and in Chapter X.
Further consideration with respect to this time factor
in internal resource development must be given to the size

and complexity of the change effort as well as the size and
complexity of the system.

The case reported here represents

a fairly large and complex effort in a fairly large and complex system.

When all of the above are combined with the

fact that once the outside consultant left the organization
(and the country) the distance caused him to become virtually
inaccessible--he could not casually be called in from time
to time or phoned and used as a sounding board, it makes for
a reasonably large and complex undertaking.

Taking all this
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into consideration, the judgment is made here that the goals
of internal consultant capacitation and outside consultant

orderly withdrawal and termination may have been accomplished
somewhat sooner, but not much.
So far, then, we have analyzed the effectiveness of the
launch process in terms of organizational effectiveness outcomes and process outcomes.

We found some evidence of

improved performance, more optimally open boundaries, and
greater mutuality of relationships.

In terms of process,

the indicators of a successful launch were ongoing and institutionalized top-level commitment and direction, the existence

of instrumentalities or structural mechanisms for maintaining
the process, widespread diffusion, and the development of
internal specialist resources.

Most importantly, the effort

was still alive after 2-1/2 years of extreme environmental
vagaries and changes in key leadership.
As a final assessment, the reader is invited to test
the case against Beckhard's (1969} conditions for success and
failure listed in Chapter II of this study.

It would seem

to hold up quite well.
Usefulness of Existing Models
In the review of existing models in Chapter II, the
conclusion was drawn that a sufficiently comprehensive model
for initiating planned change in the OD mode must include
consideration of the change agent(s), the client system, the
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nature of the proposed change, the process, and time.

In

this section, an attempt will be made to analyze the extent
to which existing models explain or predict the effect of
each of these factors on the case.

It is not the intent here to analyze the major interventions made by the change agent so much as it is to analyze
the change agent himself as an instrument of change as sug-

gested by Rothman (1974; see p. 46 of the present study).
Critical to this analysis are the issues of the change agent
as outsider, the change agent's use of power, and change
agent roles.
As the primary change agent during the period of primary
consideration--the launch phase, or the first 6 months--the
author was clearly an outsider.

Although a member of the

suprasystem, General Motors, of which GMH was a part, he was
external so far as the organization itself was concerned.
Further, he was

11

a bloody Yank, .. an American in Australia.

Existing models and related research indicate this is both
a blessing and a curse.
Greiner's (1967) model, for example, points to the entry
of a new man from outside the organization and known for his
ability to improve organizations as a necessary element in
successful change attempts.

Lippitt and Lippitt (1977) sug-

gested advantages for the outside consultant such as the fact
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that it may be easier for the client to admit to a problem
to an outsider than to a peer, the credibility of greater
experience, the freedom to safely ask naive questions, to
suggest new methods, and to test the readiness of the system,

and the provision of a wider and fresher perspective on
problems and goals.
There is much on the disadvantage side, however.

Watson

(1969) referred to resistance to change brought by outsiders,
and this was supported in Rogers and Shoemaker's (1971)

research regarding heterophily and homophily with

11

change

agent success . . . positively related to his homophily with
clients'' (p. 242) •
In the preceding case, both sides of this issue were
experienced.

There did, in fact, seem to be some "expertise 11

power accruing to the author as a result of his being an
outsider from the u.s., and it did provide him with some
degree of wider perspective.

At the same time, however, he

was received with some degree of suspicion.

His heterophily

was somewhat reduced by three facts of circumstance:

(1) he

was from General Motors and to that extent shared some knowledge, norms, and experience with the client system;

(2) some

of the key individuals in the client system were also Americans; and (3) as discussed in the case, it was a common
occurrence for someone from the U.S. Corporation to go to
GMH on a temporary assignment as an "expert" in one field or
ano~her.

Beyond these circumstantial considerations, other
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steps were taken to increase the author's homophily.

For

one, partly because it was in his nature and partly as a
result of conscious effort, he learned all he could about
Australian history, customs, language, politics, and culture

generally.

For example, as those Australians in GMH who

knew him would surely testify, he became fascinated by

Australian idioms and before long used such phrases as "fair
dinkum 11 and "she'll be right, mate" almost as though he were
a native (or "true blue," as they say).

This was not a

forced practice because it was congruent with his personality,
but he was conscious that the Australians seemed to enjoy
his attempts.

On an even less lofty level, he similarly

found little difficulty in developing a taste for Australian
beer and was not averse to stopping at a
the way home from work with some of his
participation in such

11

schools

11

11

11

Hotel

11

clients.

(pub) on
11

One's

(groups of drinkers) was a

fairly highly valued local norm and worth some sacrifice in
the name of homophily.
Another method of reducing heterophily was by working
through internal opinion leaders.

The first such instance,

of course, was the relationship that arose between the author
and the Dandenong Plant Manager.

Although he was an Austral-

ian line manager and the author was an American consultant,
they immediately shared some degree of homophily in terms
of shared beliefs in respect to how organizations work.
Moreover, the author's previous assembly plant experience
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enabled him to talk plant language and to understand the
Manager's, as well as to have some empathy with his situation.

He, in turn, helped bridge the outsider gap the author

had with respect to the rest of the system.

This sort of

bridging became increasingly true through work with the
Executive Council and Executive Task Force.

All of this is

consistent with Rogers and Shoemaker's (1971) findings,
especially this latter approach which, they stated, "change
agents frequently employ to bridge the heterophily gap:

They

work through opinion leaders in the system to halve the
social distance between themselves and the majority of their
clients.

Then the original wide heterophily gap is shortened

to two smaller gaps.

The use of leaders may also gain

credibility for the change agents' innovations by gaining
tacit endorsement of the opinion leaders" (pa 243)a
To reduce the resistance to change brought about by
outsiders as alluded to by watson (1969), the author attempted
to make both the diagnosis leading to the change and the
design of the change itself in all cases a collaborative
processa

In the instances of the Council, the Task Force,

and Dandenong, most of the diagnosis and design were done
by the client groups with the author in a process role pro-

viding techniques and models to facilitate their efforts.
As reported, the author took a more assertive and expert
stance at Elizabeth, providing his own content input into
the diagnosis and planning processes, but still encouraging
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input from the client system.

This is consistent with both

of Watson's (1969) principles relative to "Who brings the
change?"

(see pp. 66-67 of this study).

The findings of

both Watson and Rogers were thus useful.
These latter two matters--the working through opinion
leaders and the collaborative approach to diagnosis and

action planning--are also most relevant when dealing with
the issue of the change agent's use of power.

As a consul-

tant with peripheral system membership and no hierarchical

authority, a change agent's sources of power are limited and
yet his job is to influence others in the direction of change.
Within himself he needs to rely almost entirely on expert
power and referent power.
sensitivity.

Both require extreme personal

Beyond these, he depends for power by means of

the coalitions he can forge with opinion leaders and gatekeepers within the system.

These relationships, in turn,

depend again on expert and referent power.

As cited in

Chapter II, Rogers and Shoemaker (1971) generalized that
"change agent success is positively related to the extent
that he works through opinion leaders 11 (p. 243).

The change

agent efforts, reported in the case, with the Dandenong
Manager, the Managing Director, the Director of Manufacturing,
the Manager of Assembly Plants, and--individually and collectively--the Council and the Task Force were expended with
this in mind.

All of Rogers 1 findings regarding change

agents, as reported in Chapter II of this study, appear most
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relevant and useful in explaining the level of success
reported in the launch strategy for this case.

Greiner's

(1967) finding that the use of shared power characterized

successful patterns of organizational change is also
relevant.

Examination of the case will also reveal that the change
agent role repertoire was quite broad, making use, it is

believed, of the entire directive-nondirective spectrum as
developed by both Lippitt and Lippitt (1977) and Schuttenberg (1971) and as shown in Chapter II of this study.

Roth-

man's (1974) research supports such use of a multiple-role
set.

In particular, the passage cited on page 60 of the

present study supports the more directive than usual role
taken at Elizabeth.
In summary, then, this analysis leads to the conclusions
that existing models are of some use in explaining the more
effective change agent behavior reported in this case in
regard to dealing with issues of heterophily, power, and
roles.

Particularly useful were the findings of Rogers and

Shoemaker (1971), Rothman (1974), and Watson (1969).

Much of the literature reported in Chapter II suggested
a search by the change agent for potential client systems
having characteristics hospitable to innovation (Peets,
1970; Rothman, 1974; Watson, 1969).

Beckhard (1969),
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Harrison (197la), and Shepard (1975) further suggested looking for these characteristics in key individuals or subsystems of the organization.

For the consultant employed

by a company, the latter is the more realistic option.

An

independent consultant may perhaps be able to pick and choose
his clients.

An internal consultant sometimes must take

clients who are a long way from meeting optimum criteria
defining "modern" systems.

However, here is an instance

where i t can be an advantage to consult for change in a large
system.

Through systematic scouting, given the large numbers

of individuals and subsystems in a large organization, the
laws of probability suggest that a change agent can usually
find sufficient opportunity for early intervention.
relates somewhat to the

11

This

Slack 11 in large systems alluded to

in Rothman's (1974) findings in this regard.

Thus, in large

systems, the change agent's task becomes the location,
development, and synergic linking of individuals and subsystems that match as closely as possible the characteristics
of innovative systems suggested by research.

This was cer-

tainly practical in the preceding case, especially in regard
to the choice of Dandenong as the site of the initial major
intervention.

The synergic linking is shown in Figure 23 of

this chapter.

To the extent that existing findings relevant

to client system characteristics suggest such change agent
activities, they are useful.

Nowhere, however, do they seem

to appear in model form.
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As for assessing readiness, Beckhard {1969) and Harrison
(197la) provide helpful insights, particularly in regard to
sensing felt needs.

However, Gleicher's C

=

(abd) )

mula (Beckhard, 1975) appears most useful of all.

x for-

When

applied to key subsystems in this case, it is most revealing.
Dandenong, for example, felt considerable dissatisfaction
with the status quo, but was already pretty well aware of
where it wanted to go and some practical steps for getting
there.

Thus, an intervention that simply helped with another

practical step could serve as a very helpful catalyst in an
existing culture of high readiness.

The Executive Council,

Executive Task Force, and Elizabeth were all sufficiently
high in dissatisfaction that they did not need further beating over the head with pressure to change, but they did need
help with direction and practical steps.
true of Elizabeth.

This was especially

Thus, this formula not only helps in the

analysis of client system readiness, but also in determining
appropriate interventions and change agent roles.

This

author did not know of the Gleicher formula at the time the
launch strategy reported in this case took place.

He wishes

he had.
The apparent need for the client system to feel pressure
to change is further supported by the Greiner (1967) and
Dalton (1970) models, of course.

Both point to such pressure

as a necessary antecedent condition.

Perhaps it all goes

back to Lewin's (1958) notion of unfreezing.
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OD starts at a disadvantage here, as discussed in
Chapter II.

As an innovation to be adopted, it rates low

on Rogers and Shoemaker•s (1971) criteria, relative advantage, compatibility, complexity, and communicability.

Fre-

quently in the case, for example, the author referred to
difficulties he had in communicating the nature of OD and
his role, in part a function of its complexity.

This

required special coping mechanisms such as the Boardroom
presentation, familiarization experiences in the course of
offsite meetings primarily meant for other purposes, and
speaking to training classes.

In large part, however, the

author talked about OD as little as possible and

11

let it

demonstrate its rneaning 11 through activities involving opinion
leaders.

As much as possible, in this regard, he tried to

follow Watson's (1969) advice that "resistance will be less
if the program offers the kind of new experience which interests participants 11 (p. 22).
(197la) guideline:

11

This is similar to Harrison's

Develop confidence and credibility on

the part of organization members through situations where
the OD unit's unique expertise shows to best advantage 11
(p. 2).

Such activities as the Confrontation Meeting at

Dandenong and the offsite sessions held with the Council,
Task Force, and Elizabeth were in part designed with this
in mind.

The use, in the latter three cases, of experience-
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based learning was done in part because of the intrinsic
value of these learning experiences, but also, frankly, in
part because they indeed do offer new experiences that participants find interesting and they do show OD expertise to
good advantage.
Relative advantage needed to be demonstrated rather
than asserted.

This happened first at Dandenong and later

most persuasively at Elizabeth.

The latter was one of those

cases of "if you can do it there, you can do it anywhere."
While much of what people were asked to do violated Watson's
(1969) principle regarding the perceived reduction rather
than increase in client's present burdens (for example,
giving up weekends for long, hard meetings and scheduling
extra meetings), the demonstrations of relative advantage
balanced this out to some extenta
The author tried to demonstrate that OD was compatible
with values presently held by acknowledging existing efforts
and practices which were, in fact, compatible and by not
claiming to have brought something altogether new from the
great prophet in the Westa

Further, he could capitalize on

the compatibility of OD values of openness, honesty, and
teamwork with traditional Australian values of "fair dinkum 11
and "mateshipa 11

That some of this compatibility was in fact

perceived was illustrated by the comment of the man from
Elizabeth quoted on page 193 of Chapter VII.
One characteristic of innovations positively related to
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their adoption is divisibility (Rogers & Shoemaker, 1971).
This is the one criterion wherein OD has some advantage.

It

was possible, for example, to start a process at Dandenong
without doing the same thing throughout GMH.

Similarly, the

Executive Council felt free to make a trial commitment to OD
after Albury rather than a long-range commitment (although
such long-range commitment was made later).

Also, the action

research strategies of both the Executive Task Force and
Elizabeth, which employed small-scale trials, and Elizabeth 1 s

two-phase action plan are evidence of this divisibility of
OD.

Most useful, then, in analyzing the impact of the nature
of the change on the success of the launch strategy were
models developed by Rogers and Shoemaker (1971) and Watson
(1969)

There are three general categories of process models
of relevance to this analysis.

One encompasses models of

organization change, such as Lewin (1958), Greiner (1967),
and Dalton (1970).

The second are models of the OD process,

such as Frohman and Kolb (Kolb, Rubin, & Mcintyre, 1971)
and Lippitt and Lippitt (1977).

Third are models of adoption

and diffusion of innovation such as Rogers (Rothman, 1974)
and Havelock (1971).

As discussed in Chapter II, models from

each of these categories make useful contributions, but none
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sufficiently integrates all the important variables.

This

still seems to be a valid observation when applied to the
preceding case.
The phases described by Lewin (1958), Greiner (1967),
and Dalton (1970) all seemed to occur in the case in the
sequence described.

As discussed in the "Client Systern 11

section above, for example, GMH and each of the key subsystems in the launch strategy (Executive Council, Executive
Task Force, Dandenong, Elizabeth) felt the sort of pressure
to change that Greiner and Dalton both identify as necessary
starting points.

Further, as in both those models, there

was the intervention at the top of an outside agent.

At the

level of GMH as a whole, the authpr would have to be identified as that person.

This would also be true for the

Council and the Task Force.

For Dandenong and Elizabeth

there was more than one such agent.

I'.1 the former case

there was the new Plant Manager and two other new staff
heads in addition to the author.

In the latter instance,

the new man on the scene other than the author was the Manager of Assembly Plants.

Together these first two phases

might be considered Lewin's "unfreezing" phase.

The "change"

phase then occurred, rapidly accelerating in the second 6
months (Time 2 to Time 3) and into the next time period.
A "refreezing" may have started as Time 4 was approached,
with institutionalization at the Executive Committee level
becoming stronger and the internalization of the OD
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specialist role.

However, much change was still in the

works and some critical changes scarcely begun.

As the case

has just been compared to the three-phase Lewin model, it
can likewise be compared to the remainder of the Greiner
and Dalton models.

The reader who will test the case against

Greiner's eight steps given in Chapter II of this study and
Dalton's model (pp. 39 and 41-42, respectively) will find

remarkable consistency between those models and the developmental phases of the case--at either the level of the entire
system (GMH) or any of the entry subsystems.

Even the degree

of failure experienced with the Executive Council between
Time 2 and Time 3 can be explained by putting the activities
of this group into the context of the Dalton model.

Such

examination will show that there was not sufficient help or
help of the right kind to bridge the gap for this group
between Phases II and III of this model.

Subsequent inter-

vention by the second u.s. consultant almost had to start
over at the beginning of this model for that group.
Such models are extremely useful, then.

All, however,

are cast from the point of view of the organization undergoing change.

Missing is the point of view of the change

agent.
OD models such as Frohman and Kolb's (Kolb et al.,
1971) and Lippitt and Lippitt's (1977) remedy this to some
extent.

Both offer guidelines for change agents, and the

Lippitt and Lippitt model, especially, is cast from the
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consultant's point of view.

In order to apply them to this

case, however, they must be applied reiteratively to each
subsystem.

That is, the events of the case could be traced

through either model for the Executive Council, for example,
or any one of the other key entry subsystems.

However, their

For one, it would be very

usefulness is limited in two ways.

difficult to track the development of GMH as a whole in these
models since never was the system as a whole nor the change
agent's activities in one phase or another after initial
scouting phase.

That is a primary reason that the organiza-

tion of the presentation of the case departed from such
models after scouting and entry.

The models no longer met

the need for explanation or clarification.

Neither do they,

as a second limitation, satisfactorily meet the need of
explaining or predicting the level of success, beyond suggesting that if the sequence is not followed to some degree,
one may make the illogical sequential leaps found by Greiner
(1967) to be a condition of failure.

With respect to the

first limitation, i t may be that such models are perfectly
adequate for outlining the sequence of a given change project.

They may be less useful for describing the overall

change process in a large system.

With respect to their

lack of predictive value, i t must be said that such is not,
in fact, the purpose of these models even though it is, in
part, the purpose of this study.
Turning now to models of adoption and diffusion of
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innovation, we find that both Rogers' model and Havelock's
model (both given on p. 28 of Chapter II of this study) of

the adoption process track with the case reasonably well.
The action guideline from Havelock to carry out the Awareness
and Knowledge stages by means of mass media was not followed
in the case, however, and is often difficult to follow in OD
practice because of the complexity and difficult communicability of the field.

Attempts in other cases in our experi-

ence to thus communicate have either resulted in vast oversimplifications that lead to some of the hazards of inadequate
understanding described during the scouting phase of this
case or in such complexity that potential adopters are turned
off.

At this stage of the state of the art, potential

adopters st.ill seem to have to sample the innovation, even
if it is no more than some exercises in the context of a
seminar.

Only the present.ation to the Executive Council in

the Boardroom could be considered a mass media approach in
this instance, although an audience of about a dozen is not
very mass.
Already discussed in the introduction to Chapter VIII
is a modification of these models suggested by the case.

In

large system change it may be useful to include a diffusion
stage after trial, and change adoption to institutionalization.

The resulting process model would then have, accept-

ing Havelock 1 s basic framework for the moment, five stages:
(1) Awareness,

(2) Knowledge,

(3) Trial,

(4) Diffusion, and
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(5) Institutionalization.

(If using Rogers' model as a

starting point, there would, of course, be six stages.)
This seems to describe the actual process more accurately
and may be more appropriate when the intent is fundamental
change in the nature of a social system rather than the more
straightforward adoption of a given innovation.
In regard to the diffusion stage, such authorities as
Rogers and Havelock have much to contribute regarding the
impact of individual opinion leaders and the need for change
agents to work one-on-one through these leaders.

Again

perhaps because their focus is on the adoption of innovation
by a social system rather than change in the social system
itself, they say little about organized groups of such
opinion leaders.

Guidelines cited in Chapter II from Har-

rison (197la) , Beckhard (1969) , and Shepard (1975) all suggest linking forces for change into networks, however.

This

was found a most useful approach in the GMH case and contributed in a major way to the synergy of the overall effort,
one outcome of which was the rapid diffusion from Time 2 to
Time 3, as shown in Figure 23.
The adoption and diffusion models, helpful as they are,
nevertheless continue to focus on the point of view of the
receiver of change.

Further, as pointed out in Chapter II,

they are still subject to the criticism of Chin and Benne
(1969) , that they cast the receiver in a relatively passive
role.
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Finally, in terms of process, the principles regarding
"procedures in instituting change" (pp. 67-68, Chapter II
of this study) suggested by Watson (1969) to reduce resistance to change can be seen to have been reasonably well
followed in this case.

They, too, would have to be con-

sidered useful, though without the value of sequential
phases provided by some of the previously cited process
models.

Nearly all models dealing with the time phenomenon in
system change state or suggest that such change takes a long
time.

This case confirms that.

Two and one-half years into

the process, one can still not say that pervasive change has
taken place throughout the system.

Nor can one say that

sufficient improvement in end results such as profit have
taken place to label the overall effort a success.

In fact

at Time 4, profits were way down as reported in Chapter VIII.
To this extent, then, the Likert (1961) time lag theory is
valid.

Only continued effort over still longer time will

demonstrate whether or not this model will ultimately stand
up.

In the meantime, of course, there are tangible inter-

mediate accomplishments that were documented in the case,
a consideration consistent with one of Beckhard's guidelines
(see item 9, p. 40, Chapter II of this study).
A most useful insight relative to time, however, is
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provided by the s-shaped diffusion curve reported by Rogers
and Shoemaker (1971).

As discussed earlier in this chapter

with respect to process outcomes, the development of this
case can, to some extent, be plotted along this curve shown
in Figure 3 (p. 31) of this study with a very high degree of
overlap.

The slowly rising portion of the curve corresponds

roughly to the launch period--the first 6 months.

At about

that point, diffusion began to increase rapidly and would
fit on the most vertical portion of the curve.

As attention

turned, beginning at about Time 3, to managing and institutionalizing the process, the curve began moving more to the
horizontal.

At Time 4, it is believed, the curve is still

on the rise but moving toward the plateau stage.

(Implica-

tions of this phenomenon for the management of the change
process will be discussed in Chapter X.)

It is important to

note, however, that the focus of this curve is on the diffusion of innovation in a social system rather than change in
the system itself.

Therefore, while the diffusion rate may

have slowed somewhat by Time 4, the fundamental changes to
be wrought in the system as a result of this OD process that
has been diffused must still be considered far from a state
of maturity.
Rogers• noncumulative bell-shaped adoption curve (see
Figure 2, p. 29 of this study) also has some usefulness in
analyzing the present case, as do the adopter categories
shown in Table 1 (p. 30).

The Dandenong Plant Manager, for
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example, would be reasonably well profiled as an innovator,
while Executive Task Force members and some other leaders
of the earliest completely voluntary diffusion projects
would fall comfortably into the early adopter categories.
About the time the author was leaving (Time 3), requests for
assistance were beginning to come in from some people
believed to fit the early majority description.
Useful as these models are, however, they still are not

completely satisfactory for purposes of this study since,
again, they are designed to explain the adoption-diffusion
process and not basic system change.
In general, then, we may summarize our analysis of
existing models in explaining or predicting the level of
success of the launch strategy described in the case by
saying many existing models are most useful when applied to
particular aspects of the case (change agents, client system,
nature of the change, process, and time)

in particular ways

(e.g., from the point of view of the system, or in regard
to adoption behavior) , but none satisfactorily integrates
all of these aspects or deals with all of the relevant
variables.

Moreover, the categories of our analysis (change

agent, client system, etc.) are not such cleanly separated
phenomena in a living process as such a categorization suggests.

They in fact interact on one another, creating a

systemic impact.

This interaction effect among these criti-

cal variables is also not found satisfactorily in existing
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models.

It must be reemphasized that this is not intended

as criticism of these models, since any one model cannot
serve all purposes nor encompass all variables.

Our intent

here is simply to point out that there exists a need to
develop an integrated model for use by professional change
agents that will be useful to them as they try to initiate
change in large systems.
is attempted in Chapter X.

The development of such a model
The implications of this model

for educational leaders, whether in schools, communities,

or business and industrial organizations, will also be
discussed.
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CHAPTER X
A MODEL FOR INITIATING CHANGE IN LARGE
SOCIAL SYSTEMS

Introduction
Allison's metaphor (Brimm, 1975), cited in Chapter IX,
compared conceptual models to fishing nets which analysts

drag through selected ponds at selected depths with the basis
of selection being the nature of the nets themselves.

The

dilemma this poses for practitioners is caught in Brimm's
comment:

"While with unlimited resources, one could fish the

entire pond with an array of nets, the practitioner normally
must assess alternatives within the constraints of scarcity
and choose a single course of action"

(p. XI-5).

In other

words, the practitioner cannot cast forever among all the
available models.

At some point, he must "fish or cut bait.

11

To switch metaphors to one more familiar in the development
of the present case, the practitioner may indeed measure 10
times but, at snme point, cut he must.

This study is aimed

at the practitioner, the professional change agent.
stated:

As Brimm

"His choice of conceptual model, either explicitly

or implicitly accepting premises for innovative activity,
critically determines the direction of organizational change
efforts"

(p. XI-1).

It is the intent of this chapter to

posit a model that a practitioner would find useful as a
276
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guide for action for initiating change in large systems.
It may be helpful first to trace breifly how we arrived
at this point.

We began by reviewing existing models of

change and related literature and concluded that a useful
model for practitioners would include consideration of the
change agent, the client system, the nature of the change,
the process, and time.

Six months of a detailed case history

of an attempt at organization change was then presented as a
participant-observer study in which the participant-observer
was the primary change agent.

Summary snapshots of the state

of this organization change process at two later time periods
were then provided.

In total, 2-1/2 years in the experience

of an organization change effort were described.

The launch

strategy used in the first 6 months was then assessed for its
relative success.

Finally, existing models as already

reviewed were reexamined to determine the extent to which
they helped explain or predict the level of success of the
launch strategy.

At this point we are left with a number of

partial explanations provided by a number of models.
Brimm (1975) stated that the practitioner in his planning function finds himself with three sets of options when
thus trying to cope with contending models:
1.

An essential complementarity for action
exists, either in a single activity prescribed by all models or the creative
design of action which encompasses the
directives of the models.
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2.

Model prescriptions for action demand either
differing interventions or their application
at different loci. While not directly conflicting, the alternative prescriptions each
demand unique allocation of resources.

3.

Model prescriptions are directly contradictory. The choice of one activity precludes,
in its pursuit, the ability to pursue other
remedies.
(pp. XI-5-6)

Brimm (1975) went on then to deal with practitioner
responses to those options, stating:

"A first response may

be the search for an integrative model . . . . In other cases
. • • a new model is proposed which endeavors to resolve the
apparent contradictions of conflicting models 11

(p. XI-6).

Finding, in our search, a lack of a sufficiently integrative
model, we have chosen the latter response in the present
case:

the proposal of a new model.

As stated in Chapter

III, this model can be characterized as graphic, twodimensional, nonrnathematical, dynamic, and analytic.

The

primary criteria used in developing it were its usefulness
and relative simplicity.

Both criteria impose constraints on

the number and complexity of the variables and their interaction that can be included; therefore, this model, too, must
of necessity remain an incomplete metaphor for reality.
Following presentation and explanation of the model,
implications for both practice and research will be discussed.
A Model
A concept of central importance that has developed
from testing the case against existing models has been the
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S-shaped curve derived from Rogers and Shoemaker's (1971)
research on diffusion.

As already pointed out, this was

found powerfully predictive of what happened at GMH, even

though the focus of this research tradition, in Sashkin's
(1974) terms, is on adoptive change models and therefore

does not sufficiently encompass the OD goal of increased
system adaptive capacity.

It appeared, however, that this

S-shaped curve could be integrated with Lewin's three phases
of change as viewed from the perspective of the client system.

This is shown in Figure 24.

As conceived here, what we have

Refreezing

Change
.,..'-...,

Rate

of

Unfreezing
Figure 24.

Change

S-Shaped Curve Integrated with Lewin's Three

Phases of Change.
called the "rate of change" curve rises very slowly during
the unfreezing stage of change, accelerates during the change
period, and plateaus somewhat as the system refreezes into
a new state.

Thus the variables of time (both in terms of

sequential phases and the rate of change}, the process of
change, and the client system have begun to be encompassed
in the model.
Missing from most models, as discussed in Chapter IX,
is a focus on change activity from the change agent's point
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of view--most models, in fact, describing change from the
system's point of view.

A new formulation of change agent

activity was thus developed that is believed to be more
descriptive of what the primary change agents actually did
in the case than either the OD models (Kolb et al., 1971;
Lippitt & Lippitt, 1977) or the adoption models (Havelock,
1971, 1971; Rogers, 1962; Rogers & Shoemaker, 1971), but
which indeed combined parts of both.

This formulation con-

sists of the identification of five major stages of change
agent activity:
Trials,

(1) Scouting,

(2) Entry,

(3) Conducting

(4) Managing Diffusion, and (5) Fostering Institu-

tionalization.

This, in fact, is what the change agent/con-

sultants in the case did and roughly in that sequence,
although there was clearly some overlap as, for example,
some fostering of institutionalization began during the
trial stage.

Perhaps, on the other hand, it might be more

accurate to say that trials were conducted with an eye toward
future stages such as managing diffusion and fostering institutionalization.

However, the primary focus of activity must

remain on the particular stage the change agent is in at a
given point in time.
These stages too, i t appears, can be matched up with
the S curve.

Scouting takes place at the earliest and lowest

level of the curve when, for all practical purposes, no
change at all has occurred.

The curve slowly rises at entry

and at the stage when the change agent is conducting trials.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

281

As it begins to rise more steeply, his major focal point
for activity becomes managing--including staffing and maintaining the integrity of ongoing efforts--the increasingly
rapid pace of diffusion.

As the diffusion level begins to

taper off, the change agent focus shifts again, this time
to the fostering of institutionalization.

The integration

of the variables discussed thus far--time, the client system,
the process of change, and the change agent--are shown in
Figure 25.

The lines between stages are dotted so as to

indicate the absence of rigidity in these boundaries,
reflecting that they primarily define focal points rather
than exclusive activity domains.
It was important, however, that the model reflect the
fact that the sort of change we have been describing in this
study is not mere adoption of innovation.

An example of

such change in the context of management development might
consist of an organization's adoption of Managerial Grid
seminars.

The model as thus far outlined might describe

the spread of the use of such seminars in an initial pilot
trial--after some selling--through to the participation of
all employees in such seminars.

While in OD we may want to

make use of Managerial Grid seminars, our purpose is not
simply to get everyone in a given system to attend.

Our

ultimate intent in terms of the state of the system is
improvement in the optimization of boundary permeability and
mutuality of relationships (Alderfer, 1976) or, more
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IV.
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Change
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Figure 25.

S-Shaped Curve Integrated with Five Major Stages of Change
Agent Activity.
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generally, the adaptability of the system (Sashkin, 1974).
Consequently, it was necessary to incorporate this intent
into the model while recognizing, nevertheless, that adoption
plays a part as well, particularly in early stages when it
is important to get a trial of the OD approach somewhere in
the system.

Thus, in Figure 26, the state of the system is

shown to be moving first toward a state wherein it is
increasingly adoptive in the sense that it takes on the
characteristics of systems that more readily adopt innova-

tions (Peets, 1970; Rothman, 1974).

This focus holds par-

ticularly through the stage of trial conducting.

The manag-

ing of diffusion stage represents a transition, as there is
still some focus on adoption, but as the OD process begins
to penetrate more deeply in some subsystems and as change is
becoming more a way of life for the whole system, the thrust
is in the direction of

11

producing 'changingness, • a general

state conducive to change 11 (Sashkin, 1974, p. 209).
the sort of system Sashkin labels

11

adaptive,

11

This is

a system state

that ought to be at a reasonable level of maturity at the
point when the change agent's activity focus is on fostering
institutionalization.
Further, the notion of an
appears incompatible.
phase of

11

11

adaptive 11 system

11

refreezing 11

Therefore, the label for the third

system change 11 has been revised to read "Continuous

Renewal," a conceptualization more in keeping with the thrust
of an OD approach.
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Thus far the model incorporates the client system
variable through both phases of change and, now, system
states.

The change agent variable is included through the

five major stages of change agent activity.

The time and

process variables are interwoven among all of the above
dimensions as well as the S curve representing the rate of
change.

At this point it is believed the model is already

useful in explaining the developments of the change effort
described in this study.

the nature of the change.

A missing variable, however, is

It also would be helpful to change

agents if some guidelines were provided for each stage of
their activity that, based on existing models and our analysis of the present case, would be predictive of success.
Since the stated intent of this study was to posit a model
for initiating change and, consequently, the detailed case
data derived from the "launch" period, such guidelines are
provided in the final model (shown in Figure 27) for the
launch period only, which encompasses (1) Scouting, (2)
Entry, and (3) Conducting Trials.

(As a result of this

emphasis on the launch period, the shape of the S curve
becomes somewhat distorted in the final model.)
The action guidelines in the model can be seen to
reflect previously cited models and related literature as
well as the case experience:
Stage

!=

Scouting.

Determining appropriate entry

points through scouting (Kolb et al., 1971) for readiness
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(Beckhard, 1969) would include use of Gleicher's formula,
C

=

(abd)

>

x (Beckhard, 1975, p. 45), as well as considera-

tion of felt needs (Beckhard, 1969; Harrison, 197la) and
antecedent conditions (Dalton, 1970; Greiner, 1967).

Estab-

lishing access to the whole system (Harrison, 197lb) was
reflected in the case in the description of the outcomes of
the first meeting between the Managing Director and the
change agent.

All of the guidelines in this stage contribute

to helping identify and clarify the need for change and to
exploring the potential for working together (Lippitt & Lippitt, 1977).

This last consideration includes determining

the degree of homophily with opinion leaders (Rogers & Shoemaker, 1971).
Stage!!:

Entry.

The use of multiple entry points is

advised by Harrison (197lb) and supported by the case.

Wher-

ever possible, this should be done through supportive (Harrison, 197la; Shepard, 1975) opinion leaders (Havelock, 1970,
1971; Rogers, 1962; Rogers & Shoemaker, 1971).

However,

because powerful gate-keepers (Rogers, 1962) almost always
exist at the top of the formal power structure, the top group
in hierarchical systems needs to be one of the key subsystems
(Beckhard, 1969) involved at least at minimum realistic
levels (Harrison, 197la; see also the present case, p. 145) .
Although contracting is a continuous process, it is most
critical to build a solid contractual base at the entry stage
(Ko1b et a1., 1971: Lippitt & Lippitt, 1977).
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Stage III:

Conducting Trials.

Each trial involves a

reiteration of the entire OD process (Kolb et al., 1971;
Lippitt & Lippitt, 1977).

This distinguishes the adoption

and diffusion of OD from the adoption and diffusion of other
types of innovations.

What is being adopted, in other words,

is a process, not a product, and an important intent of that
process is to cause the system to become more adaptive.

The

importance of this distinction must be stressed.
The variable of the nature of the change, although relevant at earlier stages, is focused on in this stage.

That

OD does not stack up well as an adoptable innovation according to research-based criteria {Rothman, 1974) has been discussed more than once in this study.

It would appear both

from a review of the literature and an examination of this
case that it is primarily through demonstration rather than
assertion that some relative advantage can be shown.

In this

regard it is important to measure the results of these initial trials (Beckhard, 1969; Greiner, 1967) and to encourage
the communication of both the process and the results to
other parts of the system.

In designing these initial inter-

ventions, it is also wise to look for opportunities in which
"the OD unit 1 s unique expertise shows to best advantage"
(Harrison, 197la, p. 2) and which can offer "the kind of new
experience which interests participants"
p. 23).

(Watson, 1969,

The entry interventions in the case support these

guidelines.
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The case further illustrates the value of building
links between early trials and meaningful networks among
early adopting opinion leaders.

In addition to the support

systems thus created for the continuing nurturing of the
initial trials, these networks can be a powerful force for
diffusion.
The implications of the S curve for staffing for diffusion are considerable.

Given that the change agent has

followed the guidelines to date, the model would predict that
a burgeoning of activity is likely to take place soon and
should be prepared for ahead of time.

Great demands may be

about to be placed on the OD unit and its resources stretched

thin.

It seems logical, then, to staff up for this eventu-

ality, and to do it before getting caught up in the accelerating rate of change.

In addition to the quantitative staff-

ing issue, of course, is the qualitative one.

In the case,

the addition of three internal people occurred during the
diffusion stage and training and development were attempted
in the midst of considerable frantic activity.

frustrating to all concerned.

This was

The management of diffusion

would have been eased considerably had these men been on
line and well trained before the steep rise in the curve.
Research also suggests that, especially in a large system,
the preparation for the diffusion stage must help the change
agents develop a broad and flexible role set and the skill
to select appropriate roles (Rothman, 1974).

Such
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preparatory staffing and training, prudent as they may be,

may also be difficult to accomplish in practice, however.
Gate-keepers may be most reluctant to allocate sufficient
financial resources for this undertaking while the process
is still in the unfreezing phase and the trial stage, before
clear relative advantage has been demonstrated and before

much diffusion has actually begun.
well as Rogers'

(1962, 1971)

Perhaps this model as

findings could help in the per-

suasion of such gate-keepers, although, again, demonstration

seems to have far greater efficacy than assertion, even
though that assertion may be backed up by data.

In any case

there is a dilemma here with which practitioners may have
to deal.
Also illustrated in the case is the advisability when
working in the trial stage of being alert for opportunities
to build into these early trials maintenance mechanisms or
instrumentalities (e.g., Executive Council, Executive Task
Force, Elizabeth Business Team, Elizabeth Steering Committee)
that will help with the fostering of institutionalization.
Additional guidelines can, of course, be gleaned from
the literature; however, the above represent those most
strongly supported in this study through both the review of
existing models and analysis of the case.
As a final note in positing this model, i t must be
pointed out again that all models must of necessity leave
some things out.

The most important matter left out of this
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model is the extremely dynamic nature of change.

While the

model can, in fact, legitimately wear the label "dynamic"
because it shows movement and the interaction of multiple
forces, the actual process is always more dynamic and less
neatly captured in two dimensions than this or any model
would suggest.

Even planned change is always messier than

shown, resulting in truncated S curves here, misshapen ones
there, and both fortuitous and unfortuitous events everywhere.

As a result of this messiness, i t is also, of course,

more exciting to be a part of than could be captured by any
model.

Implications for Practice
In Chapter III, it was stated that the intent of the
model was to be helpful to change agents and that a major
criterion used in developing the model was its usefulness.
It must be judged, then, in terms of its usefulness to change
agents, especially those attempting to initiate change in
large systems.

They may wear a variety of hats--e.g., con-

sultant, trainer, teacher, curriculum development specialist,
community school director, social worker.

(The emphasis, it

can be seen, is on roles without direct line or sanctioning
authority, although on the face of i t the model would seem
to possess considerable fit in the case, for example, of a
line manager who is attempting to bring about the sort of
change encompassed in this study.)

They may work in many
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different types of systems--e.g., plants, corporation staffs,

schools, governments, communities.

It is hoped that those

in any of these roles in any of these systems, if they are
functioning as change agents, have already found useful
implications for practice in the model and the analyses

leading to its development.

The action guidelines, for

example, should already have strongly suggested implications

for practice.
Two elements of the model are especially designed to
make it useful uniquely to change agents in large systems.
In the first instance there was the conscious attempt to
cast the five stages in terms that reflect the change agent's
point of view rather than the client system's and to include
the action guidelines.

In regard to large systems, there

is substantial emphasis on searching out and working with
key subsystems.

This is particularly evident in the identi-

fication of Stage III:
Managing Diffusion.

Conducting Trials; and Stage IV:

This may well not be an appropriate

approach in smaller social systems where, for example, a
more focused, homogeneous process may be more suitable.
These unique features limit the generalizability of the
model, of course, as do the limitations inherent in the
research procedure from which the model was derived (see
11

Scope and Limitations," Chapter I).

A strong caveat must

be observed by the practitioner regarding acceptance of the
validity of the single case metaphor for a larger reality,
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particularly considering the potential impact of participantobserver bias in perception and documentation of the case,
analysis of both the case and existing models, and the

development of the model itself.
Given these limitations and caveats, it is nevertheless
hoped that useful inferences may. well be drawn by other
change agents in other systems.

If the model is valid, cur-

riculum development specialists may well want to give careful
consideration to obtaining trials of curriculum innovations

by supportive opinion leaders.

Social workers may want to

give attention to how, where, and with whom to demonstrate
the relative advantage of good nutrition.

Regional centers

established to foster community education may want to examine
the feasibility of building networks of supportive opinion
leaders for trial and diffusion while planning ahead for the
staffing problems likely to occur when the diffusion rate
accelerates.

And all of the above must ask whether adoption

is all they seek or if they want to develop more adaptive
systems.

If the latter is the case, the model suggests that

a process such as the OD process must be used.
It is believed that the model meets the stated criteria
of accurately explaining observations of the system studied,
predicting reactions and outcomes in that case, and providing
insight and understanding of what happened in that case.

It

is further believed that it does so with relative simplicity
while at the same time integrating a number of important
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variables.

It is hoped and hypothesized that it fits other

situations as well.

That hypothesis, however, needs to be

tested by a variety of practitioners in a variety of settings.

It also requires further research.

Implications for Research
This study, as expected, raises some interesting possibilities for further research.
(1) Admittedly, the analytical net dragged through the

pond of the case was biased.

It could prove fruitful for

investigators to subject the same case to further analysis
using other existing models or to develop new models based
on differing perceptions of the case data.

It may well be

that other models may more accurately and clearly explain
and/or predict the developments described.

Brimm's (1975)

study represents an outstanding example of this approach.
(2) The model could be tested in other settings using
the case study approach by other participant-observers.
Especially helpful, however, might be cases in which the
model was followed, but which are documented and analyzed
by nonparticipant observers.

In any case, despite the

limitations of this sort of study, the value of accumulating
a rich store of clinical data should not be underestimated.
Sufficient single

~

studies can form a multiple

~·

(3) Certainly the model should be tested in other settings using more adequately controlled research designs of
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an experimental or quasi-experimental nature.

This may be

done with the model as a whole or with specific aspects of
the model.

An example of the latter would be to test the

hypothesis that the use of multiple entry points is more

efficacious than a single entry strategy or that linking of
opinion leaders into networks leads to greater diffusion

than not doing so.

Moreover, the present study and model

focus particularly on the first three major stages of change
agent activity--the launch period.

While the entire model

requires further testing, some focus on the latter two stages,

managing diffusion and fostering institutionalization, could
be especially fruitful.
(4) Especially striking was the lack of hard research
into change agentry.

Outside of the adoption/diffusion

research tradition, scarcely any was found, and Rothman's
(1974) exhaustive review turned up little even here.

On the

other hand, there is a plethora of advice to change agents
on how to behave and much time and money presently being
spent on training the growing brigade of internal consultants
(Lippitt & Lippitt, 1977) in how to follow it.

It would seem

worthwhile to conduct research on some of that advice.
In general, this study represents an attempt to contribute to some answers to Guest's (1962)
11

"simple question":

Who does what, when, where, how, with whom, and how often?"

However, i t can still be said, as Guest stated, that i t has
not been asked enough.
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